This is what emerges from two very recent general elections. On 28 September in Moldova, the pro-European ‘Action and Solidarity’ party (PAS) romped home with a shade over 50% of votes cast (see EUROPE B13719 A15). Six days later in the Czech Republic, the ‘Association of Dissatisfied Citizens’ (ANO) scored a comprehensive win over ‘Ensemble’, the movement led by the outgoing Prime Minister Petr Fiala: 34.5% compared to 23.4%. With 80 seats out of 200, ANO, led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, may be able to put together a majority with two far-right parties (see EUROPE B13724 A30.) If this comes to pass, the country will share some striking similarities with its neighbour, Slovakia.
The Republic of Moldova (three million inhabitants), which is neighbours with Ukraine and Romania and is already linked to the European Union by an association agreement (2016), obtained the status of accession candidate in June 2022. Negotiations opened in June 2024. The majority of the population is in favour of the EU, but in the constitutional referendum on the subject, which was held in October 2024, approval hung by a thread (0.7%). On 3 November of the same year, the President of the Republic, Maia Sandu, was re-elected in the second round of voting with 55.5%, after a period of considerable suspense. All these elections took place against the backdrop of a hybrid war waged by Russia, plus the fact that there is an entirely Russian-speaking parcel of the country, Transnistria (whose self-proclaimed independence goes unrecognised by the international community). On the other hand, the pro-European side can count on the votes of the diaspora.
The Moldovans have manifestly stood shoulder to shoulder with their Ukrainian neighbours since the outbreak of the war, taking in many refugees. In view of the extremely tense geopolitical situation, the European Union has been unstinting in its ought to Moldova. The country has become the second-largest beneficiary of the ‘European Peace Facility’, which aims to reinforce its military resources. Additionally, a ‘Reform and Growth Facility”, with an envelope of nearly 2 billion euros, was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in March of this year.
The frequent visits of European leaders to Chişinău and the fact that the European Parliament has recently opened an office in the capital have also helped to make the country’s European options more appealing. On the basis of the recent election results, the pro-Russian bloc now represents just a third of the electorate. To guarantee the democratic nature of the elections of 28 September, considerable mechanisms had to be set in place to block interference from Russia (vote-purchasing, intimidation, cyber-attacks, activation of social networks, etc.), which represented a considerable investment (see EUROPE B 13722 A3).
The situation in the Czech Republic (11 million inhabitants) could scarcely be more different. A member of NATO since 1999, it joined the European Union in 2004 after a highly favourable referendum: more than 77% voted ‘yes’. Its economic health is in far better shape than Moldova’s. The country’s enthusiasm for Europe started to wane in the middle of last decade, when individuals in high places opposed the adoption of the euro: President Zeman in 2015, then Prime Minister Babiš in 2017. Babiš, who is known as the ‘Czech Trump’, famously rejoices in a colossal personal fortune and is suspected of a range of irregular activities, even being named in the ‘Pandora Papers’. No friend to the European Green Deal or migration policy, he was nonetheless defeated in the general elections of 2021, then ran unsuccessfully for the Presidency of the Republic.
The ANO’s recent victory marks its triumphant comeback and the end of a centrist and pro-European coalition. Indeed, the ANO joined the notoriously far-right ‘Patriots for Europe’ group at the European Parliament, which was founded by Viktor Orbán and is chaired by Jordan Bardella. The new Czech coalition will be resistant to aid to Ukraine and its accession to the European Union. It cannot be ruled out that Russian interference via Tik Tok had an effect during the election campaign (see EUROPE B13723 A8). While it is understandable that the Czech citizens, who are living with very high levels of inflation, wanted to punish the outgoing government, it is somewhat surprising that a nation which suffered under the Soviet yoke has failed to see the dangers of a local weakening of the European Union to the benefit of nearby Russia. Has the collective memory already forgotten the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968?
Slovakia (5.4 million inhabitants), meanwhile, is governed by a far-right and openly pro-Russian coalition led by Robert Fico. The accession referendum resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of joining the EU (more than 92%). The euro was adopted in 2009. This widespread Europhilia is already a distant memory, although demonstrations against Fico and his government take place frequently in the country. In its 2024 report on the rule of law, the European Commission revealed regressions on the part of Hungary and Slovakia (see EUROPE B13460 A1). The countries stand together in their efforts to hinder the adoption packages of sanctions against Russia. The 2025 rule of law report highlights many areas in which Slovakia has failed to make progress, for instance the independence of the judiciary and the media and the physical protection of journalists. On 26 September of this year, moreover, the Slovakian Constitution was amended to challenge the privacy of Community law and prohibit surrogacy.
The matter of relations with Russia has an energy dimension in all three countries. Moldova has become unplugged from the Russian electricity network in favour of election to the European market via Romania. Earlier this year, the EU proposed 250 million euros to bolster this energy independence, not excluding Transnistria.
Additionally, the roadmap to banning all imports of Russian fuels (gas, oil and nuclear) by the end of 2027 is at standstill in Bratislava. Derogations are reported to have been obtained (see EUROPE B13674 A10), but Slovakia may undertake reprisals against Ukraine (through which Russian gas will no longer transit), for instance by cutting off its electricity supply. As for Russian petroleum, Hungary and Slovakia are united in their refusal to abandon this. As for the Czech Republic, it announced its decision to stop importing Russian gas in the spring of this year, but will the new government feel bound by this decision?
While Moldova is thoroughly and fundamentally playing the European card with the support of its people, even though it has no certainty that it will soon be joining the EU, central Europe, with its little countries led by little kinglets with short-term ideas, may become a hotbed of Euroscepticism, sovereignism and treachery on which Moscow can depend, despite the pressure brought to bear by Donald Trump, their erstwhile inspiration.
Renaud Denuit