The plans for a close union between France and Germany run one great risk (see this section yesterday). The authorities responsible picture the creation of joint bodies, governmental and parliamentary, on the basis of co-operation between States. At the same time, the other Member States are invited to join in with these initiatives. But what institutional mechanisms will oversee these new structures? With what democratic control? It is unthinkable that half a century of European construction could be lain aside and old recipes for co-operation between governments and national parliaments be sought (ignoring the shrewd intuition of Jean Monnet and his High Authority), just when the European Parliament is asserting itself as an fundamental element of European construction. How could Belgium get involved with this kind of initiative, or any other Member State which believe that the Community method is the only guarantee of not representing an insignificant quantity?
There are two possible scenarios. If the new forms of integration take place within the framework of the current EU, under the Constitution Treaty being drawn up, the difficulties will be about the operations of Community institutions. Will Ministers, Commissioners and MPs of Member States not taking part in the new structures attend their deliberations? The example of euro zone governance heralds future complications. But if these initiatives take place outside the EU, then the situation gets even more intricate, because everything's new. A small intergovernmental Europe would mean such a step back that we should start thinking about appropriate solutions now, because we've got to a point when ideas are coming into focus, and we mustn't take a wrong turn.
French élan... A quick overview of positions shows us where stakeholders are up to in their reflections. I summarised the plan favoured by the French Foreign Affairs Minister in this column on 13 November. Dominique de Villepin wrote that he envisages a common base including the internal market and its accompanying policies, which are also common (agriculture policy, regional policy, etc), and a vanguard "for the larger ambitions in research and high-technology, and of course, defence" For his part, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin declared: "if the Europe of 25 fails, what is left for France? The Franco-German rapprochement initiative". In the Assemblée Nationale, former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur called upon the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which he chairs, to undertake an "in-depth reflection on" "the creation and rules for the functioning of a vanguard bringing together the countries of the European Union which are members of the euro zone and the Schengen area, and which aspire to reinforced co-operation in all fields, especially defence, foreign affairs and security" (I stress that Great Britain is in either the euro zone nor the Schengen area). Minister for European Affairs Noëlle Lenoir shaded several interpretations, stating that the objective was not a "fusion between the two States", nor a board of directors in the EU, and least of all, an alternative to European integration.
…and German caution. The Germans stress the link between the new initiatives and European construction. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed the fact that the idea of a vanguard will only be embarked upon officially if the IGC fails to reach a satisfactory result (which basically means approval of the Giscard-d'Estaing draft). It will thus be considered only in case of a "blockage of Europe", because the Minister's best option is to proceed with 25.
The role played by strategy. All of this leads to a tactical aspect, the role of which is to put pressure on how the IGC unfolds: if it fails, France and Germany will take other initiatives. In the field of defence, it is understood that the most ambitious achievements will not be possible with 25, but formulae for an effective vanguard under the Union are still under discussion. In case of failure, the "ambitious ones" can make their own arrangements. Reflections, however, are going beyond defence. The presidents of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag, Matthias Wissmann, and of the Assemblée Nationale, Pierre Lequiller, have entered into talks on the forms of co-operation to be explored in general, and the active role played by Noëlle Lenoir and her German counterpart Hans Martin Bury is well known. Apart from the thoughts and initiatives of these two leading countries, we must also take account of the reactions and ambitions of other Member States, which have no intention of remaining outside any vanguard (primarily Belgium, and Great Britain, for some aspects), and the direct personal commitment of Commissioners Pascal Lamy and Günter Verheugen. That will be my subject for tomorrow. (F.R.)