The country has a coherent democratic political system. The President of the Republic is elected for a term of five years (renewable once consecutively) by the single-chamber Parliament, known as the Assembly of Albania, which has 140 members and serves for a term of four years. The president has certain designatory powers (including the Prime Minister), signs international agreements, sets election dates, etc. Since July 2022, the position has been held by Bajram Begaj, a medical doctor and former chief of staff of the Armed Forces.
Executive powers are held by the government. Its leader, Edi Rama, once lived in Paris, where he studied at Beaux-Arts. Upon his return to Albania in 1998, he became Minister for Culture, Youth and Sports for two years. Between 2000 and 2011, he served as mayor of Tirana and radically changed the colours of the city, which had up until then been dominated by the dull grey that so often accompanies communism. He became leader of the Socialist party in 2005. As the head of the ‘Alliance for a European Albania’, he won the general elections of 2013 to become Prime Minister, a post that he has held without interruption ever since. He was recently returned to this position once again after the general elections of 11 May.
This stability in executive office, in stark contrast with Montenegro, has allowed political continuity, a mix of socialist cronyism and neoliberalism at home, whilst further afield it has good relations with the United States, Turkey, Israel and, as you would expect, the countries of the EU, particularly Italy, its largest trade partner. It has also managed to stay out of the ongoing squabbles between the other Balkan states and remain impervious to Russian and Chinese influences.
Rama’s governance is described as authoritarian, chiefly by his rivals, the Democratic party (centre-right) and the Freedom party (pro-sovereignist left), both of which remain too weak to offer a viable alternative. This authoritarianism can be seen in a lack of dialogue with the parliamentary opposition and civil society. It has also found an outlet in open conflict with the former President of the Republic, Ilir Meta, who accused him of concentrating the powers of the judiciary, was removed from office, was then returned to position by the Constitutional Court (2022), but arrested in October 2024 on suspicion of money laundering. Another former president, Sali Berisha, has been under house arrest over corruption charges since the end of 2023. It all leaves a mark behind it, but Rama is not worried and retains an approval rating of more than 45%.
2019 saw the creation of the Special Structure against Organised Crime and Corruption, the SPAK, a greatly feared institution as the problem is more deeply rooted here than in any of the other Balkan states. Yet a law passed in 2024 awarded an amnesty to 40 people under investigation, much to the chagrin of the European Commission. Furthermore, a root-and-branch reform of the judicial system is underway. More than one in three Albanians believe that corruption is a major problem in the country and is not getting any better. Trust in the independence of the justice system and the political parties is low, which goes some way to explain the low turnout rate in the recent general elections (42% of all those eligible to vote). However, Transparency international finds that the index of perception of corruption has improved, bringing Albania into 80th place (from 101st in 2022) with a score of 42 points out of 100. On the downside, the freedom of the press and media seems to be in decline.
Going back to the recent general elections, the result is by no means in question (an extra four seats for Rama’s party), but the candidates did not benefit from equal conditions and pressure was brought to bear on voters, which the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, have spoken out against (see EUROPE 13639/29). For all these reasons, Albania is not yet a fully-functioning democracy.
Happily, the country is showing many positive economic indicators: a growth rate of 4%, unemployment of 8.8% and inflation at 2.5%; GDP fell by 3.5% during the pandemic, but grew by 8.5% in 2021, with increases of around 4% every year since then. It has considerable resources (minerals, steel, iron, oil, chrome). Agriculture still provides work for 43% of the active population. It remains a fundamentally agricultural country with little industry, with the exception of manufacturing, construction (driven by tourism) and energy equipment. Its main exports are textiles, shoes, fuel and electricity. It plans to develop solar energy. The road network could be better and the rail network needs starting again from scratch.
To kick-start tourism, a new international airport in Vlora, on the Adriatic, is soon to open its doors to passengers. Albania has remarkable natural heritage (flora, fauna, forests, rivers, lakes, mountains, beaches, etc), alongside a cultural heritage that dates back to antiquity and the mediaeval period. It has registered UNESCO heritage sites (Berat, Gjirokastër, Butrint), the Apollonia Archaeological Park, the castles of Rozafat and Lekuresi, etc. All the ingredients for intelligent and varied tourism.
Very soon after the end of the dictatorship, Albania turned towards Europe, for obvious economic reasons. In 1992, a trade cooperation agreement was signed with the EU. The country became a member of the Council of Europe in 1995. The EIB began to grant loans to the country. Then, in 2006, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed; it entered into force in 2009, the year in which the country submitted its official accession application. Visa liberalisation came into effect in 2010. In 2012, the Commission recommended accession subject to conditions. In 2019, the Western Balkans began to benefit from the Economic Resilience Initiative. To counter the effects of the pandemic and its economic and social impact, special assistance of more than three billion euros was granted to the region. Albania also received macro-financial assistance of 180 million. This was followed by the Global Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans (nine billion) with a view to the accession of these countries. Finally, in November 2023, the Commission launched the new Facility for the region’s growth plan (six billion euros in guaranteed loans and subsidies over the period 2024-2027); for Albania, furthermore, it completed its analysis of the country’s alignment upon EU policies.
On 15 October 2024, when the second accession conference was held, the first cluster of chapters was open for negotiations: the fundamentals of the EU, public procurement, statistics, the legal apparatus, fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security and financial controls (see EUROPE 13504/1). At the third conference, which was held on 17 December the same year, the second cluster went under the microscope: external relations, foreign, security and defence policy. This went without a hitch (see EUROPE 13547/2). Fast forward to 20 April 2025: the cluster concerning all aspects of the single market was opened, with a total of nine chapters to negotiate (see EUROPE 13621/4). A little over a month later, on 22 May of this year, the fifth conference was held. This time, it tackled the cluster of chapters concerning competitiveness and inclusive growth, namely: the digital transformation media, taxation, economic and monetary policy, social policy and employment, enterprise policy and industrial policy, science and research, education and culture, customs union (see EUROPE 13644/29).
All these discussions resulted in summary conclusions, with indications regarding the additional information to be submitted, necessary progress, provisional derogations, chapter by chapter. In any event, a considerable amount of work has already been completed, as 24 out of 35 chapters are already open. The Polish Presidency of the Council has had no small part to play in this. But what is particularly striking is the pace of the negotiations in less than a year, and the prospects that are opening up (see EUROPE 13647/13).
Obviously, the process is reversible and until there is agreement on everything, there is no agreement on anything. But while it is a very positive thing that the negotiations of the Balkan countries are deserving of daily monitoring by the member states of the EU and their governments, it would be even better if the citizens themselves felt properly informed of what was going on, with as much information as possible and, above all, a ‘red thread’ running through the proceedings, to make them easier to understand. I hope that these lines will make their own small contribution.
Renaud Denuit