On 3 March, the Moldovan authorities announced the country’s application to join the European Union (see EUROPE 12903/11), following hot on the heels of similar announcements from Ukraine and Georgia. The Republic of Moldova is probably the least well-known of these three states: this alone makes it well worth taking a closer look, but its geographical position and political situation on the doorstep of a Ukraine at war gives us an additional reason.
Since the Russian attack, nearly 400,000 Ukrainians have fled to Moldova; most of them have moved on elsewhere, but 100,000 are still in the country, a figure that equates to 4% of the Moldovan population. The country could not cope with them alone. In late February, EU emergency humanitarian aid of 5 million euros was sent to Moldova (see EUROPE 12900/6), followed by a further 3 million on 11 March (see EUROPE 12909/3). Furthermore, an agreement was signed between the Republic of Moldova and the EU on 17 March to allow the European Border and Coastguard Agency (Frontex) to assist the Moldovan border guards, who have been swamped by the influx of refugees (see EUROPE 12914/25).
On the 21st of the same month, the Council of the EU approved a total amount of 500 million euros – as previously announced by the Commission (see EUROPE 12902/5) – to all countries affected by the arrival of Ukrainians in need of aid, further to discussions with the Moldavian Deputy Prime Minister (see EUROPE 12915/2). On 4 April, the Council decided to provide Moldova with further macro-financial assistance (loans and grants) of 150 million euros over the period 2022-2024 (see EUROPE 12925/23). Again concerning aid to refugees, the Commission announced on 12 April that it had set up a warehouse in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, to store 1200 tents and 4000 blankets, delivered by the three flights of a humanitarian air bridge (see EUROPE 12931/6). Finally, thanks to the success of the ‘Stand up for Ukraine’ fundraising campaign, the Commission was able, on 19 April, to make a further 5 million euros available to Moldova (see EUROPE 12934/5). On top of all this come acts of bilateral solidarity. These recent decisions are worthy of a re-cap as they express the EU’s positive reactivity to the populations in question, but also its grave concerns about the case of Moldova.
Although huge publicity surrounded Ukraine’s accession application, Moldova’s is no less important. On 6 April, the EU/Moldova parliamentary association committee called for the country to be granted candidate status and for its economy to be increasingly integrated into the European market (see EUROPE 12928/32). As it happens, an association agreement signed in 2014 in the framework of the Eastern Partnership entered into force in 2016; the EU is Moldova’s principal trade partner. On 11 April, Moldova and Georgia both received a questionnaire from the Commission to be filled in as part of the first stage towards a potential accession (see EUROPE 12930/6); Ukraine’s had arrived just three days earlier.
Moldova is considered one of the poorest countries in Europe; it is very small (around 34,000 km²) and has a population below three million. Its economy is still based largely on agriculture. Landlocked between two large countries, Romania and Ukraine, it has no Black Sea port. In common with many countries of the region, it has a complicated history, made up of wars, divisions and deportations. The Treaty of Bucharest (1812) cut the Principality of Moldova in half. The eastern half became Romanian, the rest a province of the Russian Empire. The latter acquired independence in 1917 as the Democratic Republic of Moldova and then, out of fears of the Bolsheviks, united with Romania. It became part of the USSR in 1944. This was the expression of a victory over the Nazis, as the Romanian leader had taken sides with them in 1940.
In 1991, the Republic of Moldova declared independence, which was immediately recognised by Romania, but a civil war broke out: two pro-Russian regions, Gagauzia and Transnistria, located in the south and east of the country respectively, broke away. The former gained autonomous status within Moldova in 1994. The latter declared its independence, but international recognition was not forthcoming. Under an agreement signed in Moscow in 1992, it is only if Moldova should reunite with Romania that Transnistria – or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) – would have the right to self-determination.
The territory of the PMR (around 4000 km²) is shaped like a long strip adjacent to most of the border with Ukraine. It is more industrialised than Moldova itself. The PMR has its own national anthem, flag, army, capital city, Parliament, President, currency and stamps. It has a single-party regime and retains certain Soviet symbols. Units of the Russian army (at least 1500 troops) have remained there since the dissolution of the USSR. This area is, moreover, the only part of Moldova conquered by the Bolsheviks in earlier times.
According to organisations such as Amnesty International, the fundamental freedoms of the PMR are not effective. Of its population of 500,000, the main ethnic groups are, in decreasing order, Russians, Moldovans and Ukrainians. In 2006, the regime held a referendum in which just two options were proposed: independence or being annexed to Russia; the latter option won more than 97% of votes cast. The result was recognised by neither the OSCE nor the EU, on the grounds of irregularities, lack of independence of the media and the fact that there was no Moldovan option on offer.
In the wake of the annexation of Crimea, the government declared that it wished to join the Russian Federation. Following the Russian attack on Ukraine, however, the PMR asserted that it was not a party to the conflict. Incidentally, it possesses the largest depot of weapons in Europe and enjoys a flourishing arms trade. Addressing the ‘foreign affairs’ committee of the European Parliament on 22 March, the head of Moldovan diplomacy, Nicu Popescu, said that the situation had become calmer in Transnistria, but added that it could “change very quickly. The combat zone is moving closer to our border” (see EUROPE 12916/12).
Indeed, on 22 April, Russian General Rustam Minnekayev, acting commander of the central military district of Russia, said that Russia hoped to take total control of Donbass and southern Ukraine, the latter being a ‘corridor to Transnistria, where cases of oppression of the Russian-speaking population have also been observed’. Moldova, naturally, protested, that summoning the Russian ambassador, expressing its profound concerns and reiterating the neutrality of the country. It comes as no surprise that further shots were fired on Odessa over the weekend.
Moldova is a modern democratic republic, but its political life is no long and tranquil river. It is polarised between mostly pro-Russian communists and socialists on the one hand and pro-Europeans, who have long brought several political groups together, on the other. The idea of uniting with Romania, which is considered ‘fascist’ by the pro-Russians, was definitively rejected in the referendum of 1994. The association agreement with the EU certainly created tensions, but good sense prevailed. Since the constitutional reform of 2016, the President of the Republic is elected not by Parliament, but by direct universal suffrage. Neither of the two sides is naturally dominant, but at the moment, the President elected in November 2020, Maria Sandu, and the Prime Minister, Natalia Gavrilita, in office since August 2021, are both members of the Action and Solidarity Party (which has links to the EPP). This party won an absolute majority in the last elections and its success reflects stronger popular support than ever for the European option. Internally, therefore, the planets were aligned in favour of EU accession, but externally, to say that this development is not greatly to the Kremlin’s liking is something of an understatement.
If Russia manages to fully annex all the parts of Ukraine it has its eye on, it is unlikely to stop there. Tiny Moldova would be a mere mouthful for Russia; at the very least, it would not struggle to reach Transnistria, as it is already publicly threatened, in which case the Moldovan authorities would not be able to sit back and do nothing. Russia’s conquest would then take the form of an arc stretching from Donbass and the north of the Moldovan breakaway state, opening up exciting geostrategic and economic possibilities to Vladimir Putin. In 2020, President Sandu called in vain for Russian forces to leave the PMR. Financial support from the EU of 7 million euros was agreed in December of last year to reinforce Moldovan defence, without making provision for the supply of lethal weapons.
But will that be enough? It remains vital to assess Moldova’s overall capacities in the event of a Russian attack and to establish a specific strategy, if the West does not want to be caught on the back foot and forced into an emergency reaction once more.
Renaud Denuit