I possibly exaggerated last week by dwelling on the details of the Union's future institutional structure, neglecting the golden rule dear to Convention President Giscard d'Estaing by which Europeans must first agree on what they want to do together, and then define the workings of the institutions in the light of what they will have decided as to substance. My justification is that the institutional debate is nevertheless there: most papers submitted to the members of the Convention, as well as a large part of their work (see, for example, the conclusions of the "subsidiarity" group in our bulletin of 21 September, p.3) is devoted to it. I am nevertheless pleased that two major events lead me today to stray from the institutional debate itself: the first is the intervention by Commissioner Pedro Solbes over EMU, the second is the beginning of work of the "defence" working group.
In favour of four Treaty reviews. The European Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs fully confirmed the Commission's ambitions, before the "Convention's "economic policies co-ordination" working group. The Commission considers that the "Economic and Monetary Union" (EMU) chapters of the Treaty need seriously reviewing, along the lines of the creation of a European economic authority as strong as the monetary authority, by, notably, enhancing the powers of the Commission itself. Pedro Solbes confirmed, with a few additional details, the guidelines that were set out in this section of 12 September (see the summary of Mr. Solbes' statement in our bulletin of 17 September, page 13). Thus: a) alongside the general EcoFin Council, a specific EcoFin Council will have to be created for the euro zone, functioning according to the Community method; b) the Commission's "recommendations" to the Council on economic policy should become formal "proposals", which the Council could only reject through unanimity; c) the Commission should have the ability to address economic policy recommendations directly to each Member State, without passing by the Council; d) the Commission should gradually represent the euro in international bodies.
The intergovernmental method would be ineffective. Pedro Solbes accompanied his four proposals (which do not cover the measures the Commission considers appropriate to improve the working of EMU as from now, that do not concern the Convention as they may be taken on the basis of the Treaty as it now exists: see the aforementioned section of 12 September, point A) with a few remarks. He, in particular, confirmed one of the reasons for which a purely intergovernmental management of economic co-ordination would not be effective. I already expressed myself on this point by writing: "ministers will always tend not to harm each other reciprocally, and therefore exchange concessions (everyone should be able to benefit from the "understanding" of the others), with the risk of replacing rigour with watered-down compromises". With greater elegance and tact, Mr. Solbes said: "acquired experience at the beginning of the year demonstrates that it is very difficult for a minister to warn his neighbour at the Council table. The Commission has by nature greater freedom of tone. That allows for painful bargaining to be avoided that affect the credibility of the economic policy co-ordination mechanisms".
Pedro Solbes' proposals would stand no chance of being accepted by finance ministers if the decision was theirs. But it is the Convention that is preparing the future treaty, and it will be an IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) that will then take the decisions. Yet, there are reasons for considering that the attitude of heads of government could be more Community-based than those of finance ministers (see this section of 20 September). To begin with, Mr. Solbes' text is there, very solid and very ambitious, and what's more very well drawn up: concise but extremely clear, one of the best contributions to the Convention so far. We shall see what the Convention will do with the issue, on which so far Convention President Giscard d'Estaing has remained silent (or almost).
Responsibility of the "defence" group. The second development to be stressed in the work of the Convention concerns the beginning of the work of the "defence" working group, chaired by Michel Barnier. The importance of this group does not only stem from the significance of the field covered itself, but also from the fact that it will be unable to avoid a delicate and essential aspect of the future treaty: the provisions to make should a Member state intend not to participate in a fundamental chapter of the Union. Valery Giscard d'Estaing has so far left this aspect in the shadows, but the "defence" group will not be able to avoid it.
(F.R.)