I recently expressed the fear that the Convention may find itself left behind in relation to governments on one aspect of the future constitutional treaty: the strengthening of the economic chapter of EMU. That was only one example. The multiplication of initiatives and projects on fundamental aspects of the reform of the EU is taking such a breathtaking and diversified turn that the Convention risks observing at a given time that the struggle over ideas is taking place with it on the margin, by anticipating its debates and possibly part of its conclusions. This danger seems obvious to me in four areas: the EU's institutional architecture; the development of CFSP and ESDP; the possibility of "differentiation" (I opt for the word used by Jacques Delors) between Member states.
The review of the rules governing EMU is unavoidable. Recent developments confirm to what extent a review of the rules that currently govern Economic and Monetary Union is essential. The large debate - announced by a document (unjustly ignored, or almost) from the Commission to the Convention, by stances taken by some European Commissioners and more recently by President Prodi who voluntarily broke the rules of diplomatic language - has begun within the European Parliament. This section had to a certain extent anticipated it by revealing the deadlock within Convention's relevant working group (16 October) and then analysing the situation (18 and 19 October). Romano Prodi explained himself before the EP. While exposing in part differing views, MEPs welcomed the fact that this debate was now under way. Nothing will be able to stop it now, and that's a good thing. The Convention must find its rightful place, showing imagination and initiative instead of simply aligning itself on the position of finance ministers.
Heads of government leading. The possibility that heads of government should go beyond the stance of these ministers is not theoretical; on the contrary, different developments confirm this. Let's cite: a) the choice of Chancellor Schroeder of appointing Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (whose institutional ideas are well-known) as his representative in the Convention; b) the explicit statements by Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker to an Austrian newspaper in favour of the economic chapter of EMU; c) the stance of Pierre Moscovici, Chirac's representative, and Raffarin in the Convention; d) plus, generally-speaking, the firm stances of the heads of government members of the EPP in favour of the Commission's central role and autonomy.
Mr. Moscovici declared that, among the Convention's working groups "the one on economic governance reached disappointing conclusions. We cannot stop there". This confirms Chirac's being in favour of a specific role for the Commission in this field (see this section of 25 October). For my part, I don't think I have done the Convention a disservice in denouncing the deadlock in its work on the Union's economic governance.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing cannot delay the institutional debate too long. In his address in Brugge, the Convention president said that institutional issues would be "dealt with in the final stage of the Convention's work". And he explained the reasons most convincingly. I was unable to quote all these passages in my commentary (one cannot quote everything), but our readers have the full text of the address (No. 2283 of our EUROPE/Documents series, annexed to the bulletin dated 9 October) and I urge them to refer to it. But, even though the remarks of the president are well-founded, logical and clearly set out, I consider that the Convention should not remain totally outside the debate, which has taken on too vast a proportion, which has become too urgent to be ignored for long in the Convention's debates. Especially as several draft constitutions being discussed are the work of members of the Convention or are explicitly addressed to the Convention, and that heads of government are getting involved directly. For its part, the Commission will present its institutional documents next month.
I understand Valery Giscard d'Estaing's logic when he says: "it is our answers to fundamental questions on the Union's powers and modes of action that will determine the formulae will shall finally recommend for the institutions." But it is possible, while avoiding quarrelling over words, now to define a few criteria and a few principles, enabling the enlarged EU to avoid being reduced to a weak entity without personality.
Deepening the foreign policy and defence policy is an acquired fact. It's no longer a hypothesis; it's a certainty. For most politicians, up to the highest levels, CFSP (foreign policy) and ESDP (security and defence policy) will necessarily represent two pillars of the future EU. The modalities remain to be defined, the principle is there.
It would be pointless to list and publish a list of concurring quotations. I shall simply limit myself to that of Romano Prodi, which sets the tone. In his interview published on 18 October, the Commission president declared: "The EU without a common foreign policy would serve no purpose. I have often spoken very diplomatically. Today, let's speak the truth, loud and clear. We are entering a time when national states are too small to have separate voices. Europe must speak as one, or disappear from the world's geopolitical map." That's also the opinion of a large group of heads of government, notably those of most (or all?) of the large countries. But it is not the opinion of other Member states, and possibly some candidate countries. Valery Giscard d'Estaing has so far been cautious on the subject. In his address in Brugge, he was simply descriptive: "the European Union has begun to organise itself to act is domains that exceed the initial ambition and powers of the Treaty of Rome: external policy, defence policy and justice and home affairs policy (…) These new policies deal with the very essence of our concept of the State".
The Convention may postpone the definition of the institutional functioning of CFSP and ESDP to the last stage of its work, but the very strategy of its president (define the contents before the mechanisms) means that it decides without waiting on the principles of these two fundamental policies of the future EU. Those fearing confrontation will say: there is no agreement! That's no reason to procrastinate. On the contrary, three reasons demand that the situation be clarified immediately: a) it is both urgent and important to know which Member states and which candidate countries are not in favour of a Community presence in these two domains; b) prevarication and attempts to conceal differences serve no purpose as (I' already written this) States deciding to move forward will not give up on their plans; quite simply, they will do it among themselves, on the fringe of the EU and its procedures, as purely intergovernmental achievement with all that implies (in particular, small countries would practically be ruled out of the enterprise or only play walk-on parts); c) we must now begin to consider the regime to provide for for countries wanting to stay outside this enterprise: which brings us to the fourth and last point of this analysis.
"Differentiation" between Member states must already be admitted. The Convention already has the political and moral duty to affirm two essential principles: 1) no country of the Union may be obliged to participate in projects it does not choose to, but at the same time no country may prevent another from moving ahead; 2) the constitutional treaty will not need the ratification of all Member states to take effect between countries having approved it, as long as the latter represent a very high percentage (yet to be defined) of the total. It is indeed unthinkable that future Europe's essential project, and two years of negotiations, can end up in "the dustbin of history" because at the last hour the Parliament of a small country changes its mind, or because the Labour Party returns to power in Malta and pulls the rug under the request for membership (as it regularly does).
The number of self-exclusions must be reduced as much as possible, offering alternative solutions to countries with reservations only over a few aspects. Appropriate institutional provisions must offer a Member state the possibility of deciding not to participate in this or that element of the treaty, while remaining full-fledged members of the Union and participating in all other aspects. It is not necessary to invent anything radically new: the EU already has the single currency with three countries not taking part, and other exemptions in the field of defence, justice and domestic security. In no way would it be a question of "exclusion", but always and only a free choice for the country concerned; it's they, their people, who decide. This is why terminology is important. Jacques Delors speaks of voluntary "differentiation" between Member states, inevitable, he says, as it is unthinkable that 25 countries (and more later) should have identical ambitions. This would be the way to resolve differences over CFSP and ESDP without bringing down the European project to the level of the least ambitious. Valery Giscard d'Estaing has already said (in his interview with Der Spiegel, see our bulletin of 24 October, p.7) that his thoughts are going along these lines. In his statement, what is important is not an "exit clause" (which, as far as I'm concerned, is totally normal: one does not oblige a State to remain in the EU if it does not choose to) but the affirmation by which a State not ratifying the constitutional treaty "would not take part in the future system" (and he has already provided for the case of those not agreeing to "certain points": on this, see the considerations developed in this section of 8 October).
Some member of the Convention will be surprised at noting that the president should announce his intentions more in speeches and interviews than in the framework of the Convention itself. What is important, is that the ideas are there. The Convention must seize and discuss them. (F.R.)