Hunting down misunderstandings. France has fleshed-out and clarified its plans for Europe, and has done so through the most qualified voice in the matter, that of its Minister for European Affairs. Given his role, Pierre Moscovici did so - with his own words and in accordance with his convictions - on behalf of the government as a whole. I consequently believe that what I read in Le Figaro of 26 June is in fact the French position.
Of course, the recent speech by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin is in no way contradicted, but, it seems, that speech led to certain misunderstandings, notably from an institutional orthodoxy point of view. The new texts dissipates these, stating unambiguously France's commitment to the "Community method", the role of the Commission, generalized majority voting, and especially a model of Europe going beyond an economic whole, tending towards a whole comprising: a European economic government, a social Europe better to protect workers' rights, an industrial policy, a cultural policy, a common foreign and security policy. All this is down in black and white. I imagine that in the social and cultural fields, the word "policies" is to be taken with a pinch of salt, without any vague desire for unification. Social policy depends on the free electoral choice of each people, Europe limiting itself to the framework and general rules, and in the field of culture, the goal can neither be to unify nor align, as the cultural identities of each country, national traditions, languages, etc. must be safeguarded and it is not up to Community institutions to decide. This being clear, Mr. Moscovic stipulates: "our partners in Europe do not necessarily agree on everything, but they know that these French ideas will have to be taken into account, if we, all together, wish to provide Europe with a future". The goal of the federation of Nation-States (a confirmed Delors' formula) means for France a union of countries "that choose to provide themselves with a federal organization to manage together large parts of shared sovereignty".
Launch of the renovated Council. The institutions are drawn out unequivocally: a) at the top of the edifice, the European Council, made up of democratically elected Heads of State or Government; b) a Parliament with growing powers of co-legislator and able to be sent back before the electorate to "acquire greater responsibility, in the British sense of accountability"; c) the Commission, incarnating the European general interest. Its authority and democratic legitimacy would be enhanced by providing for its President stemming from the political force (party or coalition) to have arrived at the top of the elections to the European Parliament. Thus, Moscovici explains, citizens "would know that in voting in these elections, they are backing such or such a declared candidate to the presidency of the Commission: they would know that their ballot paper will have an influence on the appointment of the European personality who will lead the institution responsible, in the Union, for proposing and executing decisions that affect them"; d) a Council with a "clearer and more permanent structure". Mr. Moscovici reaffirms here France's support for the formula of a Council made up of Deputy Prime Ministers (of ministers with sole responsibility of coordinating European issues within their own national governments) often meeting in Brussels to coordinate the work of the specialized Councils. The Council could thus better assume the role of co-legislator (with Parliament) and, in its legislative role, it would systematically deliberate through a qualified majority. This institutional plan of things is, as we see it, faithful to the "Community method" and takes on board the results of many previous ideas.
The last ambiguity? The final part of the text concerns the priority and irreversible nature of the Union's enlargement, which is "the backdrop, the sense and the very purpose" for the reforms being envisaged. Miscovici sets out the idea by which a Europe enlarged to 27 members (and more later) would be divided into two parts: a "simple free-trade area, without politics or projects, with weak institutions" for the whole, and a "vanguard closed-in on itself and with its own federal bodies". France, "rejects the prospect of a two-speed Europe, where the new Member States - and some current ones - would be forcibly and durably relegated to a second division". Obviously, this description does not refer to the formula we have often referred to in this section, setting out, notably, from the thoughts of Jacques Delors, as it would only be a caricature. This formula is not based on any kind of exclusion but aims to tackle cases of self-exclusion on the part of countries not wanting the more ambitious project. It is possibly the last ambiguity that needs clarifying. The following "short account" will try to do so.
(F.R.)