This Wednesday 30 October, the European Commission is to adopt ‘enlargement package 2024’, a regular document providing a highly detailed update on the progress made by each of the candidate countries for accession to the European Union. Without giving too much away about the content of the strategic document, might be a useful exercise to take a closer look at the context.
The hottest topic the moment is Georgia, a country that secured candidate status at the European Council of 14 December 2023, in full awareness that in-depth reforms would be necessary. The adoption of legislation that runs counter to the values of the EU had already attracted warnings from the Twenty-Seven: careful, you’re moving away from the European perspective. While the President of the Republic of Georgia, Salomé Zourabichvili, who was elected by universal suffrage, is openly pro-European, the government and Parliament have been dominated by the increasingly pro-Russian ‘Georgian Dream’ party since 2012. This party officially won the general elections of 26 October by a comfortable majority. Although it is estimated that 80% of the population is in favour of the EU, and exit polls suggested victory for the opposition, this result is worrying and has been challenged right up to the highest level, with the President herself calling for protests on Monday (see EUROPE 13513/1).
A few days earlier, bad news was in from Moldova, where the first round of the presidential elections had coincided with a referendum on the inclusion of the ambition to join the European Union in the national constitution. After a considerable period of suspense, the ayes had it on Monday 28 October, by 50.46%, with the Moldovan diaspora vote very clearly tipping the balance in favour. Moreover, the pro-European serving president, Maia Sandu, romped home with more than 42% of the votes (see EUROPE 13508/1). The second round of the elections, to be held on 3 November, could also have some surprises in store. The European Council had already given Moldova candidate country status in June 2022, followed two years later by the green light to open accession negotiations. Yet on its home turf, Moldovan society seems greatly divided.
In both Moldova and Georgia, it is believed that Russia’s role in these electoral outcomes was by no means a neutral one. Observers have spoken of mass vote-buying, ballot box stuffing, misinformation campaigns, intimidation. This interference was made easier by the fact that two areas of Georgia have been under Russian control since 2008 and that in Moldova, Transnistria is notoriously pro-Russian. It seems clear that the Kremlin, having failed in its ‘special operation’ for the rapid absorption of Ukraine, is trying other means of intervention to prevent the other two countries to leave its orbit. Despite the aid already paid out to the Moldovans and the Georgians, the European Union will have its work cut out to win hearts and minds on the ground, particularly as the head of the Hungarian government and de facto saboteur of its plans, Viktor Orbán, is jamming the official political messages from the inside (see EUROPE 13513/1).
Matters seem more straightforward when it comes to the Western Balkans. Firstly, a positive signal was sent out on 15 October with Albania’s official launch of the first ‘cluster’ of European Union acquis (see EUROPE 13504/1). This event could have taken place even earlier if EU officials had not tied Albania’s fate to that of North Macedonia, which is currently being held up over its dispute with Bulgaria. The uncoupling of the two, for which we argued in this column in June 2022 (see EUROPE 12972/1), eventually came about, putting fresh wind into Albania’s sails, but not North Macedonia’s. At the time of writing, Tirana describes the objective of accession in 2030 as achievable (see EUROPE 13513/2).
Additionally, the re-elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, made a tour of the Western Balkans last week, taking her to Tirana, Skopje, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Pristina and Podgorica. She met senior government figures to renew links, in the run-up to the forthcoming Western Balkans Summit to be held on 5 December.
The results of these visits will no doubt feed into the meeting of the College of Commissioners when it debates the ‘enlargement package’. It is worth noting that in Serbia, the President had a satisfactory meeting with the President of the Republic, Aleksandar Vučić, but refused to meet the Prime Minister, Miloš Vučević, who had just held talks with a Russian minister also visiting Belgrade. Serbia’s links with Russia remain close and constitute a major outstanding problem. As for Bosnia & Herzegovina, it is the only country of the region still to have its reform agenda rubber-stamped by the Commission (see EUROPE 13512/2).
The Commission has set out growth plans for each of these countries and is calling for a ‘single market’ to be set in place between them. As for the Eastern European candidate countries, the support of civil society will be a decisive factor in every case. To win over the populations of both the member states and the countries knocking on the door, it may be helpful if the European Commission and Council the EU recruited specialist communication advisors, or organised credible communication campaigns in a timely fashion.
It appears clear that there will not be a wave of simultaneous enlargement to several countries at the same time by setting an arbitrary date (for example 2030) and it is the ‘regatta’ method, as it is described (most accurately), that will prevail. Montenegro, which has been in talks since 2012, currently looks like being the closest to accession, which is hoping for in 2028 (see EUROPE 13511/8). Despite the remarkable progress made by Ukraine, it is unlikely that the Twenty-Seven will sign off its membership while it is still in a state of war. Moldova remains in the race, but it now appears likely that Georgia will have to be crossed off the list. Kosovo has not yet acquired candidate status.
In the meantime, no further surprises can be ruled out. Future enlargements are elements of an historic adventure of which senior EU officials do not control every parameter, whatever they may believe to the contrary.
Renaud Denuit