The Italian Presidency's compromise on the draft Constitution for Europe is summarised on the following pages of this bulletin. I shan't attempt a detailed commentary, which would take some careful reading, and will instead keep it to a few observations on points which are unlikely to be resolved by the Foreign Ministers in Naples later this week, and which will have to be taken up by the December session of the IGC at Heads of Government level. If the Naples conclave is a success, there will basically be four of these points "in suspense":
- majority voting procedure in Council;
- composition and functioning of the European Commission;
- revision procedure for common policies in the Constitution;
- common defence policy (though several major elements have already been agreed).
Some governments want to add to these a reference to the Christian (or Judeo-Christian) roots of European civilisation. I do not feel that this issue should be an item for political plea-bargaining, but should be resolved in an open, balanced text, referring to the whole of Europe's cultural heritage, from a historical point of view.
Spain in bad posture, Poland more so. On majority voting in Council, we already know that Spain and Poland have rejected the Convention's formula of double majority, which was retained by the Presidency (whereby a decision needs to be approved by the majority of States representing at least three-fifths of the population of the Union), and are calling for the Treaty of Nice to be kept, under which a pre-established number of votes is allocated to each Member State. Spain, and therefore Poland, would have 27 votes each, and the four most populated countries 29 each, out of a total of 321. This "quasi-equality" would be broken if population were to be brought into the equation; Madrid and Warsaw are fighting for their weight in the Council. But Spain has got its escape route, by stressing that the Nice Treaty has entered into force and if anybody wants to change it, they can make a proposal and the Spanish government will look at it. Poland, which is less accustomed to the language of European negotiation, has rejected outright any idea of compromise: either the Nice formula is kept, or the Polish parliament will reject the Constitution. The Polish government may, at a pinch, agree for the voting method to be modified at a later date, in the light of experience (and therefore with Poland's say-so). In an open letter to "a Polish friend" (published in a Belgian newspaper and a Polish one), Belgium's former representative Philippe de Schoutheete proved that the Convention's formula increased Poland's relative weight in the Council, bringing its total to 8%, as against 7.82% in the Nice formula. But while this calculation is accurate, it failed to change Warsaw's mind. That's the story, and it's stalemate, because most Member States, plus the institutions (European Parliament, Commission) won't give up "double majority". The larger countries have always had the same weight in Council, since its inception; but they are prepared to relinquish equality with Germany. Spain and Poland are being asked to make a similar effort, for the sake of a fairer and simpler system. It was very probably this dossier Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had in mind when he called upon the Member States which favour the Convention's formula formally to declare their agreement, to let the "reluctant ones think" (see this section yesterday).
No decent compromise in sight for the Commission. I do not believe that the IGC is ready to define a formula that will be satisfactory to the European Commission. On first sight, the Italian compromise is no better than the others. But is there really any need to include details of the composition and functioning of the Commission in the Constitution? The next Commission will be appointed under the rules of the Treaty of Nice, because it will take up office next autumn, before the Constitution enters into force. Each country, therefore, will have a Commissioner, and we will have five years to agree on the definitive formula, with the benefit of experience. The Constitution could just confirm the principles: the Commission's autonomy, its role and responsibilities. The Heads of Government should abandon the idea of setting complex and inefficient rules in stone, which would harm the "Community method" by eating into the institutional balance which it is based on!
Revision and defence: agreements possible? The revision procedure for the Constitution should be flexible enough to allow its technical elements to be improved in the future; the Italian compromise seems to go boldly towards this As for the Europe of Defence, this will happen anyway; all the IGC can do is to see if this can be done inside the EU, or outside it. (F.R.)