After the long silence and almost total lack of projects, should we now fear an over-abundance of projects, plans, designs and other outlines of how the future of Europe should be? During several years, pragmatism was all the rage: Europe exists and is moving forward, no need to know where it is going. Several key isolated voices preached in the desert to invite Europeans to define their aims, to try to have a clear vision of their future. They were regarded as lagging behind and as not knowing how to keep up with European modernity. But in just a few months the wind has changed. Today, everyone is going ahead with projects and the number of Constitutions is abounding. For politicians, the future of Europe is again on the recipe.
And so much the better. There has been so much talk of debate that we are not going to complain about its profusion (even though some initiatives seem to spring more from opportunism or the concern of being present than from some interior requirement). But it is also appropriate to give some warning so that projects, which are not often compatible between them and which could even give rise to perplexity and distrust, could be looked at more objectively. But, please, let us not confuse those who have always reflected on European construction and on direct experience with those who improvise.
Servitudes of the Presidency. The country that holds the EU Council Presidency does not have its hands totally free. First of all it has a specific political responsibility: that of successfully carrying out the institutional reform under way. This does not of course mean accepting any old thing, but on this point both Mr Védrine and Mr Moscovici were very clear: France will not agree with any compromises considering it is better to have a failure than a bad agreement. Secondly, the Presidency must take into account everyone's positions. It does of course have its preferences but cannot impose them on its partners. If the Presidency lacks objectivity and serenity, the whole European institutional system is brought back into question, and the possibilities of improving the current alternating half-yearly mechanism become illusory.
It is because they were aware of this situation that the two French ministers responsible for institutional reform have been forced to do some dialectical acrobatics regarding the plan set out in Berlin by Jacques Chirac, making a distinction between this plan and the Presidency's actions. Pierre Moscovici said: "It is not the French Presidency's speech. It was not conceived as such, not even by its author. This does not diminish the fact that France, during its Presidency, will speak with one voice". Hubert Védrine went on to specify that the speech by the President of the Republic "is not a French plan, but a sort of reflection spoken out loud on how to pass enhanced cooperation to the driving group". They both stressed that only the success of the IGC will allow later developments to take place within a Community framework.
The same considerations can explain a certain amount of French irritation for the speech delivered by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who is said to have anticipated what - on the part of the authorities in power - should only have been expressed after having gathered the results of the IGC.
Threat of "directory". We do not speak of a real directory, which does not exist, but of the impression that exists elsewhere that France and Germany hope to impose it. A strange situation, that of these two countries. Though they do not take initiatives, the pro-Europeans regret the absence of the Franco-German driving force, which is indispensable for progress to be made in European construction. But, if they do take action, they are suspected of wanting to impose their hegemony. This fear has been expressed by political decision-makers of several EU countries and still more openly by the highest authorities of certain applicant countries, which give an alternative: "balance or hegemony".
France and Germany must not present common projects that are meticulously perfect, as if the future of Europe had already been decided in Paris and Berlin, leaving the others the choice between following or remaining excluded. It would be all the more unfortunate as it is not true. The reading of different projects from France and Germany show that they are sometimes contradictory and often partially incompatible. In Jacques Chirac's project, the idea that the vanguard could work effectively with the current Institutions with simply a small flexible secretariat at its disposal gives rise to some perplexity. One can understand the fear that the Union might be split up. But if the secretariat envisaged is only a flexible liaison body, how could the countries of the future vanguard agree that decisions concerning them be taken by the institutions of an enlarged EU, in which they would be largely a minority? In practice, frontrunner policies would be decided by others, which is of course ridiculous, and Jacques Delors understands this very well. In fact, everything is open, everything is to be invented. The Council Presidency must make it understood that only an essential aspect is to be considered attained.
That which is not done in compliance with the "Community method" will be done outside it. The only essential aspect to be considered as attained is that no EU country and no applicant country should imagine it is able to stop the movement simply by opposing it. Hubert Védrine was fortunately very clear about this: if the IGC fails to give Europe the institutions and instruments that work, if reform does not open the road to "enhanced cooperation" between countries which refuse EU dilution, then "some countries would say they will do it outside the Treaty" and among these countries there would no doubt also be France and Germany. And, in this case, there is indeed a real danger of directory, of hegemony!
The "Community method", with institutions that are independent of the governments, guaranteeing and responsible for the general interest, constitutes the basis of the only Europe that could gain the consensus of the peoples and respect of national identities. The European Parliament is increasingly joint legislator, the Council can deliberate by majority, the Commission bases its decisions on Community legality, and the Court of Justice one day condemns a small country and another a large country. This Community method is the true guarantee against hegemonies and directories. The countries that already know they will be part of the frontrunners - like Benelux and Italy and (we hope) a few more - must be aware of this, understand that the independent institutions and the effective institutional mechanisms represent their priority interest.
For other countries, the choices are far more difficult. Of course one immediately thinks of the United Kingdom. Tony Blair is putting on a very serene face, and it is a good thing. But the President of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, said on returning from London after talks with the British leaders: "I felt they were very worried. The economic circles and the government would like to dive towards the euro and toward Europe, but they are up against a hostile public opinion, which is aggravated by a very anti-European press". The risk is therefore great that all those who, for years, have been criticising the European venture in the United Kingdom by presenting it as a plot against their country's traditions, history and autonomy, are harvesting the fruit of their attitude and of their convictions. They will get the Europe they have always wanted, which is already considerable (even, from some points of view, it will be something marvellous, mainly for part of Eastern Europe). But they will prevent anything else from being built up, in addition, on the Continent, without their country's participation.
A word one must be very wary about using. Another appropriate precaution is that one should not artificially create mistrust or reticence toward the real intentions of those who are taking part in the debate on the future of Europe. There are no doubt persons of good faith whose project would be to create a super-European State unifying area which would go beyond the notion of nation. But it is far from a majority trend. The reflections which count in our view go rather along opposite lines: not only to maintain nations (Jacques Delors'" solution of "Federation of Nation States" is now well known) but of leaving these nations control of everything that unites the citizens and forges the character and nature of a people, based on its history and its traditions: culture, social welfare and health systems, education, with cooperation and common projects and programmes, but no more. Even regarding common foreign policy, Mr Delors recently stated: "I do not support a single foreign policy. I believe we should carry out joint foreign policy actions but that each nation should keep its margin of manoeuvre, bearing in mind its historic role, its geopolitical place, and its affinity with other countries".
Given these intentions which acknowledge that one cannot do away with centuries and centuries of history and tradition, certain other projects give the impression there is a trend toward uniformity and levelling which does not correspond to the Europe of our dreams, in which each people would feel at ease and would be recognised for what it is, with its own culture, qualities and even shortcomings. And we shall add a consideration that will not please all our readers: We should like the word and the concept of a European Constitution to be set to one side or used more parcimoniously. A Constitution must reflect the mentality and the aspirations of the people which takes it on. Why should 30 countries have a single Constitution? A Constitution, can even contain excesses or particularities that are specific to a people and to one given moment in historical time. Situations change, and a Constitution can be modified. History shows us that a people can sometimes want an entirely new Constitution. But a European Constitution would be frozen as it would take agreement between 30 countries to change as much as a single comma.
And, anyway, is it really necessary? We are not unaware that, for some, the EU's Constitution should only be used to distinguish between what should remain national or regional, and what should become European. But we do not need a Constitution for that. Ferdinando Riccardi