Anatomy of Trump’s Thinking on NATO… and on the EU
“Over the past two decades, history has undergone several brutal accelerations that Europeans neither anticipated nor understood in time, leaving them frozen in shock. The most recent of these dramas is the rupture of the transatlantic relationship, officially sealed – for anyone who still had doubts – on 4 December 2025” with the publication of the new National Security Strategy of the United States, Federico Santopinto explains in this analysis published by the French Institut des Relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS), where he is head of the related programme of research.
Beyond a rhetoric that attacks the European understanding of democracy, freedom of speech and pluralism of the media – for President Trump does not scruple to describe European leaders as “weak”, nor even to hint at potential American interference in European elections, as if Russian interference were not enough – the security strategy document urges the Europeans to “Europeanise NATO”, and also refers to annihilating the European Union in a NATO context. This narrative has at least had the merit of profoundly irritating the President of the European Council, António Costa, who has had no hesitation in putting an alleged ally back in his place after the latter thumbed his nose at the very foundation of the Alliance: mutual respect and solidarity.
“The idea of Europeanising NATO does not, in fact, originate in Washington. It first took shape in Brussels, before being subtly hijacked by the current occupant of the White House (…). Fearing that the United States might disengage completely from the continent, [the Europeans] developed the concept of the “Europeanisation” of NATO in the hope of keeping Washington on board. This notion goes beyond a simple rebalancing of roles between Europeans and Americans: it assumes that the forces deployed within the Alliance will be predominantly European, while still keeping the United States at the heart of the NATO architecture”, writes Santopinto, who is mostly correct. The well-worn idea of a European pillar of NATO only ever served, in certain cases, as a pretext to give a semblance of legitimacy to cooperation projects between Europeans or the illusion of a sharing of the burden between the two sides of the Atlantic. But the brand-new idea – dating from this very year – was biased from the beginning. It is true, as Santopinto points out, that the starting point was the idea of sooner or later having to offset American disengagement and was a response to the demands made by the Trump administration of the Europeans to take charge of conventional defence of continent (first address to NATO of the new Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, on 12 February), but it did not resolve the critical issue of the vassalisation of the Europeans. Effectively, the starting point was the observation that the Europeans had no command structure outside NATO and that the creation of an operational system of this scale would take a decade at the very least, without even touching upon the question of the Allied command of Europe, currently in the hands of the Americans. In other words, it aimed to “buy some time”, another expression that has often been heard in the corridors of the NATO since the beginning of this year. Buying time by buying into the Trumpian demand of spending 5% of GDP on defence, even though this was just 3.5% intially, the addition to be justified by various expenses more or less vaguely allocated to a “security” heading. Buying time by buying American equipment, including anything the United States no longer wants to send to Ukraine. Buying time by supporting hikes in customs duty …
As Santopinto stresses, this was tantamount to ignoring Donald Trump’s other constant objective: annihilating the European Union, a commercial rival that has had the “temerity to sketch out a new industrial policy with a strategic, interventionist and protectionist bent, capable of competing with American firms in the military and dual-use sectors”. Not only that, but the same European Union is trying to limit the excesses of his friends, the GAFAM. It is also promoting multilateralism and, even worse in his view, the fight against climate change.
The drama in this history is certainly the fact that even if they feign ignorance, Donald Trump’s best allies are very often the Europeans themselves. “Most European capitals (…) have always had a dual attitude towards the integration process: they praise it by day and fear it by night, especially when it touches on the defence sector. The Europeanisation of NATO therefore appears to them as a convenient solution, since it would allow them to cooperate militarily within NATO’s intergovernmental framework, while bypassing the EU and continuing to nurture the illusion of national sovereignty”, Santopinto quite rightly argues. The illusions provide a comfort that is quite addictive. The trouble is that they always break down in the end and the comedown is a very painful one. Given the urgency of the situation, there is only one possible watchword, as Costa told the annual conference of the Jacques Delors Institute on Monday 8 December: reinforcing Europe. (OJ)
Federico Santopinto. Anatomy of Trump’s Thinking on NATO… and on the EU. IRIS. The analysis is available in English and French on the Institute’s website: https://aeur.eu/f/jzk
Allies and Rivals
Sven Biscop (Institut Egmont) has also written a “rough” analysis of new US Trump-made strategy. “The principle of ‘non-interventionism’ stated at the outset of the NSS does not apply to Europe. On our continent, the Trump strategy is to actively intervene, ‘cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations’. Who is Trump looking to: ‘the growing influence of patriotic European parties’. In other words, the Trump administration will continue, and likely even increase, its active interference in our elections, in support of the anti-democratic extreme-right forces, and against the EU. Let us be clear: that is a hybrid attack as unwelcome, and as threatening, as any Russian or Chinese hybrid attack against us”, Biscop argues.
“The NSS says the US ‘will need a strong Europe’, but what Trump really seeks is to undo European integration, leaving individual countries run by Trump-friendly governments that are easily dominated”, the author warns, before adding that “the power that Trump seeks to placate is Russia. ‘As a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply attenuated’, says the NSS – the understatement of the year. ‘Many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat’ – implying that it isn’t, really. Worse, the NSS pretends that it is somehow our fault that the war continues: ‘The Trump Administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition. A large majority of Europe wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes’. If that pernicious fabrication is the starting point, we must worry about the ‘significant US diplomatic engagement’ that the NSS promises to manage our relations with Russia”. And quite frankly, we are worrying about it.
The self-deception of some knows no limits, as can be seen by the reaction of the High Representative of the EU, Kaja Kallas: “we haven’t always agreed on certain subjects, but the core principle remains the same. We are the greatest allies, and we must stay united”. “No, it is exactly the opposite”, Biscop quite correctly retorts, explaining that “we will still cooperate on specific issues, but Trump has declared the core principle dead. Henceforth, the US will behave towards Europe like other states to: they are allies and rivals at the same time. We will work together on one issue, and against each other on another. That is only normal: it was naive to think that we could preserve forever the transatlantic harmony that was shaped by the Second World War and carried over into the Cold War. There is no law of nature that says alliances cannot last – but in the history of great power politics, they seldom do”.
So, what is the answer? “Decide once and for all that we are an independent pole of the multipolar world – a great power. Translate that independent mindset into military independence by building a complete European pillar in NATO – now. Assertively defend our economic sovereignty against everyone, the US included. Say the course on Ukraine, alone if necessary. Actively block any outside interference in our domestic politics, including from the US”, Biscop advises; for the purposes of greater clarity, he might have been better to refer to ‘the European Union’ rather than to ‘we’. To do this, do we need to pursue the mirage of the European pillar within NATO? This is all the less certain as NATO cannot be the framework of military independence. If we are to affirm our sovereignty, must we do the exact opposite of what Trump wants: full integration or, in other words, the federalisation of the EU? The response, definitively, is yes. And as quickly as we can. (OJ)
Sven Biscop. Allies and Rivals. Egmont. The analysis is available on the website of the Institute: https://aeur.eu/f/jzl
Le Kosovo comme terrain d’analyse de la PSDC
This is the subject of a study by the Diellza Ajeti, published in the “Debates and Documents” collection of the Fondation Jean Monnet. Having pointed out that “the launch of the EULEX Kosovo mission in a 2008 marked a decisive stage in the development of the CSDP, as it was the largest civilian mission ever deployed by the European Union”, the author goes on to stress that it also “revealed the profound limits to European engagements in civilian crisis management”.
For instance, “EULEX suffered from a lack of political coherence from its inception, because of a lack of common position between the member states on the status of Kosovo. Five EU countries – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus – do not recognise the independence of Kosovo, which was unilaterally declared in 2008. This division had the effect of weakening the political legitimacy of the mission, which was seen as a diplomatic compromise rather than the expression of a unified strategic will”. “Several independent evaluations stressed the structural and organisational shortcomings of the mission. The special report of the European Court of Auditors published in 2012 shed light on unsatisfactory management of human resources, vague objectives, a lack of clear performance indicators and shoddy strategic planning”, Ajeti writes, adding that “another major challenge was the difficulty in vouchsafing the neutrality and effectiveness of legal actions, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Although EULEX had international magistrates and public prosecutors to deal with the most complex cases, its work was regularly criticised for its lack of transparency and a degree of political timidity in the handling of cases involving senior Kosovar officials. The controversial case of corruption involving EULEX prosecutors in 2014, which led to an internal investigation and public criticism, sapped the credibility of the mission and cast doubt on its ability to guarantee high levels of governance”.
“Local ownership of reforms is also a structural weak point. Although it has a mandate of accompaniment, EULEX has not always succeeded in winning the genuine support of actors in Kosovo or in strengthening public confidence in legal institutions. Indeed, according to the NGO Humanitarian Law Centre, which specialises in war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, just 25 cases have been settled, even though the war in Kosovo left 13,000 dead. This rate is particularly tragic in the cases of sexual violence committed during the war, in which ‘not one case has been resolved, not one single perpetrator brought to justice’. Finally, despite efforts in terms of training, supervision and institutional reform, the long-term results of the EULEX mission remained mixed. According to a number of reports, the structures set in place continue to be vulnerable to political instability and corruption”, the author goes on to stress. She concludes that “with the European Union facing a multiplication of crises, whether in terms of security, migration or geopolitics, the experience of Kosovo comes over as a reference we ignore at our peril. It prompts us to rethink the outlines of EU external action in end-of-conflict contexts, highlighting the conditions for intervention that is effective, legitimate and long-term. Preparing a post-war Ukraine could also require involvement, in other words accompaniment to maintain the rule of law and consolidate peace in the long term. It is now vital to learn lessons from this experience to reinforce the credibility, coherence and impact of the CSDP in a changing international order”. (OJ)
Diellza Ajeti. Le Kosovo comme terrain d’analyse du fonctionnement de la politique de sécurité et défense commune de l’Union européenne (available in French only). Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Debates and Documents collection, issue 41, November 2025. ISSN: 2296-7710. 21 pages. The study is available free of charge on the website of the foundation: https://aeur.eu/f/jzm