The ultimate aim of the European Green Deal is a fully decarbonised European Union by 2050. This is one of the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement. It is based on a binding legal framework, the basic act of which is the ‘Climate Law’ proposed by the ‘von der Leyen I’ Commission and adopted in June 2021. It concerns all sectors of the economic and social life of the EU. At least to begin with, this flagship project rallied a reasonably broad political consensus and mobilised economic and civil society operators.
The European far right has drawn strength from the electorate, thanks mainly to its alarmist rhetoric on immigration. Also running through its DNA are the promotion of traditional values (family, public order, clamping down on crime, patriotism), homophobia, the cult of leadership, denunciation of the ‘elite’ (often presented as corrupt), the mistrust of science, hostility to internationalisation and the organisations and law that subscribe to it. For a long time, it positioned itself in favour of leaving European Union, prior to a radical internal change. It is indifferent to the fate of the future generations and the warming of the planet.
Its power to do harm has been illustrated in referendums on European integration (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) and in terms of increasing national powers (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, etc.) to influence the decisions of the European Council and of the Council of the EU. At the European Parliament, it was for many years a marginal group, idle but extremely adept at redirecting funding. Its hardest fringe admittedly did well in the European elections of 2019, but so too did the environmental parties. For this new term of office, the Commission enjoyed the automatic support of the pro-European majority, consisting of the EPP, the Liberals and the Social Democrats. This majority would also extend to the Greens for any initiative of that colour.
Despite the pandemic, then Russia’s attack on Ukraine, plans to bring the Green Deal to life progressed at a consistent pace: promotion of renewable energies, energy efficiency of buildings, a moratorium on the sales of new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2035, nature restoration initiatives, fighting environmental crime, limiting the use of plastics, waste management, promoting the circular economy, industrial Green deal, regulation in favour of a “net zero” industry to encourage decarbonised production in Europe, and much more. The post-Covid economic recovery plan would also require the member states to put 37% of the payments received into green projects. The war in Ukraine was the perfect opportunity for the EU to start to wean itself off its dependence on hydrocarbons of Russian origin and to diversify the energy mix within the Union.
Things started to go downhill in 2023, with the major nature restoration project (and, therefore, downgraded ecological systems), which was met with strong resistance on the right-wing benches of the European Parliament. On 12 July of that year, the text was approved by a narrow margin, with 336 votes in favour, 300 against and three abstentions: the EPP allied itself with the hard right MEPs, as did 30% of Liberals (see EUROPE 13221/1). At the end of the third trilogue session, an agreement was reached on the regulation with the Council of the EU on 10 November (see EUROPE 13290/1). For a long time, Hungary led the resistance to the text at the Council, which was not able formerly to adopt it until 17 June 2024, with six member states voting against (see EUROPE 13433/2).
In early 2024, European farmers throughout the EU manifested their distress and anger. The EPP declared its solidarity with them, attacking various aspects of the Green Deal (see EUROPE 133364/1). On 6 February 2024, President von der Leyen announced the withdrawal of the proposed regulation for the sustainable use of pesticides. The Parliament rejected the text (even the watered-down version) on the strength of push-back from the right. Subsequently, standards on set-aside and crop rotation were also toned down, but did not reduce EU aid.
This was described as a ‘necessary break’ in the enactment of the Green Deal. In March, however, the organisation Solar Impulse published a study in favour of the Deal, arguing that it could create many thousands of jobs and improve the standard of living for all. Regardless, the Commission set about weakening its ‘Farm to Fork’ project for environmentally respectful food production.
In the European elections of June 2024, the ‘Greens’ lost 20 seats while the EPP and the three far-right parties gained. September, a coalition of the EPP, the Patriots for Europe (PfE) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) imposed a resolution against the Venezuelan regime of Nicolas Maduro. Similar alliances sprang up on internal matters of the Parliament and, albeit without success, aiming to strip environmental NGOs of funding. The cordon sanitaire was growing slacker.
In September, with the Draghi report, the objective of competitiveness of businesses won priority over the aim of bringing about the Green Deal, although the latter officially remained in the race. It is worth noting that Draghi also made a very strong argument in favour of decarbonisation and the circular economy.
In November 2024, Donald Trump won the presidential elections in the United States, much to the delight of those who would style themselves upon him, principally Viktor Orban. On the day he took up office for the second time, Trump took his country out of the Paris Climate Agreement, repeatedly describing global warming as ‘fake news’. His tough stance towards the European Union was music to the ears of far-right members of the European Parliament, who felt that this validated their politics.
The law on fighting imported deforestation had entered into force in June 2023, with application set to begin on 30 December 2024. This regulation sought to deflect a range of base products from deforested areas. It came in for criticism from both within the EU and from outside it. The Commission felt it necessary to defer and amend it, on the pretext of simplification.
On 14 November 2024, the European Parliament voted in favour of a year’s postponement, with the EPP’s amendments bringing in a category of ‘no risk’ countries to benefit from a simplified procedure winning support thanks to the hard right, to the deep disappointment of the social Democrats and ‘Greens’ (see EUROPE 13524/1). On 19 November 2025, the Council of the EU decided on postponement by one year, although certain member states were calling for even more (see EUROPE 13755/12). The Executive Vice-President of the Commission, Teresa Ribera, and a number of respected businesses criticised this legal instability, which would punish those who had prepared ahead of time (see EUROPE 13756/23). Did this pitiful saga ultimately benefit the planet, or business? I’ll give you one guess.
To make life easier for businesses and thereby improve their competitiveness, the ‘von der Leyen II’ Commission, which took up office in December, devised a plan divided into stages. And so Omnibus was born (in the sense of ‘for all’, rather than the sense of horse-drawn public transport).
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, aiming to extend European environmental standards to non-European companies exporting to our territory and which had been in force since October 2023, was the subject of a proposed simplification on 26 February 2025, in the ‘Omnibus I’ package. Having been accepted by the Council of the EU on 18 June, it won broad support from the members of the European Parliament on 10 September (see EUROPE 13706/24).
In the same package and also coming under the umbrella of the Green Deal are two directives concerning businesses and their responsibilities to the climate. The first entered into force in January 2024. It requires businesses to report on their commercial strategy to enable them effectively to participate in the ecological transition. The second, which has not yet entered into force, sets out companies’ duty of vigilance to avoid infringements of human rights, environmental damage and breaches of employment law in their supply chains. The Commission proposed simplifications in a single directory modifying the other two, reducing the number of businesses affected.
At the European Parliament, the coalition of the EPP and the three far-right parties slashed the number of businesses subjected to these legislative requirements (see EUROPE 13751/1). In the first case (reporting), where previously, businesses employing more than 250 came under the reporting requirement, the threshold increased to 1750 employees and a turnover of 450 million euros or more. In the second case (duty of vigilance), the threshold has been increased to 5000 employees (instead of 1000) and an annual turnover of 1.5 billion euros (instead of 450 million). As a result, all other businesses escape these two obligations. This sends out a clear signal that climate and social matters basically lie outwith the scope of responsibility of the majority of European businesses.
In September of this year, in the framework of a consultation launched by the Commission, some 200,000 European citizens called for Omnibus not to water down existing law. This is also the position taken by many non-government organisations. But wheels are turning and they will get to other areas in due course. These wheels are not powered by impact studies and are unencumbered by the braking system of civil society involvement. They are powered by the world of businesses and its desire for even greater latitude. But fortunately, there are people standing by who are sensitive to the future of the planet and humanity. Shortly before COP 30, the British medical review The Lancet published a report on the consequences of global warming for human life. The number of deaths caused by global warming alone between 2012 and 2021 is estimated at 546,000. The situation is getting even worse due to extreme heat waves, fires and pollution, which affect human health from infancy.
Our Europe needs industrial champions choosing to go green, mass investment, dynamic SMEs: all of this is true and a matter of urgency. The speed at which the EU makes decisions requires improvement, but it must not make decisions in favour of churning out slipshod, precarious legislation. In particular, it needs to start distinguishing between simplification and deregulation. The latter strips legislation back to nothing or gets rid of it altogether for certain sections of the population. Administrative simplification, on the other hand, should make it easier for anyone required to do so to apply the rules. It is particularly beneficial if the red tape involved slows things down rather than allows things to run smoothly. It is very strange, in the current state of affairs, that the administrative complexity brought about at national or infranational level is never talked about in the context of the EU, which is apparently the only organisation capable of ‘bureaucracy’. The Commission produces an annual report on the rule of law in each member state but nothing, not even a study, on any kind of bureaucracy index.
The battle for the climate is far from won. The far right constitutes an increasingly impenetrable block on the road to decarbonisation. To preserve us from this fate, there should be a major campaign to justify the rules and budgets of the European Union. Nobody has ever explained them to the citizens. The enemies of democracy shout and scream, lie, make threats. The friends of democracy inform and explain.
Explain, and then explain some more.
Renaud Denuit