Hezbollah
French journalist of Algerian origin Mohamed Sifaoui begins his book by retracing the long history of the Shiite militia from its foundation in 1982, more than 40 years ago. Next, he goes on to debunk a myth that endures: that of a respectable political organisation plus a breakaway terrorist group, as if there were no connection between the former and its “military” wing. Finally, the author analyses the consequences of the Israeli operation of autumn 2024 and the fall of the Syrian regime of Bachar al-Assad on the Lebanese militia, which is frequently – and somewhat naïvely – presented as being dead in the water. “If we need to take the threat of the Shiite axis into account today, it is because two of the main players – Hezbollah and Iran – are driven by martyrology and work on a to-the-death principle, while the third – what is left of the Syrian regime, individuals with nothing left to lose and some of whom are at large – may, if only out of the desire for revenge, act against Western or Arab targets”, the author states in an introduction that was completed before the American attacks against both command centres and nuclear plants in Iran (our translation throughout). The success of these attacks must be put into context, but although they temporarily weakened the regime of the mullahs, they cannot fail to have propped up the martyrology.
To help readers into the history of this “complicated” Middle East, Sifaoui takes them back to its origins after the hijira. He tells how the Shi’ites came to the Lebanese mountains to take refuge from persecution in Syria between the 8th and 10th centuries, before travelling further south into Beqaa valley, where they established permanent settlements and clashed with the Crusaders in a region of strategic importance during the 12th and 13th centuries (1099-1291). In 1516, after the fall of the Mamelukes, the region fell under the control of the Sunni Ottoman Empire, which kept them “relatively marginalised” until the early 20th century. “To sum up, the sociological history of Beqaa Valley, over the centuries, was marked by waves of migration, the consolidation of the local Shiite authority and alternating periods of repression and autonomy”, the author writes. “Over the centuries, these factors contributed to making it a bastion that persists to this day. The conditions of relative marginalisation, the clan dynamics and the deep roots in agricultural land, meanwhile, played a key part in the identity of Beqaa”.
Against this historical backdrop, reinforced by the development of religious divisions and demands in Lebanon and the effects of the creation of the Hebrew state, Hezbollah was born in secrecy in 1982, drawing its ideological and theological roots from Iranian doctrine, before officially announcing its existence three years later.
“Unlike Western political movements, which are generally based on secular principles, Hezbollah draws its legitimacy directly from a religious vision of power, inspired by doctrines theorised by the ideologists of Teheran. Certainly, the movement has an eschatological vision, exhorting the image of the martyr and presenting the fight against the enemy as a ‘sacred duty’ dictated ‘by divinity’. Unlike Western political parties, which generally operate within a national framework, Hezbollah stakes a claim as a supranational force, as part of a broader fight on behalf of the Ummah (Muslim nation). This militia therefore represents a political objective that cannot be categorised. In my view, it is the only case of its kind in the contemporary landscape, fluctuating between a terrorist movement, a political party, and armed militia and a transnational religious organisation. Its modus operandi is also unique, as it is based on a balance between political pragmatism and fidelity to a radical religious ideology, making it a movement like no other and very difficult to understand using traditional Western evaluation grids”, the author explains.
“On a superficial level, the movement adopts a moderate and inclusive stance whenever it tries to establish itself in the Lebanese political landscape and extended audience beyond the Shiite community, and at the same time it espouses a radical, clearly violent and ideologically structured discourse when addressing its supporters and military leaders. This discursive flexibility allows Hezbollah to position itself as a radical Islamist movement and, at the same time, a pragmatic political player that is capable of negotiating and cooperating with other Lebanese factions. This position will also assure the party a degree of effective mobilisation beyond the Shiite community, whilst allowing it to navigate within a pluralist political system in which inter-community alliances were critical”, Sifaoui stresses. He goes on to point out that between 1982 and 2000, “the year of Israeli disengagement in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah carried out nearly 400 attacks, almost 300 of them in Lebanon on and the rest abroad”. “Although there are no precise statistics, an empirical calculation suggests that in eight years, the militia killed nearly 1500 people, a third of them civilians, in various operations. The countries targeted include Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, among many others”. He goes on at that “between 1985 and 1986, France was subjected to a series of attacks on its own soil. They were commissioned by Iran and coordinated by Hezbollah. They left a dozen people dead and many injured (…). On 27 and 28 July 1994, in London, attacks were carried out against Jewish organisations and the Israeli embassy (…). Additionally, by request of Iran, Hezbollah did not just carry out attacks, it also armed and funded Palestinian terrorist factions (…); we must not forget the attack in Burgas, Bulgaria, which cost six people their lives in 2012, including five Israeli tourists (…). On 22 July 2013, the European Union decided to include only the ‘armed wing’ of the Shiite militia on its list of terrorist organisations. However, France decided to depart from its European partners by maintaining links with the organisation (…). The refusal of France and a number of its European partners to classify Hezbollah – the whole of Hezbollah, as it cannot be divided – as a terrorist organisation complies with a desire to walk a kind of ridgeline and avoid taking the risk of cutting itself off completely from Lebanese soil, not forgetting the fear that has prompted many senior French officials to avoid taking the risk of getting on the wrong side of the Shiite militia, as they are well aware of its capacity to cause trouble, both inside Lebanon and outside it”.
“Although it is a terrorist organisation, it would be reductive to present Hezbollah through that aspect alone today. It is far more than that, and that is where it derives its strength and its dangerousness. It is a multifaceted movement. The Shiite militia makes policy, engages in smuggling, it is involved in cases of banditry, it perpetrates terrorist acts, implements socio-educational projects, runs masks, publishes religious books, has its own internal intelligence service and another external one, has created a close protection service. It’s a kind of cartel, fanatical about Shiite doctrine, shaping large parts of the everyday lives of the Lebanese”, Sifaoui stresses. The author goes on to point out that the aid actions for the reconstruction of homes and the development of southern Lebanon on which, under the guise of assistance to the Shiite population that has suffered as a result of the war, delivered through an organisation called Jihad al-Binna, also served to build a sophisticated subterranean network of military infrastructure. Little, moreover, is known about the equally sophisticated fundraising methods used by the Shiite organisation, involving the Lebanese diaspora and criminal activities, in certain cases, within a vast network of countries covering Europe, including France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, North America and Latin America as well as various African countries. “If Hezbollah needs (at least) a billion dollars to operate all of its arms (political, educational, cultural, propaganda, military, social, etc.), annual revenue varies over the years between 1.5 billion and 4 billion dollars, in its most prosperous periods”, according to estimates by the intelligence services, the author writes.
According to a “defector”, whom the author does not name, Hezbollah could “arm up to 30,000 men in Lebanon” and “around 6000 militants are believed to be dormant within the Lebanese diaspora throughout the world, including around a hundred who are believed to have been given specific training, in some cases in Iran, to equip them to carry out attacks, or even suicide missions, if the order came”. When asked by Sifaoui about the situation in France, the defector said that he “personally knows six individuals who have been through this type of radicalisation”, adding that “this does not mean that they are about to carry out an attack tomorrow, but if they were ordered to do so, they would”. Even so, he “does not believe that they would target French interests. They would be more likely to target Israeli interests in Europe or individuals who embody the Jewish community”.
“The operations of the Israeli army, which began on 17 and 18 September 2024, with the explosion of pagers and walkie-talkies of members of the militia, followed by the elimination of much of its headquarters, plus the murder of its leader, Nasrallah himself, on 27 September 2024, were more than just a setback, they were a profound humiliation that affected the morale of all members of the militia, those on the inside, obviously, but also those active abroad”, the author notes, adding that the organisation has “suffered considerable human and material losses” and that, according to the World Bank, the price tag of the conflict stands, for Lebanon, at at least 8.5 billion dollars. A ceasefire officially entered into force on 27 November 2024, with, in theory, a redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the south, but this has yet to materialise.
But Hezbollah, disorganised and weakened though it is, not only by the Israeli strikes, but also by the loss of its Syrian ally, is not yet dead. “It is highly unlikely that the Shiite militia will give up its role as leader of the ‘resistance to Israel’” and thus “break with any armed activity”. “It is something that the organisation could consider in the short or medium term in order to take the time needed to regroup, rebuild and re-militarise, but certainly not permanently (…). Hezbollah without military action and without terrorism is no longer Hezbollah”, Sifaoui argues, predicting that the “organisation will increasingly operate discreetly and rely, in strict continuity of the Shiite doctrine, on what is called ‘taqiyya’, the double narrative and pretence”. He goes on to add that “until its military forces are fully rebuilt, the militia will first act under cover of secrecy. It is highly likely that the organisation will return to secret operations for which no responsibility is claimed and target Israeli interests (but not these interests alone). On the other hand, what the movement knows how to do, for instance with the support of the Guardians of the Revolution, is to bring into being a new terrorist group with a new name, which will operate secretly on behalf the Iranian regime and Hezbollah, targeting the new Lebanese leaders and the interests of Western countries and Israel. There are four parties with an interest in operating asymmetric and underground welfare. The leftovers of the Syrian regime, now secret Mafia-type groups, the regime of the mullahs, Hezbollah and terrorist organisations active in Gaza. In other words, the story is far from over”.
“With its repeated attacks, the Israeli army has just handed the Lebanese a unique opportunity that will allow the re-establishment of the Lebanese state if they accept it. To do this, it will be necessary to disarm the Shiite militia whilst bolstering the legitimate institutions, starting with the Lebanese army. This is an absolute prerequisite that would make it possible to state that the terrorist organisation has truly been destroyed”, according to the author. He goes on to quote France’s former ambassador to Israel, Éric Danon, who argues that it will be necessary to meet at least three conditions in order to neutralise the Shiite militia, politically and militarily: (1) “weaken and fragment the Iranian regime as much as possible”, as it is the principal supporter of the terrorist organisation; (2) “encourage the new authorities in Beirut (President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam] to undertake the vital reforms of the State structure”, to give the population “renewed hope in the Lebanese institutions and distance themselves from Hezbollah, which is responsible for many of their troubles”; (3) make sure that “the Lebanese Armed Forces are a permanent fixture in South Lebanon instead of Hezbollah, so that the latter loses its legitimacy to own heavy armaments”.
It is in light of the above that the Irish proposal, announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence at the informal meeting of Defence Ministers of the European Union, held in Copenhagen at the end of August, makes sense. The mission to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces, an initiative that is likely to be implemented, must be of sufficient scope to carry out the task, rather than limit itself to lecturing on human rights and providing a few vehicles and other communication or individual protection equipment. (Olivier Jehin)
Mohamed Sifaoui. Hezbollah – De Beyrouth à Paris, la milice prépare son retour (available in French only). Les éditions du Rocher. ISBN: 978-2-2681-1174-2. 315 pages. €21,90