L’Afrique contre la démocratie
In this essay, Senegalese journalist Ousmane Ndiaye sets out to unpick the discourse amalgamating decolonialisation, pan-Africanism, anti-Westernism and the rejection of democracy. For, he explains, military regimes are no less corrupt than civilian ones. Because democracy is a universal aspiration and has existed in many different forms in Africa, well before the days of colonisation.
“The more the movement against ‘imperialism’ has gained traction, while post-colonial military interventionism continues, economic power struggles, Western interference and injunctions, the more momentum the movement against democracy has gained, open and now credible, as it has the support of activists, intellectuals and even of governments stemming from an impressive wave of coups d’état. It is becoming the new mantra, from the elite down to the man and woman on the street. Democratic denial is openly assumed, theorised and promoted. Very often, and abusively, in the name of the vital fight against imperialism and the pan-Africanism that is increasingly indispensable. Anti-French or anti-imperialist protesters, including groups of intellectuals, self-proclaimed sovereignists, the rejection of democracy is now practically a figure of speech that is de rigueur in any debate on the future of the continent. This rejection of the democratic ideal as a political regime has become solidly distilled and rooted in the public debate. Even worse, it is presented as fact, but this is all built on foundations of sand”, the author writes (our translation throughout).
“The democratic and intellectual blindness of the new pan-Africanism, very often the salon variety […], is based on this assimilation, this confusion: democracy = West. This equivalency is as lazy as it is wrong. It is lazy because it leaves to one side the complexity and nuances of history. It is wrong as it is used as a tool to legitimise new dictatorships that are killing the freedom and spilling the blood of the continent (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea)”, Ndiaye argues, adding that “the other driving force behind this new anti-democratic narrative is based on the rejection of France and its interference. Genuine interference [later on in the book, the author points out that “by artificial means, France has installed and maintained its men in Gabon, the Comores, the Central African Republic, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville, having only to concern itself with the legitimate considerations and aspirations of its own people”]. But it is the pretext for state and general conspiracy concerns justifying the rejection of democracy on the grounds of suspecting ‘recolonisation’. As if the return of the colonists was the only possible outcome of the democratisation of the continent”.
Listing the various activists making use of their popularity to influence the populations, not least the young people of the continent, the author makes particular mention of the journalist Alain Foka, who, having made a lot of money over many years out of Radio France Internationale and France 24, “is preaching pan-Africanism on his channel Alain Foka Media (AFO Média), vilifying France and the West and the ‘democracy they want to impose upon us’”. Others, such as Ibrahima Maïga of Burkina Faso, threaten, insult and intimidate all critical voices, Ndiaye stresses, adding that “in Mali, the musical legend Salif Keïta has converted to this anti-democracy discourse. He has, moreover, been co-opted by the soldiers as a member of the National Transition Council (NTC). The great Ivorian singer Aïcha Koné has, for her own part, brought out a song to the glory of the Sahel putsch”.
The case of Mali is symbolic of the myth that “the soldiers came to save the nation from terrorists, of course, but also from the dreadful, irresponsible and treacherous civilians”. “This is the main thrust of the discourse to justify those behind the putsches, amplified by their supporters and media”, the author notes, pointing out that in 65 years of independence, Mali has been under military rule for 39 years and civilian rule for just 26.
“The disqualification of civilian power is central to the fashionable anti-democracy discourse. It has been built up around the artificial and binary civilian/military divide. On the one hand, you have patriotic soldiers, full of integrity, who are prepared to give their lives for the nation. On the other hand, opportunistic and corrupt civilians who have sold out to abroad. Their failure is used to justify all military power-grabs in western and central Africa”, the author continues. However, although “the soldiers’ popularity is based on the failure of the civilians […], the civilians did not govern alone. The army has also been an important pillar of governance in these spaces”, Ndiaye stresses. “Let us take the argument that has been put forward by the perpetrators of all coups in the Sahel over the last 10 years: the failure of the war on terrorism. From General Assimi Goïta in Mali, Captain Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso or General Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger, they were all central to the anti-terrorist strategy. The failure was undoubtedly caused by the negligence of politicians, but also by the disorganisation of the armies: a lack of training, complacent recruitment procedures, thefts of provisions, lack of discipline, etc.”.
Under the title “De la théorie de la dictature éclairée ou la kagaméphilie” (on the theory of enlightened dictatorship or Kagamophilia), Ousmane Ndiaye explores the obsession with Paul Kagame, who is credited with having reconstructed and developed his country “as if Rwanda was no longer one of the least developed countries on the planet (159th place out of 193 countries on the Human Development Index) and largely dependent on international aid, so criticised by Kagame – but still needed in ‘his’ country. Between 2010 and 2020, it was consistently between 15 and 20% of gross national income”. “A skilled strategist, the Rwandan is capitalising on this frenetic admiration. Rwanda sends its ‘technical advisers’ all over Africa: to Benin, Togo, Guinea. People are falling over each other to be invited to Kigali”, the author writes, adding that the “‘forums’ industry has its free zone in Kigali. It is all about economy and business. Globalised capitalism particularly adores Kigali and its president. But the Foundation for Innovation and Democracy of historian Achille Mbembe uses its forum in Kigali to preach democracy. Obviously, everything is permitted, except to criticise the politics of the master of Kigali. Democratic discussions in a country in which political parties are reduced to the bare bones and their leaders are thrown into jail if they are lucky and beheaded in a ditch if they are not. There are no independent media. Dissidence is a one-way ticket to prison or death. Criticism is a dying art”.
“Alpha Condé is verging on a caricature of the tragedy of the historical opposition. These African political leaders of the 1980s, who often fled to exile in Paris or were imprisoned, who carried the democratic dream of millions of young Africans in the 1990s, but came to power only to show themselves to be the gravediggers of democracy. The socialist Laurent Gbagbo awarded himself a mandate without election, before going on to annihilate his country in civil war. The Liberal Aboulaye Wade, after 26 years leading the slow march towards democratic change, devolved power monarchically on his own son, Karim. The 2000s saw democratic aspirations overtaken by the arrival in the seat of power of the flame-bearers”, the author adds. “The responsibility of this historical opposition in the toppling of the democratic ideal is enormous. The generation that fought tooth and nail against the forces of order became disenchanted after bringing them to power. A sort of profound democratic traumatism that obviously feeds into democratic denial”.
The author also tells some of the story of the activist Kémi Séba, the son of Beninese parents; he grew up in Strasbourg before becoming radicalised, was found guilty of incitement to racial hatred several times and took refuge in Senegal, where he has become the “most widely-viewed French-speaking neo-pan- Africanist”. “As of May 2025, he had 1.3 million followers on Facebook, 994,000 on Twitter and 248,000 on YouTube”, states Ndiaye, observing that “in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou, military regimes roll out the red carpet for him. The activist is becoming an institutional player. He has been appointed special adviser to General Abdourahamane Tiani, the head of the military regime in Niger”.
A must-read for anybody wishing to understand the development of African societies and the proliferation of new dictatorships on the continent. (Olivier Jehin)
Ousmane Ndiaye. L’Afrique contre la démocratie – Mythes, déni et péril (available in French only). Riveneuve. ISBN: 978-2-3601-3739-8. 172 pages. €10,50
La convergence des haines
In this edition of Esprit, which focuses on the convergence and astonishing development of reactionary thought, philosopher Jean-Yves Pranchère, lecturer at the Free University of Brussels, discusses the “neo-Pétainist project dominating the far right of Europe: an authoritarian and racist radicalisation of the United States – as currently embodied by Trump – is allowing Europe to take its place in more moderate nationalist regimes than those of Putin or Trump – who are congratulated on setting in place an authoritarian brand of capitalism, which is deemed too violent for European tastes” (our translation throughout).
“The distinction between conservative and reactionary is relevant, but unstable. Conservatism presupposes the existence of a degree of stability, a balance in social relations, guaranteeing that the society has the means to reproduce. Once the Conservative becomes afraid of a decadence he sees as such that society would no longer be capable of ensuring its survival, then he cannot do otherwise than wish for a ‘conservative revolution’ that will be either reactionary (if the revolution believes it is possible to return to a previous state) or fascist (if the revolution believes that it is necessary to create a ‘new order’)”, Pranchère explains, going on to point out that “in the United States, where Christianity is still rooted in fertile soil, crying apocalypse ensures great resonance. In Europe, where the processes of secularisation are more deeply rooted, the idea of a reactionary Catholic Renaissance is not credible, no matter how much money is spent on bringing it about by billionaires such as Bolloré and Stérin – which the papacy most assuredly does not support. On the other hand, the fear of Islam is strong. This is what allows Houellebecq to set himself up as saying that the ideal would be a return to the Catholicism of the 10th century, but that is meaningless: let us hope that the United States become fascist and we can continue to lead our lives as Islamophobic consumers”.
The sociologist Benoît Gautier contributes an article on the Catholic post-liberal movements in the United States and France, entitled “Maurras is back”. “In the person of the American vice-president, J.D. Vance, a particular form of Catholicism is now a major component of the Trump coalition. This post-liberal or ‘fundamentalist’ tendency is the result of political and doctrinal work carried out for the last dozen years by theologists, but also respected academics in the field of political science and law. Catholic post-liberalism proposes a rereading of Catholic doctrine as formulated in post-war Europe, before becoming consecrated by the second Vatican Council. The post-liberals hope to lay down the teachings of the Church that were used as a basis for the Catholic promotion of human rights, the rule of law and political liberalism, for instance when the Catholic Church opposed Socialist-leaning authoritarianism. Additionally, they draw on French counter-revolutionary thinking by putting forward a theory of taking power from the young leaders of the conservative movement, many of whom have converted to Catholicism under their influence. This theory is elitist, pro-conspiracy and – which is no coincidence – takes inspiration from the anti-Semitic criticism of the French Revolution. While in France, tendencies became marginalised due to their compromise with Pétainism, the political and ecclesiastic situation could raise concerns that this doctrine may accede to an important place driven by the influence of its powerful American heirs”, Gautier writes.
He goes on to argue that “American Catholic post-liberals draw from French thought, it is not the theologist of the spiritual resistance, Henri de Lubac, that they talk about, even though he is greatly admired by conservatives. They are highly critical of Jacques Maritain for creating the foundation for the Church’s support for the United Nations in the promotion of ‘human integrity’. Their frames of references are far older. Patrick Deneen promotes the anti-Semitic counter-revolutionary Louis de Bonald or the Cardinal of l’Action française, Louis Billot. Adrian Vermeule regularly quotes the anti-Semitic counter-revolutionary Joseph de Maistre and derives much of his political and legal thinking from the Catholic and Nazi lawyer Carl Schmitt. The Catholic despots Franco, Salazar and Dolfüss are presented as examples of political virtue. Maurras is promoted more discreetly, as it is conceded in the circles that l’Action française was condemned by the fact that its leader is an atheist. Steve Bannon, for his part, publicly acknowledges the influence of Maurras. His Nazi salute followed by an ‘Amen’ at the annual conference of conservatives in February 2025 is a fairly clear summation of his position. He is present in these networks, for instance in building a reactionary Euro-American grouping located in the more extremist fringes of the European nobility and clergy. The atmosphere being soaked up by Vance’s friends is therefore greatly influenced by Maurras. By referring to de Maistre and Bonald as masters, the American post-liberal fundamentalist Catholics are wearing the same hats as their predecessors from l’Action française. Having been fed well-known sources, these theorists reach a political theory that the State must promote the morals defined by the Church, sexual and religious minorities have fewer rights than everybody else and the executive dominates all other powers”.
“Although the political situation is entirely different, one finds in France, as well as America, a far-right coalition made up of nativist, libertarian, sovereignist and national-revolutionary tendencies. The dykes keeping these movements apart (particularly the so-called ‘government’ right and the more radical movements, such as the Groupe union défense or GUD, have fallen, at least as regards the militant youth. Their point of commonality is the fight against the ‘islamisation’ of society and the variable-geometry defence of the French ‘identity’, by means of the fight against immigration. Despite considerable differences, all the manifestoes of these parties call into question the rule of law, the division of powers and fundamental human rights”, Gautier stresses, going on to add that the “collapse of the centre and union of the Right is putting the French right-wing into a situation that is less far removed from that of the right-wing monopoly of the American Republican Party, which has now been entirely cannibalised by Trumpism”. (OJ)
Anne Dujin (edited by). La convergence des haines – Enquête sur les pensées réactionnaires (available in French only). Revue Esprit. No. 523-524, July – August 2025. ISBN: 978-2-3723-4342-8. 205 pages. €22,00