On Tuesday 8 April, the Polish Presidency of the EU Council presented, in the Working Party on Telecommunications, new draft conclusions on the reform of European telecommunications networks, known as the “Conclusions on reliable and resilient connectivity”.
The document, which Agence Europe has been able to obtain, details new avenues of reform to target certain critical sectors and respond to concerns that have emerged since the last version, in particular the case of alleged corruption on the part of Huawei and the threats now facing European infrastructures.
Dated 4 April, this third draft compromise includes a new reference to the “the far reaching geopolitical implications on the (...) security environment” of threats to European networks, and stresses the need for this approach to be “integrated into the possible revision of the existing legal framework”.
The text calls for “a reliable and resilient connectivity that takes into account current and emerging technologies especially AI, 6G and quantum communications”.
On network security, the new draft stresses “the importance of diversification of infrastructure diversification, in particular in emergency situations”. At this stage, competitiveness seems to be taking a back seat.
The new draft adds a reference to “reducing the risks associated with communications networks”, referring to “trusted suppliers – as defined in the framework the 5G Toolbox – when deploying communication networks”.
Added to this is the need, again on the basis of the compromise presented, “to accelerate the full implementation of the 5G (...) toolbox (...) in particular the Union level coordinated security risk assessment of critical chains”.
The document also encourages discussions on “a more harmonised approach to address emerging cybersecurity threats in electronic communications”.
It should be noted that the toolbox suffers from a lack of coordination in its deployment at European level. The desire to exclude Huawei from communications networks, which had been backed by the initiative, has not been followed by the EU27 (see EUROPE 13599/8), at this stage. The recent corruption scandal could, however, change things (see EUROPE 13604/27).
The paragraphs relating to European satellites have been reworded and now emphasise “the role of IRIS in (...) bridging the connectivity gaps across the Union and improving the EU’s independence from non-European providers for communication services – particularly secure ones”.
As for submarine cables, the draft refers to the “strategic interests of the EU in the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean and North seas, as well as in outermost regions”, and the importance of ensuring “threat prevention, risk detection, rapid incident response, deterrence, as well as recovery and repair capacities”, by improving existing technical capacities.
See the draft compromise: https://aeur.eu/f/gca (Original version in French by Isalia Stieffatre)