A tightening of UK rules on parole conditions does not, in principle, preclude surrender to the UK of a wanted person present in the EU, ruled the Court of Justice of the European Union in a judgment handed down on Thursday 3 April (Case C-743/24).
In Ireland, a terrorism suspect in Northern Ireland is challenging his surrender to British justice, arguing that it would be incompatible with the principle that penalties must be defined by law due to the United Kingdom’s tightening of parole rules after the alleged commission of the criminal offences in question.
The British justice system now requires a prisoner to serve at least two-thirds of his sentence before being eligible for parole, whereas the previous system allowed automatic parole after half the sentence had been served in custody.
Since Brexit, the execution of European arrest warrants has been governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK, which differs from the mechanism governing the European arrest warrant. In July 2024, the CJEU ruled that the judicial authorities of the Member States must autonomously examine the risk of infringing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights where the person concerned alleges such a risk in the event of surrender to the UK (Case C-202/24 - see EUROPE 13463/11).
The Supreme Court of Ireland is considering whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 49) prohibition on retroactively imposing a heavier sentence than that applicable at the time the offence was committed includes a tightening of parole conditions.
In its judgment, the CJEU answered in the negative, deeming it necessary to separate the concept of the ‘penalty’ imposed from measures relating to that penalty’s ‘execution’, with the conditions of release on licence forming part of this second aspect. The European Court found that the UK regime preserves the possibility of release on licence and does not lead to an extension of the maximum period during which a person could be detained. In addition, the application of a criterion relating to the dangerousness of the convicted person at the time of his possible release on parole is linked to the penalty’s execution.
See the judgment of the Court of Justice: https://aeur.eu/f/g8l (Original version in French by Mathieu Bion)