The Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU got off to a strong start on 1 July with a visit by Pedro Sánchez to Kiyv, followed two days later by the traditional visit of the European Commission to Madrid (see EUROPE 13214/1). Ministerial meetings got underway on 10 July. Spain is a fair and highly respected partner, well represented at the European Council by its head of government, who has forged many alliances there and reasserts his values whilst remaining open to compromise. The programme of this Presidency bears his fingerprint: re-industrialising the European Union, moving forward with the green transition, promoting greater social and economic justice and reinforcing European unity. With such a packed agenda under a country that is already held the six-month Presidency four times, an awful lot – all good – can be expected of it.
And yet there is one crucial question: will the current government be able to hold this Presidency right until the end? General elections are scheduled for 23 July; the country will be asked to elect 350 members of Parliament and 208 out of its 265 senators. And who called them? Pedro Sánchez himself, even though the current term in office runs until November. The decisive factor was the result of the municipal and regional elections of 28 May this year. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) led by Sánchez lost seats and its far-left ally, Podemos, shed half of its electoral support. More pertinently, looking at the opposition, the People’s Party (PP) came out as the great victor and then entered into an alliance with the far-right Vox party in some 10 cities. In the opposite corner to the alliance of left-wing parties governing Spain since early 2020, a right-wing bloc has emerged and seems to be on the up. As for the Liberals of Ciudadanos, they collapsed and are no longer represented in any one region. The very day after the elections, Sánchez decided to call early general election: something of a gamble for him.
At the end of last decade, Spain was experiencing a period of great political instability – and a rerun cannot be ruled out. In May 2018, Sanchez tabled a motion of no-confidence in the government of Mariano Rajoy, whose PP party was bound up in a corruption scandal. The no-confidence vote succeeded and Sánchez, with the support of the far left and almost all the regionalist parties, was sworn in as President of the government on 2 June. In early 2019, the Spanish Congress of Deputies threw out the draft finance bill. Sánchez obtained permission from the king to dissolve the Cortes Generales. The elections of April saw victory for the PSOE, but not a parliamentary majority, even with Podemos in the balance. The two parties failed to agree and Sánchez lost out in the investiture votes of 23 and 25 July. Despite the consultations carried out by King Felipe VI, the stalemate was total and a further round of the elections was called for 10 November. PP and Vox increased their share, while PSOE and Podemos lost three and seven seats respectively. This situation would prompt them finally to agree on a coalition government, with the addition of the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC). The investiture vote was not held until 4 January 2020 and Sánchez failed to win an absolute majority at the Congress of Deputies. In the second round of voting, a simple majority was all that was needed: he was victorious in the elections of 7 January by 167 votes in favour, 165 against and 18 abstentions, the tightest majority since the Constitution entered into force in 1978. Having acted as caretaker for nine months, Pedro Sánchez became a full head of government for four years. The coalition, representing 155 MPs out of 350, needed the support, or at least the neutrality, of a constellation of small parties representing around 40 seats in all.
There is little chance that this state of affairs will be repeated after the general elections of 23 July. There are in fact three likely scenarios: an unexpected left-wing victory, allowing continuity, a right-wing victory leading to a government made up of the PP and Vox, or complete failure to put together a majority of any kind (which could trigger further elections). All opinion polls show a comfortable lead for the PP, with 31% to 34% of voting intentions, followed by the PSOE, which is likely to increase its share, but not to exceed the 30% mark. Vox is expected to come in third, with around 15%. Podemos, meanwhile, is now part of a new party, born of a vast consultation of civil society and given the name Sumar (Unite), which is expected to gain up to around 14%. As for the remainder, there are around a dozen minor parties seeking the support of the electorate.
There are two factors at play that may change this situation: the dynamism of the campaigns of the various players and the tactical voting instinct in favour of the major parties. It will all boil down to how these votes translate into seats. It is unlikely that the right-wing bloc (PP + Vox) will obtain a majority (175), but its left-wing counterpart is even less likely to do so. On the other hand, the minor regional parties will be far less inclined to join forces with the right than the left.
What consequences could all this have for the six-month Presidency of the Council? In all its history, there have been many times when it has been led by a caretaker or minority government. But in a highly polarised context such as the one in Spain, a defeated executive would be constantly open to criticism from the opposition and the press close to it, which would paint it as not representative of the will of the people. It is, furthermore, true that membership of the European Union is a broadly consensual matter in Spain, so much so that it has not been a theme in the current election campaigning. It is therefore unlikely that an appeal to vote PSOE to ensure the continuity required by the Presidency of the Council will have much of an effect.
If the right-wing grouping is victorious to the extent that is able to form a government rapidly, there will be a mixture of continuity and change. Obviously, the PP’s experts are already working to ensure a smooth transition at European level, but their leaders are not bound by the 56 highly specific pages of the Presidency programme drawn up by the Sánchez government, much less by the programme of the Spain-Belgium-Hungary. With Vox as part of a national government for the first time, moreover, it is likely that there will be inflections, if not tensions. Because this far-right party, which is a recent but solid addition to the Spanish political landscape, has been campaigning not to leave the EU, but against the alleged damage it has done to farmers and fishermen as well as on the classic themes close to the hearts of those of this particular political stripe (climate scepticism, hostility towards migrants, abortion, women’s rights, LGBTI, the pro-independence movement, etc...), to say nothing of supporting national traditions (bullfighting, hunting, religion…). This means that there will almost certainly be a complete change of tack on the complex but important dossier of the migration and asylum pact, as well as, for instance, such matters as equality of the sexes.
One might respond by saying that the success of a Council Presidency is just as much a matter for the diplomats and technical expert behind the scenes. This is to cheapen the position that Spain, as a country, will defend in all of the debates. It is, above all, a reading that will feed into the narrative of those who wish to denounce an insidious depoliticisation of the European Union. Ultimately, it is also an error of understanding, as the common positions, decisions, recommendations, resolutions and conclusions of the Council are the result of political negotiations that can be carried out only by politicians who have been given a mandate through universal suffrage.
Well aware of the uncertainty caused by the election of 23 July, Pedro Sánchez has decided to postpone the speech of the head of the Spanish government to the European Parliament on the priorities of the Presidency until September. This speech will be highly anticipated, particularly if it ends up being made by his successor.
Renaud Denuit