I do not know of any reasonable person who wants to close the doors of Europe to a country like Turkey. The issue is more one of defining the nature of the relations which will be established (see this column of yesterday), without forgetting the current links which already go well beyond those with any other country: the customs union, bringing with it a largely joint trade policy.
Irrelevant arguments. For some time now, I have been convinced that full accession is not the correct formula, either for the EU or for Turkey. I would say that it is a “lazy” solution, dictated either by a lack of sufficient reflection or by the (more or less intentional) desire not to take full account of all of those aspects which should be considered. Some of the arguments in favour of accession are not relevant. For example, in my opinion we cannot simply dismiss the geographical criterion with a shrug of the shoulders. Geography counts, and how! We cannot use this argument in some cases (e.g. Morocco) and not in others. And the shared values criterion on its own is not enough. If it were, why not use it with regard to, for example, Québec? And why then doesn't Washington, instead of pressuring the EU to admit Turkey, offer it a place among the United States of America? These are jokes rather than serious questions, I admit, but my intention is merely to demonstrate that the values-criterion cannot be separated from the geographical.
As for the historical criteria, these are partly unusable. To observe, as Mr Bolkestein did, that the relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire have always been confrontational is pointless, as the relations between Germany and France, and many others, have also been just as confrontational. In fact, the whole point is to put an end to conflict. The historical argument does not work the other way either: to observe that Turkey's history has always overlapped with that of Europe is not a sufficient reason for accession, as the same could be said for many other countries outside Europe, including the USA.
If we take the various criteria cited on their own merit, we come finally to the only one of them which should be a determining factor: the political criteria. My impression is that many political figures and observers lack the lucidity or the courage to tell the whole truth on this matter.
Civil power and military power. The principle of the primacy of civil power is obviously a key one, and Europe cannot renounce it in any circumstances. And yet how can we refuse to see that it is military power which defends and has so far guaranteed the secular state in Turkey? It prevented Ataturk's legacy from being dismantled in 1997 through a coup d'Etat; it has slipped into the background at present because the EU's political forces are, logically enough, putting the emphasis on the primacy of civil power. Just recently (9 May) the Socialist group of the European Parliament published a press release under the title "'yes' to Turkey's accession process, 'no' to army involvement in political life” with this statement by Martin Schulz: “The Socialist group is very concerned about the attitude and involvement of the Turkish army in political life. Those who think the army can protect secularism are mistaken.”
This position is entirely justified, because using the force of arms to contest the results of a vote represents a negation of democracy, and the EU fights shifts in this direction elsewhere with all its power. In the same press release, Mr Schulz's comments are followed by those of Hannes Swoboda emphasising that the party in power in Turkey, the AKP, should “fully respect the principles of secularism” (who could disagree?) and that it is “currently the main driving force behind the country's democratisation and moves towards closer ties with the European Union” (which is somewhat less obvious).
The question which we are avoiding asking openly is: in the Islamic world, up to what point do free elections enable democracy and freedom to be introduced or consolidated, in concrete terms?
Free elections and consolidation of democracy and freedom. The facts indicate that often in Muslim countries, when the people finally get the chance to express their views, they support or consolidate the power of fundamentalist or religious forces. There are numerous and occasionally spectacular examples of this: the victory of the fundamentalists in the first round of the legislative elections of 1999 in Algeria, and the cancellation of the second round by the army, in order to prevent them gaining power; the rise in power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; the victory of AKP (moderate Muslims) in Turkey; the Hamas victory in Palestine. These choices are sometimes justified, at least in parts, by objective reasons, but the consequences if these choices have sometimes been terrible, in Algeria and in Palestine for example. Should we therefore regret that elections are held in certain countries? That would be absurd; it is clear that the EU must work to further the democratic method and to ensure that people can express themselves, even if the results are occasionally disconcerting. Every population has the chance to choose its regime, and their choice must be respected. But the EU should assess this choice, particularly in the case of a candidate for accession. The inspection should therefore become much more demanding, and certain demands are legitimate in key areas: rights of minorities, equality between men and women, religious freedom, the separation of church and state, etc. In Turkey's case, to this can be added an end to the occupation of a part of an EU territory (in Cyprus) by a foreign army.
Questions and explanations. There are two possible interpretations of the official Turkish attitude: either the authorities and politicians in general have not sufficiently considered the scope of the obligations which would result from access to the EU (with the limitations on national autonomy which result from it), or they are aware of them but are acting on priority: first obtain access, giving satisfaction to the economic forces and gaining the right to participate “from the inside” in all European decisions; then we can see how to deal with the inevitable complications.
In the area of external relations, Turkey's situation seems to me to have points in common (on a smaller scale) with the Russian situation: internal ethnic differences which they would rather deal with without external interference; their own strategy with regard to neighbouring countries which at one time were part of the same entity; complicated relations with the majority of its neighbouring countries; aspirations to an independent energy policy which is not subject to Community regulations. Turkey would therefore be most at ease in a less integrated European Union, without ambitious common policies and strong powers.
Cause for confusion in Europe. There are many sources of confusion, or at least causes for reflection, from the European point of view. The possible accession of Turkey would create difficulties in the functioning of both the planned European institutional mechanisms (as Turkey would be the member state with the greatest weighting in the Council and the largest representation in the European Parliament) and the funding of the Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Policy as they stand now. The EU would also find itself involved in the lively controversies within Turkey itself (not least the Kurdish issue) which complicate its relations with its neighbouring countries (Iraqi Kurdistan, Armenia). We have already had a taste of the future complications in Brussels, where the various Turkish ethnic groups, Armenians, etc. do all they can to involve the EU in their sometimes bloody quarrels. What will happen if all Turkish citizens benefited from the free movement of people in the EU, possibly even without controls under the Schengen system?
Furthermore, some observers do not share the opinion that the entry into the EU of a legally secular country run by moderate Muslims will help avoid “culture shock” and at the same time prove that the EU is open and co-existence possible; they fear that, on the contrary, developments in Turkey in the direction of the European social model (equality between men and women, rights for minorities, freedom of religion, etc.) will widen the gap between the Turkish state and more radical Islam, which will increasingly consider Turkey to be an enemy. Instead of being appeased, the conflict between civilisations could be aggravated.
The European face of Turkey. Alongside the confusion, there are reasons which argue in favour of Turkish accession; and they are powerful ones indeed. Turkey is European in its roots, history and civilisation, and in reality it already participates in Europe. It is a long-standing member of the Council of Europe, it was the first country linked to the European Community by an association agreement, it is the only country in a customs union with the EU, it has participated as an observer in the Convention which drew up the draft Constitutional Treaty, it is a member of Europol. The Turkish Employers' Association (Tüsiad) has long since been a member of Businesseurope (formerly Unice) and a representative has stressed that “in economic terms, Turkey is already part of the European family”. Part of Turkey is European from all points of view. Istanbul (which was formerly called Constantinople and Byzantium) and Turkey's Mediterranean coast bring together all the elements of European civilisation, starting from the myth of the nymph Europa's rape by Jupiter on that coast. Recent demonstrations in Istanbul in favour of the secular state were impressive. But to just what extent to they represent the wider Turkey? A partial response will emerge from the next elections and the nomination of the new president.
In the meantime, the meeting which recently took place in Ankara between Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Jean-David Levitte, a diplomatic advisor to Nicolas Sarkozy, is a positive sign. Confirming that the ongoing negotiations would continue, Mr Levitte probably raised the question of a possible “privileged partnership”. We can only hope that this possibility will soon take its place in the negotiations.
(FR)