The progressive convergence of views on institutional reform between the Community's six founding countries (see this heading in yesterday's EUROPE) does not cover all aspects. It would be nice if it did, but this is not the case. France, Germany and Italy, on one hand, and the three Benelux countries, on the other, have different opinions regarding the future composition of the European Commission. Some recommend a Commission with no more than 20 members, whatever the number of Union Member States. Others still support the formula "one Commissioner of the nationality of each Member State". How can one prevent such divergent views from becoming the cause of serious friction or permanent frustration, or from making to no avail the substantial convergence of orientation on more fundamental issues, such as strengthened cooperation before resulting in an effective and structured vanguard? The first effort needed is to try to understand the respective positions and certain bitterness.
The anxiety of Belgian and Luxembourg authorities. In different contacts with the Belgian and Luxembourg authorities, we have had the feeling that they are going through real anxiety in the face of what they see as an attempt to remove their countries (and the small countries in general) from a prominent position in the European entente. And there is no reason to believe it is any different for the Dutch authorities. The Benelux countries do not challenge the need for a "new form of vote weighting in Council taking the relative population size of Member States more into account", and they are willing to accept not only vote re-weighting but also the establishment of "double majority" in order to take population into account. The Benelux memorandum of 29 September is explicit on these points. But these countries have the impression that the "large" countries aim at minimising their role from all points of view: within the Council, within the Commission and within the Parliament. And they feel this as an injustice. They note that, in the federal States (in Germany as in the United States and elsewhere), one of the major Institutions welcomes the participant entities on a parity basis. Over and beyond the legal aspects, how could three countries that played such a large role in the history of European integration agree to being marginalised with negligible influence? They are aware that their role is not comparable to that of Germany and France, but they consider it to be no less significant: a balanced role, faithful to Community principles, and also often to compromises. So many celebrities from the small countries have played this role in the interest of Europe as a whole!
At the same time, the Benelux countries placed emphasis on the fact that the applicant countries would see as unacceptable exclusion the lack of any guarantee that one of their own nationals would be part of the permanent members of the European Commission, the Institution which, in the public opinions of their countries, embodies the EU more than any other. A Commission with many members would no doubt cause a few problems, but this, say the Benelux countries, would be less serious than exclusions.
Is the role of the large countries in danger? The large countries would be wrong to neglect the extent of these feeling s and reasons. But, at the same time, the Benelux countries must also make an effort to understand the position of the "large" countries. The quantified predictions of transposition, as such, of the current rules in a Europe with 30 members or more are hallucinating if not grotesque. The future Council could take important or decisive decisions despite the opposition of all the countries which have been building a united Europe for the past half a century. The new EU guidelines could be defined against the will of all those who founded it. The rule of one Commissioner per country, without any adjustments, would result in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom together having, within the Commission, an influence that would be less than half that of the new Member States. In a longer term outlook, they would be less represented than former Yugoslavia alone, if this were one day to be divided into Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro plus Kosovo. In an Institution that deliberates by simple majority of its members! If we were to get to such a situation, how could one imagine that the "large countries" would confer upon this Commission extended management powers and real political authority? Let's be realistic.
A high level aeropagus? Enlargement therefore makes some measures necessary regarding both the Council and the Commission. For the former, it would be a matter of providing for the three "large" countries together to be able to form a "blocking minority". If it is true, as some observers say, that the hypothesis of a coalition of small countries against the large is purely theoretical, having never occurred in fifty years, then so much the better. The blocking minority of the "large countries" will never need to come about. As for the Commission, it would appear there are only three alternative possibilities: either a ceiling to the number of members; or a Commissioner of the nationality of each Member State both present and future, with internal reform and internal "hierarchy"; or this last solution without reform. The last solution would transform the Commission into an aeropagus or learned assembly for discussions no doubt at a high level, but probably devoid of all real powers, which is exactly the opposite of what is recommended.
In institutional reform, everything holds together. The composition of the Commission is linked to its powers, and the two are linked to vote weighting within Council. If there is no overall view or reasonable consideration taken of the arguments of all, negotiation would encounter unpleasantness and blocking. Some efforts in order to re-establish better understanding are already under way, and we are pleased to point out the contribution by the former Permanent Representative of Belgium at the European Commission, Philippe de Schoutheete (1), who again called for reflection outside the usual scheme of things. He notes that the small countries need a strong and independent Commission, which takes everyone's interest into consideration without allowing itself to be influenced by the weight of the "large" countries. And the "small" countries should ask: "Is it in our interest to have a strong presence in a weak Commission, or a balanced but less weighty presence in a strong Commission?" Mr de Schoutheete thus expresses his view: "For those who trust in the Community method, which has well served Europe, there is no doubt about the response. It is the strength of the Institutions that is important".
To avoid having too many Commissioners, solutions other than rotation are beginning to be studied. The key point is the safeguard of the "Community method", which in turn implies a strong Commission, whose prerogatives would be maintained if not strengthened. This is in no way contradictory to the growing role of the Heads of Government, which represents an inescapable and even salutary evolution, as it is a positive thing that the highest member State authorities, whose democratic legitimacy and the visibility for the public opinion are obvious, should be increasingly involved in the orientations and even the management of Europe: see on this subject the conclusions of the seminar early September, chaired by Jacques Delors and Etienne Davignon (2). It would be naïve to oppose the fact that Heads of Government should exercise at European level a role corresponding to their national role, on the condition that this is done while safeguarding the "Community method", respecting the institutional balances set out in the Treaty, without secretariats or other new bodies outside the Community framework. Commission President Romano Prodi said something highly important on the safeguard of the Community method and the Commission's prerogatives, and on the risk of intergovernmental drift killing the democratic nature of European construction. It is therefore by this new tone taken by Romano Prodi and its significance that we shall conclude these reflections tomorrow, bringing to an end the silence that we had imposed on ourselves about the Commission president at the time when it was in fashion to say just about anything about him.
Ferdinando Riccardi
(1) Philippe de Schoiutheete's article on "Supporting the European Commission", published last week in Le Soir in Brussels. (2) See our bulletin of 6 September, pp.5/6.
Note: We have received echoes calling on us to reproduce, in our series EUROPE/Documents, the three main documents on which our editorial this week is based. It is true that these texts are available, in one way or another, but it is often the case that, for many of those interested they are more theoretically than truly available. So, after having sent our subscribers, with the present bulletin, the European Commission document on energy supplies (to be discussed at the end of the week by the Heads of Government at the Biarritz Summit, and which should therefore be made available immediately), we shall be sending them:
a) the speech delivered on 3 October in Strasbourg, before the European Parliament, by Commission President Romano Prodi; b) the "Benelux Memorandum on the IGC and the future of the European Union"; c) the joint document by Germany and Italy on "enhanced cooperation".