Clivages politiques et lignes de fracture au sein du Parlement européen
The aim of this study, carried out jointly by the Institut Jacques Delors and the Greek think tank ELIAMEP, is to take a deep dive into the voting tendencies of members of the European Parliament over the course of the first year of the current Parliament, identifying political networks and lines of division, not just between the political groups, but also within them.
“As at 10 July 2025, the European Parliament has 203 national parties represented by 701 members of the European Parliament, reflecting a high degree of political fragmentation. There are only twelve parties with more than ten delegates. 18 independent candidates have no party affiliation, 83 parties are represented by just one single MEP, 46 parties have two MEPs and three parties have three MEPs each. In total, 259 MEPs, or more than a third of the entire Parliament, belong to very small political parties or are politically unaffiliated. On the one hand, this strengthens the diversity and plurality of the EP. On the other, it is a constant concern as regards the formation of stable political and ideological networks, given the highly individualistic approach that prevails among the majority of these political ‘lone wolves’. Conversely, just ten national parties bring together 204 MEPs, thereby dominating political interactions within the EP”, the authors stress (our translation throughout).
An analysis of roll-call voting led the authors to identify three different types of political group. The first comprises groups with relatively high internal consistency. These are the EPP, the S&D and Renew Europe, “with the Greens some (short) distance away”. These parties can be described as the “central bloc”, sometimes described as the “von der Leyen majority”. The second group includes the ESN and the PfE. “The European Left and the ECR both occupy an intermediate position, showing thematic flexibility and temporary and selective convergence with both the other groups in different votes”, the authors observe, going on to stress that “the independent MEPs are characterised by enormous differences and low predictability in their voting behaviour”.
“All in all […], the S&D group is the most cohesive in the European Parliament, whilst the ECR and PfE groups show the greatest differences in the voting behaviour of their members, indicating lower internal cohesion. The EPP group and Renew Europe also show a high level of cohesion, reflecting a more stable and better coordinated political position within their groups”, the authors observe, going on to note that the members of the S&D, EPP and Renew Europe groups vote largely in accordance with the median position of their group. “Conversely, the ECR and PfE groups vote with the greatest dispersal […], which reflects a greater internal diversity and greater frequency of cases of divergent votes. Groups such as the Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL and ESN groups sit in the intermediate bracket, with moderate levels of cohesion”, the authors add.
EPP members are “broadly aligned on almost all matters […], with the most problematic area in terms of cohesion being the environment. There are very few cases in which the national parties systematically depart from the party line”, with the notable exception of the “Swedish Kristdemokraterna, which stands alone on most matters”. The Social Democrats of the S&D “operate with a high degree of convergence, which reinforces the unified political position of the group and its effectiveness in legislative procedures. Exemptions and special cases within this group are the Estonian party Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond on environmental issues and the Bulgarian party Balgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya and the Maltese party Partit Laburista on resolutions concerning Russia”. The Liberals of the Renew Europe group broadly vote very similarly, except on environmental matters. “The exceptions are the Danish party Det Radikale Venstre, mainly on environmental and energy matters, German party Freie Wähler, on budgetary and environmental questions, and the Latvian party Latvijas Attīstībai, on sanitary and budgetary issues”. “The group Greens/European Free Alliance participate actively in the decision-making progress, frequently coming into line with the majority whilst retaining a critical position on specific subjects. The group is dominated by the German Greens and shows great coherence in the fields of human rights, energy, the environment and technology, which are key issues in the group’s political and ideological manifesto”.
“The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group does not present a high degree of internal cohesion, with a somewhat vague and frequently contradictory position on key matters. It sometimes converges towards the positions of the ‘government bloc’ (EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens), following what is known as a ‘Venezuelan majority’. This alignment principally emerges in votes concerning the condemnation of authoritarian regimes (such as Venezuelan), democracy and matters relating to human rights”, the authors go on to explain. However, “the group’s cohesion is put under pressure on most issues, particularly the budget, relations with Russia, the environment, health policy and institutional matters. In these thematic areas, many of its members take a more sovereignist position. The Italian party Fratelli d’Italia plays a key role in setting out the group’s political line, whilst parties such as Perus suomalaiset (Finland), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden), Danmarksdemokraterne (Denmark) and Elliniki Lisi (Greece) move a considerable distance from the party’s principal line […].Elliniki Lisi systematically departs from the group’s general position, particularly on matters of foreign policy and democracy. On Russia, for instance, the party’s position is closer to that of the ESN group, which expresses more pro-Russian positions, and the same applies to the condemnation of authoritarian regimes and bolstering democracy as a European value. This reflects the greater ideological differences within the ECR and its limited ability to impose internal discipline, with some of its constituent national parties acting more like independent players than coherent members of the same political group”.
Despite the diversity of the radical left group, “the general level of cohesion is satisfactory, despite significant differences, notably on Russia, concerning which opinions are greatly divided […]. In general, the group […] maintains a critical position towards European integration. It rarely supports positions that reinforce deeper European integration, giving priority to social justice, ecological sensitivity and national sovereignty. The most controversial issue for the group is that of relations with Russia, the exceptions being the Danish party Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne, the Cypriot party AKEL, the Swedish party Vänsterpartiet and the Portuguese party Partido Comunista Português”, the authors note.
The Patriots for Europe (PfE) group “has no coherent voting behaviour and its members vote differently on most matters. It is therefore more a tactical alliance than a coherent political party based on ideological unity. The issue that divides this political group the most is that of the environment, on which differences are particularly wide. The Czech party ANO 2011 votes differently on budgetary and environmental issues; the Czech party Přísaha, on budget, environment, foreign affairs and resolutions concerning Russia; the Czech party Motoristé sobě, on environmental questions of foreign affairs. Austria’s FPÖ diverges on matters of technology, Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti on budgetary issues and the Dutch party PVV on health matters”.
The Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) “expresses a radical Eurosceptic and sovereignist political position, with strong opposition to European integration. It functions more like an artificial construction aiming to guarantee the advantages of a parliamentary cluster (funding, discourse, committees) than as a cohesive political movement. This can be clearly seen in the ESN’s low levels of cohesion on most matters, such as energy, foreign policy and relations with Russia […]. Its member parties are more on the same page when it comes to environmental matters, calling for an anti-ecological programme, and on questions of social policy, with a strongly anti-immigration position and discourse. The most noteworthy differences in voting behaviour can be seen on resolutions concerning Russia, with Lithuania’s TTS systematically voting against the group’s general line. France’s Reconquête française departs from the group’s general stance on matters of foreign policy and technology, whilst Poland’s Konfederacja votes differently on energy matters”, the authors note.
In conclusion, the authors stress that “the political divide between European integration and national sovereignism seems more marked than the traditional divide between Left and Right”. This also reflects “the growing importance of the European factor in European policy, but also in national policy”. This first analysis of its kind is clearly worthy of being continued and expanded throughout the course of the legislative period. (Olivier Jehin)
Antonis Papakostas, Spyros Blavoukos, Georgios Matsoukas. Analyse de la dynamique politique au sein du Parlement européen : clivages politiques et lignes de fracture (available in French only). Institut Jacques Delors & ELIAMEP. April 2026. 34 pages. This study can be downloaded free of charge from the Institute’s website: https://aeur.eu/f/lqx
Serbie : l’acceptation de la violence bloque les réformes
In this article published in an edition of the German review that focuses on south-eastern Europe, the journalist Thomas Brey (DPA), who has devoted most of his career to covering the Balkans, looks at how the Serbian political elite is using violence and how much this has filtered into society, blocking reforms and democratisation. For this reason, he argues, the European Union should develop a strategy to counter this phenomenon, at the same time tackling Russian propaganda.
Amongst other things, the author stresses: (1) role played by the influential Serbian Orthodox church, which denies women’ right to equality; (2) the large number of firearms in circulation (around 550,000 registered guns) and a total number that has been estimated at 2 million, making Serbia, “with 39 firearms for every 100 residents, making it, alongside Montenegro, the country with the highest number of private firearms in Europe – with only the United States and Yemen exceeding this figure globally” (our translation throughout); (3) frequent violence in the public domain, for instance the brawl at the Parliament in November 2024; (4) the use of the media as a weapon.
On this last point, Brey quotes Dusan Teodorovic, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: “regime uses the media as a weapon. Its media do not serve up information, but propagate fear and hatred and mobilise their members. The lower-quality press is permanently pursuing a strategy of polarisation, whereby any individual who takes the slightest step of line becomes an enemy. In this kind of atmosphere, conflicts with Serbian society are a real danger”. This leads the authors describe President Vucic as the “initiator and beneficiary of the violence”.
“It is barely comprehensible that the EU […], as Serbia’s biggest donor and trade partner, is and always has been denigrated, without anybody putting forward the slightest argument bearing any resemblance to reality. One effective measure would be to create a public counter-space to break the monopoly of the media”, the journalist argues, explaining that this could involve a reinforcement of the political foundations active in the south-east of Europe and supporting small groups of Western journalists to invest in daily efforts to correct this information.
“It is vital to tackle Russian propaganda. Since 2014, Russia has been using Serbia and the entire wider region as a test bench for disinformation techniques and themes, before going on to roll them out throughout Europe”, Brey stresses, going on to call for the EU’s financial aid to be conditional on the country’s progress towards reform and democratisation, and for solid support or programmes such as Erasmus, which would allow young people to see the absurdity of the propaganda for themselves. (OJ)
Thomas Brey. Serbien – Gewalt-Akzeptanz blockiert Reformen und Demokratisierung (available in German only). Revue Südosteuropa Mitteilungen. 05/2025. ISSN: 0340-174X. 112 pages. €17,00
Geopolitically Mapping the Western Balkans
The same edition of Südosteuropa Mitteilungen also contains a fascinating map of the roles, methods and influences of the various actors present in the Balkans. With the changing stance of the United States, currently, under the Trump family, looking like nothing so much as real estate agents, with Jared Kushner investing in luxury tourist complexes on the Albanian coast and a Trump Tower project in Belgrade under discussion. China is using trade as a weapon, along with the promise of an economic miracle, to promote its influence, whilst Turkey and the Gulf states are described by the authors as “missionaries” (our translation) exerting religion and cultural influence. Hence an appeal to the European Union to give greater consideration to all these games of geopolitical influence. (OJ)
Wouter Zweers, Ivan Kelecevic. Geopolitically Mapping the Western Balkans. Revue Südosteuropa Mitteilungen. 05/2025. ISSN: 0340-174X. 112 pages. €17,00