Hungarians are invited to renew their national parliament on Sunday 12 April, in general elections that will have major repercussions at European level, regardless of the outcome.
While according to the polls, the Tisza (‘Respect and Freedom’) party of Péter Magyar, an opponent of Viktor Orbán from the ranks of the Fidesz party, looks set to win, the outgoing Prime Minister, who is seeking a fifth consecutive mandate is far from admitting defeat. He is leading a campaign in which anything goes, from interference by foreign powers to disinformation about the European Union that is accused of imposing a way of life on Hungarians that clashes with their traditions by promoting gender equality and the uncontrolled arrival of migrants.
A true test of the nationalist wave that Europe’s far right hopes will sweep through the EU countries where elections will be held in 2026 and 2027, the Hungarian election is being closely watched in Brussels. If Mr Orbán were to remain in power, the EU would continue to be blocked in key areas such as political, financial and military support for Ukraine, which has been struggling for four years against Russian military aggression. It would probably lead to internal reflection within the EU on respect for the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ between Member States, at a time when Mr Orbán is blocking a new macro-financial loan to Ukraine as long as Russian oil deliveries via Ukraine have not resumed (see EUROPE 13825/26).
On the contrary, removing the Hungarian Prime Minister from power for at least four years would be a relief for those who are convinced that deepening European integration is the only way for Europe to carry weight in a world dominated by power struggles.
Mr Magyar’s accession to power would not necessarily mean a radical change of course for Hungary, and his ability to reform the country would also depend on the scale of an eventual victory.
Admittedly, the Tisza party is affiliated to the European People’s Party (EPP), from which the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, hails. Officially, the political families forming the ‘von der Leyen’ majority are required to be ‘pro-EU, pro-Ukraine and pro-Rule of law'. However, in January, the seven MEPs from the Tisza party did not take part in the vote on the motion of censure against Ms von der Leyen and were therefore punished by the EPP group.
Nevertheless, the fall of Mr Orbán could be a game-changer at European level. Agence Europe draws up an inventory of the political frictions and legal disputes currently pitting Hungary against the EU, and attempts to anticipate possible developments in the event of a change in power.
Priority number 1: unblocking the post-Covid-19 recovery plan. The Hungarian recovery plan, revised at the end of 2023 to include a ‘REPowerEU’ chapter designed to strengthen Hungary’s energy independence from Russia, will benefit from €10.4 billion in EU financial aid (€6.5 billion in grants, €3.9 billion in loans).
The Council of the EU adopted the initial Hungarian plan in December 2022 (see EUROPE 13082/2). Apart from pre-financing for the ‘REPowerEU’ chapter of around €920 million, no instalments of European financial aid have been paid to Hungary because it has not finalised the required prior measures. These ‘super milestones’ take up the 17 anti-corruption measures identified as part of the ‘Rule of law conditionality’ regulation, and include four reforms to improve the independence of the judiciary.
In order to access funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the financial instrument of the EU’s post-Covid-19 recovery plan, a ‘Tisza’ government will have to legislate between mid-May and the end of July to comply with the preconditions required by the end of August 2026, the deadline set for payments from the European Commission.
It is also possible that funds from the Hungarian recovery plan will be transferred to other EU programmes, such as InvestEU, and/or national development agencies.
In 2024, Donald Tusk’s accession to power in Poland enabled the release of European funds allocated to Poland’s post-Covid-19 recovery plan.
Priority number 2: the release of cohesion funds blocked for infringement of the ‘Rule of law’ conditionality regulation. According to data provided by the European Commission, on 1 January 2026, around €7.6 billion in EU cohesion policy was still blocked.
In December 2022, following the triggering of the Rule of law conditionality mechanism, which Hungary and Poland had unsuccessfully challenged before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (see EUROPE 12892/1), the Council of the EU suspended €6.3 billion of cohesion funds earmarked for Hungary due to persistent concerns about the protection of the EU’s financial interests (see EUROPE 13082/2).
At issue is the Orbán government’s refusal to respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: - the Hungarian Child Protection Law, which was referred to the CJEU by the Commission (see below); - restrictions on academic freedom; - a migration policy that violates EU asylum law and has been condemned by the European courts (see below).
Of these blocked sums, the Hungarian authorities definitively lost €1 billion at the end of 2024 and 2025 (see EUROPE 13551/14).
It should be noted, however, that despite these tensions, decisions have been taken in favour of Budapest. At the end of 2023, to help overcome Hungarian opposition to the opening of negotiations for Ukraine’s accession to the EU, the European Commission released €10.2 billion in European funds, taking the view that Budapest had undertaken judicial reforms to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see EUROPE 13313/9).
In March 2024, the European Parliament referred the Commission’s decision to the CJEU. In February 2026, the Court’s Advocate General proposed annulling the unfreezing of European funds intended for Hungary (see EUROPE 13807/19).
Deteriorating national public finances. On the budgetary front, Hungary, like nine other EU countries, is currently subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).
The Council of the EU has called on France to reduce its deficit to below 3% of national GDP by the end of 2026. After 5.4% of GDP in 2024, the Hungarian deficit for 2025 is estimated at 4.6% of GDP.
In addition, Hungary is one of seventeen EU Member States to have activated the national escape clause in the Stability and Growth Pact to increase their military spending. It is also the only country - of the nineteen that have sought loans from the ‘SAFE’ instrument to increase military spending - not to have received the green light from the Commission. If it had been approved, Hungary’s defence investment programme would have been allocated €16.2 billion, the second largest budget after Poland.
Some attribute this blockage to Mr Orbán's persistent refusal to approve the EU’s future loan to Ukraine.
Irreconcilable differences with the EU on the Rule of law and societal issues. In September 2018, the European Parliament initiated an ‘Article 7’ procedure on respect for the Rule of law in Hungary (see EUROPE 12094/14). After seven hearings within the ‘General Affairs’ Council, this procedure is still ongoing. And despite a deterioration in the situation in sectors such as justice and the media (see EUROPE 13676/27), the Member States are proving incapable of increasing the pressure on the Hungarian government.
If it carries out the reforms required to gain access to European funds and the RRF, a possibleTisza government could benefit from a lifting of the Article 7 procedure, as was the case when Donald Tusk returned to power in Poland.
Mr Magyar also raised the possibility of Hungary joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, as Hungary - along with Denmark and Ireland - is one of the three Member States that have not yet done so.
Furthermore, in the area of fundamental rights, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has been fighting for several years against any progress at European level in promoting the rights of LGBTIQ+ people.
Numerous conclusions on sectoral policies have not been adopted by the Council of the EU due to Hungary’s refusal to use the term ‘gender equality’ (see EUROPE 12713/10). This was also the case in June 2023, during negotiations on conclusions aimed at stepping up the fight against violence, including online violence, affecting the LGBTIQ+ community (see EUROPE 13198/3).
In July 2022, the European Commission decided to take Hungary to the European Court of Justice over a June 2021 law discriminating against LGBTIQ+ people. The proceedings in this case have not yet been concluded, although the Court’s Advocate General ruled in June 2025 that this law infringes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (articles 1, 7, 11, 21 - see EUROPE 13654/26).
Would a ‘Tisza’ government change Hungary’s position on respect for the rights of LGBTIQ+ people? The question remains.
The EPP party did not march in Budapest in June 2025 during the ‘Pride March’ in support of the LGBTIQ+ community. For its Chair, Germany’s Manfred Weber, taking part in Budapest Pride would have been counterproductive for the allied Christian Democrat party’s quest for power, given the deep-rooted conservatism in Hungarian society, especially in the countryside.
It should also be noted that, on social issues, Mr Orbán’s Hungary is resistant to any European policy aimed at tackling the housing crisis. In November 2025, it blocked the adoption of EU Council conclusions on the future European Affordable Housing Plan, considering that this policy should remain the responsibility of the Member States (see EUROPE 13755/38).
Towards the end of migratory blackmail? Two months before the entry into force of the ‘Pact on Migration and Asylum’, the outcome of the elections in Hungary could put an end to Hungary’s systematic obstruction of migration policy, which has been Viktor Orbán’s battle cry for over ten years.
Tensions between the EU and Hungary are crystallising around the CJEU’s ruling in June 2024 that Budapest deliberately ignored an earlier judgement from 2020. As a result, the Court imposed a lump-sum fine of €200 million on the Hungarian authorities, together with a record penalty payment of €1 million per day for as long as Hungary failed to comply with European case law (case C-123/22 - see EUROPE 13431/18).
In concrete terms, the blocking was based on the maintenance of the system of prior ‘declaration of intent’ in embassies, which de facto prohibits the lodging of an asylum application on Hungarian soil, as well as on the practice of pushbacks without an individual decision, in direct violation of the 2008 ‘Returns’ Directive.
If national law is not brought into line, the total amount of penalties levied by the European Commission by way of compensation from the cohesion funds will exceed €750 million by 9 April 2026, including almost €550 million in penalty payments.
In the run-up to the elections, Péter Magyar’s position on this issue suggests a change of method rather than a complete ideological about-turn. A victory for the Tisza party would probably lead to the repeal of laws deemed illegal by the CJEU and an end to illegal transit zones.
The turn towards security in the EU’s migration policy during the European legislature demonstrates the influence of the positions defended by Mr Orbán since he fiercely opposed compulsory mechanisms for the relocation of asylum seekers within the EU.
The controversial enlargement of the EU to include Ukraine. As a member of the EPP party, Mr Magyar’s party is supposed to be in favour of continued EU political, military and financial support for Ukraine. In the event of an election victory for the opposition to Mr Orbán next Sunday, a complete reversal of Hungary’s position on Ukraine should not be expected, an explosive issue within Hungarian society.
On the military front, Mr Magyar has already indicated that a ‘Tisza’ government would not deliver arms to Ukraine.
In political terms, it should be noted that at the end of 2023, Mr Orbán temporarily left the European Council meeting room so that the twenty-six other European leaders could decide to officially open negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU (see EUROPE 13314/1). Since then, Hungary has blocked the opening of negotiations on the chapters relating to the adoption of the acquis communautaire, even though the legislative screening work is continuing at a technical level in order to lose as little time as possible and continue to offer the Ukrainians a perspective.
If he wins the elections, Mr Magyar could change his country’s current head-on opposition to a constructive abstention, so as not to block the vast majority of Member States wanting to move forward. With all the internal EU challenges it represents in terms of assimilation, Ukraine’s accession will take time, even if this prospect is part of the security guarantees that could be granted to Kyiv as part of a comprehensive peace agreement with Russia.
The same applies to the twentieth package of sanctions targeting Russia. Finalised in February, it is currently being blocked by Budapest. In return, the Commission did not approve Hungary’s investment programme under the ‘SAFE’ instrument.
As for financial support for Ukraine, in exchange for the unfreezing of European funds, Mr Magyar’s Hungary could show flexibility and finally lift its veto preventing the finalisation of the EU’s €50 billion loan to Kyiv for 2026 and 2027. Even with the Tisza party in power, Hungary should not be affected financially by the EU loan in the same way as Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
In the field of defence, Mr Orbán’s departure could have the effect of unblocking payments from the ‘European Peace Facility’ (EPF), an instrument outside the EU budget which finances defence operations outside the EU to prevent conflict and strengthen international security (see EUROPE 12626/18).
Since the beginning of 2023, Hungary has been blocking the mobilisation of the EPF to reimburse the Member States for their arms deliveries to Ukraine, to the amount of €6.6 billion. In October 2024, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, proposed that the Member States provide voluntary contributions to the EPF, a proposal supported by Budapest, but which has still not come to fruition (see EUROPE 13503/7).
Unconditional support for Israel. After the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 2023, Hungary has sided with Israel, with Mr Orbán expressing his unconditional support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In line with the Trump administration’s and the Israeli government’s contempt for international law, Mr Orbán decided in April 2025 to withdraw his country from the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Announced on the same day that Mr Netanyahu, the target of an ICC arrest warrant for war crimes in the Gaza Strip, was in Budapest, this withdrawal is supposed to take official effect one year after its formal notification to the ICC (see EUROPE 13615/3).
Finally, the position of a potential ‘Tisza’ government on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be followed with interest. This would raise the question of lifting the Hungarian veto, which currently prevents the EU from imposing more sanctions on violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank. (Original version in French by Mathieu Bion with Justine Manaud)