Jacques Rupnik is a political scientist specialising in Central Europe. For Agence Europe, he analyses the issues at stake in the Hungarian parliamentary elections to be held on Sunday 12 April, at a time when the national-conservative Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, who has been in power for nearly sixteen years, appears to be weakened by his opponent, who is credited with 49.4% of voting intentions, according to the average of the latest opinion polls: Péter Magyar MEP (EPP), a former member of Fidesz - Viktor Orbán’s party - who has become leader of the centre-right Respect and Freedom party (Tisza). (Interview by Nithya Paquiry)
Agence Europe: Could these elections reshuffle the cards between Hungary and the European Union (see EUROPE 13845/2) ?
Jacques Rupnik: Above all, it is a political test of Budapest’s approach to its relations with Brussels and the European Union. And these relations have been tense, even marked by a certain hostility. We saw it in the campaign: Orbán spoke of “Brussels parachutists”, of Brussels as a threat.
What could change, if the polls are confirmed at the ballot box, is that the relationship would be re-established between members of a common, shared institution. Péter Magyar said it during the campaign: he is pro-European, in favour of NATO and the European Union. So, first of all, the tone is going to change. And not only that.
But we have to be careful what we say. It all depends on the scale of his victory and whether he is in a position to form a government. If he can not only change his tone, but also undertake a number of measures, such as lifting the block on aid to Ukraine, or showing in his domestic plan that he hears the criticisms levelled at the Orbán regime, then the funds blocked for Hungary could also be unblocked. That’s what he’s aiming for.
Viktor Orbán appears weakened. Is this a sign that power is wearing thin?
The wear and tear of power, certainly. Sixteen years in politics is a long time. The practices - nepotism, cronyism, corruption... It all comes into play. There’s also the economic slowdown and the whole energy issue to consider.
I wouldn’t say that the relationship with the European Union as such is a major factor in a no vote. This can be a factor, especially for the younger generation, who suffer from the image of a country that systematically sets itself up as the opposition. But that’s not the main factor.
Orbán has also sought to make his presence felt on the European stage.
His ambition was not just to protest from Budapest, but to take action and influence European policy. He has created a network at regional level and more widely at European level.
At European level, he helped form the Patriots group. In short, we could say: the national conservatives, or the ‘Trumpists’ on a European scale. It began in Central Europe, with Robert Fico in Slovakia (Slovak Prime Minister, editor’s note) and Andrej Babiš (President of the Government, editor’s note) in the Czech Republic. Poland and Hungary were initially the linchpins of this grouping. Poland’s defection was a major event.
But his network is much broader. There are relations with Geert Wilders (leader of the far-right Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, editor’s note), closer ties with Georgia Meloni (Italy’s Prime Minister, editor’s note) and the support of Marine Le Pen (President of the far-right Rassemblement national group in the French National Assembly, editor’s note). So if he loses the elections, his ambition to reshape European politics will obviously be undermined.
What does Péter Magyar represent from a European perspective?
First and foremost, he was the candidate around whom the opposition could rally. Orbán has won four elections in a row. There have been several attempts at a coalition, all of which have failed. Magyar, on the other hand, has managed to impose himself.
But it should be remembered that he comes from Fidesz. He has twenty years of Fidesz behind him. He comes from that background. So we need to remain cautious. If you look closely, you can see that he doesn’t break on everything. The border fence put in place in 2015 would be maintained. They are against quotas. They are also against the idea of Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the European Union.
However, he will no longer oppose or veto aid to Ukraine. That’s the good news for Ukraine. But on enlargement, the position is more cautious: we’ll see later. There’s no rush.
I’d say he’s closer to a moderate right, a European centre-right, something not far removed from the EPP.
Would a victory for the opposition be enough to transform the system?
Dismantling is a very difficult business. The only case we have is Poland. But in Poland, it was eight years, not sixteen. And even there, the dismantling was partial.
The question is: how do you dismantle an illiberal regime without using illiberal methods? If we try to do it by following all the rules, we run the risk of not making much progress.
Political change, symbolic change, would be the easy thing. The most difficult things are the structures. Without a two-thirds majority (the threshold required in Parliament to amend the Constitution in Hungary), it will be difficult to change constitutional rules or appointment mechanisms.
While there are areas where he will be able to move quickly, notably public broadcasting, which has been totally under government control, on the whole it will be complicated.
It should also be said that the Hungarian justice system has not been completely transformed, as in Poland, and has retained a relative autonomy.
What is most difficult is the interweaving of the economic oligarchy and the state apparatus. That’s the Orbán system. Economic groups that are dependent on the State or want to work with the public sector must align themselves. And this then has an impact on the media.
What should the European Union do in the event of a changeover?
It is important that the political and symbolic change in Budapest finds an echo in Europe that is equal to the circumstances. We need to make our mark. Europe was presented as a scapegoat, as a warmonger. We need to show that change is possible.
But this cannot be done by the Commission alone. Ms von der Leyen is not particularly popular in Hungary. The signal should also come from Europe’s political leaders.
And perhaps tangible proof should be provided. On the one hand, Magyar would unblock aid to Ukraine. On the other, it is possible that as measures are taken, some of the funds blocked for Hungary will be released.
And if Viktor Orbán wins?
The campaign will leave its mark. But Orbán is a very experienced player. His method has always been the same: confrontation, negotiation then compromise.
If he is re-elected, he will obviously be strengthened. He will seek to consolidate his role as a unifying figure for the national-conservative right in Europe. He will also have external support. But he can’t go too far. The Hungarian economy is in a bad way and European funds are important. So he knows the limits.
He will no doubt intensify the power struggle. But without crossing the line completely.