Qui fait l’opinion ?
In this work, which deals with the democratic crises affecting the European countries and the influence of the “new media”, the director of the Observatoire de l’opinion [Observatory of Opinion] of the Fondation Jean Jaurès takes a deep dive into how opinion is formed and how it affects voting participation.
Antoine Bristielle’s starting point is the widely shared view that the first manifestation of the crisis of democratic representation, in France and many other Western democracies, is a drop in voter turnout, with fears of a shift to a “democracy of abstention”, in which a growing number of citizens stay away from the ballot boxes permanently (our translation throughout). On top of this comes the growing phenomenon of affective polarisation: “The citizens do not necessarily have more ‘extreme’ opinions than previously, but their adherence to a particular camp is increasingly manifest, leading them systematically to reject proposals coming from the other camp”, the author stresses, setting out to examine the existing link between the crisis of political representation in its four principal dimensions – lower election turnout, voting for populist parties, subscribing to conspiracy theories and affective polarisation – through the prism of changes in the media landscape.
“Far from the assertions on the subject made by many journalists, studies show that the trend in ideological polarisation has in fact been downwards in recent decades. The fall of the USSR is not unrelated to this phenomenon: now, even political parties described as ‘far left’ ultimately have fairly reformist agendas. It is, rather, affective polarisation that is on the increase in Western democracies”, Bristielle writes. He goes on to point out that “although the increasing number of information sources is not unrelated to this phenomenon (…), the increased emphasis in the public debate on so-called ‘societal’ subjects rather than economic and social ones is another root cause of this. These intimate matters, related to individual rights, are more liable to appeal to voter sensitivity and prompt them to look upon the opposing camp as an enemy rather than an adversary”.
He continues by explaining that “affective polarisation brings about major problems for the viability of democracies. The democratic pact is not based on the principle of consensus, in other words the absolute and unrealistic quest for a position that pleases all citizens. There are many social groups within society, each with their own interests and concerns, some of which are sometimes simply incompatible with the interests and concerns of the other social groups. Rather, the democratic pact is based on the fact that the negotiations resulting from electoral power balances are accepted by all. However, when affective polarisation becomes too great, the social group that loses weight in the political arbitration may simply refuse to accept the decision, with, in some cases, recourse to violent challenges of the election results. The storming of the Capitol by Donald Trump supporters on 6 January 2021 must be understood against the backdrop of an American society in which this phenomenon of affective polarisation is very strong. Those protesters quite simply felt that living in a country governed by a Democratic President was unconscionable”.
The author, who has analysed political communication by type of medium or format, notes that “if political issues are in the majority in classic distribution (58%) and on the social networks (65%), the same is not the case in the field of ‘infotainment’ (46%), which mixes information and entertainment”. “Contrary to the discourse claiming that the social networks are depoliticised spaces, it is, in fact, within these online formats that political representatives have the greatest opportunity to develop their vision on the principle issues of public policy”, he observes, adding that “the networks also play into an individual discursive register (52%), more so than ‘infotainment’ offerings (45%) and far more than the classic output (5%), in which institutional register is virtually omnipresent. As for emotions, these are emphasised more on the social networks (65%) than in traditional political broadcasts (44%) and in ‘infotainment’ (27%), supporting the ‘emotional reveal' surprisingly little (…). Lastly, and less surprisingly, the contradiction added in by the journalist is greater in classic broadcasts than in ’infotainment’ (6°% compared to 26%)”.
Contrary to another widely held assumption, “the fact that a person has seen one particular type of content rather than another, or has not seen any extract, has no particular effect on voting intention”, Bristielle explains, going on to analyse the influence of the social networks on conspiracist attitudes. “When French people were asked whether they believed in ten conspiracy theories, 35% reported not believing in any of them, 17% believed in one of them, 27% believed in two to four theories, 11% believed in five or six theories and 10% believed in seven theories or more. One can only conclude that conspiracism is spreading rapidly in France”, the author writes, going on to describe the fertile soil on which the seed has landed. “The feeling of living in an increasingly uncertain and uncontrollable society, growing mistrust of the institutions and politicians and, finally, the fact of acquiring information on the social networks”. In particular, as social networks function like bubbles, allowing conspiracy theorists to find fellow Internet users who share the same sensibilities, but also as echo chambers, which may eventually reinforce and/or build the conspiracist leanings of those who meet there. (Olivier Jehin)
Antoine Bristielle. Qui fait l’opinion ? – Crises démocratiques et nouveaux médias (available in French only). Fayard. ISBN: 978-2-2137-2578-9. 245 pages. €21,90
Les Balkans en 100 questions
The Balkans continue to be “pawns in a global game of strategy being played above their heads” (our translation throughout). “From this point of view, the situation in the region is barely any different today from what it was in the 20th century – only the list of ‘major powers’ has changed. Russia and Turkey are still there, the United States and China have become major players, while the European countries, now united, are supposed to be speaking with one voice, although this is not always the case”, journalists Jean-Arnault Dérens and Laurent Geslin, who specialise in Balkan affairs, write in the introduction to this book.
Although the “vocation” of all countries of the region to join the European Union was affirmed by the European Council of Thessalonica in 2003, they remain a long way away from this objective, 20 years down the line. And “while the EU very often supports corrupt autocracies in the name of regional stability, many of the Balkan people have lost all hope of ever seeing their country move towards the much-vaunted European ‘standards’ – functioning rule of law, a more or less effective social protection system. Tired of waiting for Europe to come to them, they are leaving en masse, and the exodus movement that is emptying the south-east of Europe represents the main challenge for the future of the countries of the region, even those that are members of the EU, such as Bulgaria and Croatia”, the authors stress.
“The Balkan states, whether they have succeeded in slipping into the EU in time or have a ‘vocation’ to remain ‘eternal candidates’, remain a dominated territory. Their only economic ocation seems to be provided cheap and competent labour, either to be exported or to work in delocalised factories. They also have to play the role of ‘border guards’ for the EU, even though the ‘Balkans route’ has been one of the main routes of access for exiles from Asia, Africa and the Near and Middle East since 2015”, state Dérens and Geslin, who aim to show that the “challenges and problems currently facing the countries of south-eastern Europe do not arise from the ‘exceptionality’ or even the ‘exoticism’ of the Balkans”.
“On the contrary, on all matters from the authoritarian direction taken by the states, nationalistic demagogy fed into by the decaying elite, playing down racist, xenophobic or revisionist tendencies, the ever greater precariousness of employment, violent border control through to the pillaging of natural resources, the Balkans have often anticipated the trends that then spread out through rest of Europe”, the authors stress. They then examined, in 100 questions, the Ottoman legacy, the fall of the empires and both World Wars, the Socialist experience, the collapse of Yugoslavia, persisting nationalism, the economy, European integration, which is starting to flag, and external influences – from Russia to China via Turkey and the Gulf states, not to mention the influence networks woven by Viktor Orbán – the environment, culture and the media as well as contemporary challenges. (OJ)
Jean-Arnault Dérens and Laurent Geslin. Les Balkans en 100 questions (available in French only). Tallandier. Texto. ISBN: 979-1-0210-6365-5. 314 pages. €10,50
L’Albanie au grand défi d’adhérer en 2030
October 2024 saw the opening of the first chapters of Albania’s negotiations to join the European Union, committing the country to meet a challenge that is all the tougher for the fact that it has been set for 2030, researcher Sébastien Maillard stresses in this publication of the Institut Jacques Delors.
“A member of the Council Europe since 1995 and of NATO since 2009 – the year it applied to join the European Union – Tirana is cultivating its links with both Washington and Brussels, like the Baltic states that are often taken as a reference. It is keeping Russia at arm’s length, but also China, particularly under pressure from the United States, which has made the country its rear base” for intelligence in the region, Maillard stresses, adding that Albania’s alignment on the common security and defence policy has been “complete for several years consecutively” (our translation throughout). “Its proximity to Turkey has not prevented it from refusing to extradite opponents to Erdoğan”, the author also stresses, adding that “this Euro-Atlantic allegiance makes it a reliable ally in these times of geopolitical renewal. The ‘land of eagles’ will be the host of the next European Political Community Summit, to be held in June 2025. It is also lobbying to host the 2027 NATO summit”. The cherry on the cake is that “its anchoring in the West is a matter of consensus in society and the entire political class. There is no party challenging the objective to join the EU, which is shared by the population. Adherence to Europe is reported to be the highest in the region. According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey, 87% of Albanians considered that their country joining the EU would be ‘a good thing’”.
“In the inextricable dispute between Belgrade and Pristina, Tirana is urging the Kosovo government to follow the recommendations of the EU and the United States. Losing influence “on” over Pristina, Albania cannot lay claim to any mediation role in a conflict in which it would not be seen as a neutral and therefore credible player. It is keeping its distance. The country’s elite rejects the fantasy of forming a ‘Grand Albania’, a political slogan that is inaudible in Tirana and absent from the public debate”, Maillard stresses. He goes on to state that “emigration is reinforcing a diaspora that is shared out principally between Italy, Greece and Germany. Basically, the Albanians joined the EU before Albania. The diaspora, estimated at a total of 1.7 million people in 2020 (then equivalent to 59% of the resident population), is also very present in the United States. This strong foreign presence, which has been put at as many as 2 million people, supports pensioners, whose pensions are still largely insufficient to live on, with abundant transfers (9% of GDP in 2022)”.
There remains the matter of corruption. “A recent study backed by the EU shows that the share of the adult population admitting to having corrupted or being corrupted by public agents was still a high level of 40% in 2023, as it had been in 2014 (…). Today, the population is the most exposed to corruption in the Western Balkans, according to the same study. The Transparency International index of perception of corruption in 2023 put the country in 98th place out of 180, slightly higher than Serbia and Ukraine (currently in joint 104th place)”, the author notes, recalling that Albania continues to have a particularly high involvement in drugs trafficking.
The deadline of 2030 that Albania has set for itself was not confirmed by President von der Leyen during her visit to Tirana on 23 October 2024, but the Commission supports a very tight timetable and negotiations, Maillard reports. Following the opening of the first group of five chapters on 15 October, a second group is expected to be opened in mid-December. All 35 chapters should be likewise open by the end of 2025, with the stated aim of concluding all chapters by the end of 2027 to then allow enough time for each of the Twenty-Seven to ratify the accession treaty. “Keeping to this timescale will be a challenge, but it will allow Edi Rama to launch a dynamic, to create the conditions to force the pace among the government, public services and business”, the author argues, adding that in his view, “the chapter likely to cause the greatest headache will be the one on the environment”, particularly on bringing waste water treatment into line with the standards. The government, Maillard goes on to stress, is already planning to negotiate a transition period of 10 years after accession to meet this goal. (OJ)
Sébastien Maillard. L’Albanie au grand défi d’adhérer en 2030 (available in French only). Institut Jacques Delors. Décryptage, November 2024. 8 pages. The publication be downloaded free of charge from the Institute’s website: https://aeur.eu/f/epq