Already in 2023, the case was being made in certain quarters to prevent Hungary from taking up the Presidency of the Council of the EU, for reasons that our readers need no reminder of. Certain members of the European Parliament made this into a question of principle. The resolution adopted, by a very considerable majority, by the European Parliament on 1 June of that year has in fact a much broader remit, targeting the worsening rule of law situation in the country. The institution questioned the capacity of the Hungarian government to execute its Presidency with credibility and called upon the Council to find a solution (see EUROPE 13192/7). As the treaty makes no provision for this kind of sanction, things moved no further than that.
Meanwhile, the situation in Hungary improved not one jot and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continued to provoke his counterparts and block legislation, particularly on the sensitive matters of aid to Ukraine and the country’s possible accession to the EU.
In an interview in May of this year, Orbán unveiled the five priorities of the forthcoming Presidency (migration, Ukraine, European defence, competitiveness, demographic crisis) (see EUROPE 13420/18); but when the programme was officially launched on 18 June, it contained seven priorities, in the following order: a new Pact on competitiveness, reinforcing European defence, a merit-based enlargement policy – making no reference to the Western Balkans – a halt to illegal migration, the future cohesion policy, a farmer-friendly CAP and, finally, demographic challenges. The logo of the Presidency, a ‘Rubik’s Cube’, symbolising Hungarian ingenuity, and the slogan chosen, ‘Make Europe Great Again’, eclipsed all other messages (see EUROPE 13434/12).
There was something quite grotesque in this paraphrasing of Trump’s slogan. What even is this Europe that was once great (or should we say awesome)? The Europe from before the Communities, the Europe of the 19th century, the Europe of the Enlightenment or the conquistadors? The Presidency could shed no light. Even a meaningless slogan has a meaning; in this case, the Europe we have now is no good. It also references Orbán’s veneration of Trump, a man with only the most basic understanding of Europe.
Incidentally, the Hungarian programme, 44 pages long and structured in accordance with the official layout of the Council, proved to be a job of work entirely in keeping with documents of this kind. It covered all the most important current issues and sought honourably to find its own ground in a period of transition, against the backdrop of the installation of the new European Parliament, the formation of the new Commission and the end of the Michel era.
One might nonetheless detect within it a propensity to increase the number of informal meetings (when the Council meets in Hungary) and adopt conclusions rather than legislation (even though there are some 30 dossiers on the table for negotiation with the Parliament). The Presidency will reach its zenith on 7 and 8 November, with the meeting of the European Political Community, then the European competitiveness summit.
In June, therefore, the eurosphere was reasonably calm, attributing to Hungary’s diplomats a level of technical knowledge that was more than adequate and a sense of fair cooperation. At midnight on Monday 1 July, the Hungarian Presidency began. The traditional visit of the College of Commissioners did not take place, having been postponed until September at the earliest. The next day, for the first time since the attack of February 2022, Viktor Orbán was in Kyiv. His meeting with the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy bore little fruit (see EUROPE 13444/21), then Budapest confirmed that it was blocking the European Peace Facility earmarked for Ukraine (see EUROPE 13446/4).
But the surprises did not stop there. On 5 July, the Hungarian leader was in Moscow to discuss Ukraine with Putin, in violation of the political line adopted by the European Council and bearing no EU mandate (see EUROPE 13447/1). On 8 July, he met senior Chinese government figures in Beijing. The timing chosen was somewhat bizarre. The whole enterprise was presented as a peace mission – under the logo of the Presidency of the Council. A salvo of protests by the other leaders followed. At Coreper, all the ambassadors (with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia) agreed that the move was out of line. On 16 July, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, wrote to Orbán in the strongest possible terms, reminding him that the rotating Presidency of the Council had ‘no role in representing the Union on the international stage’ (see EUROPE 13455/18). On 17 July, the European Parliament voted through one more resolution on Hungary, condemning the conduct of its prime minister on various heads (see EUROPE 13455/4). The following day saw the publication of a report by Orbán to Michel, justifying these numerous international contacts out of the desire to reopen diplomatic channels with powers other than the United States, whose pro-war policy he argued had been adopted by the EU (see EUROPE 13456/5).
Even so, the credibility of the Hungarian Presidency took considerable damage. In July at least, several member states of the EU with geographical proximity to Russia were reported to have been represented at the informal Council meetings by senior civil servants (see EUROPE 13452/24); for instance, there were just four ministers at the ‘Energy’ Council of 15 and 16 July. The Commission President decided that the institution would be represented at all informal Councils of the six-month period not by Commissioners, but by Directors General; furthermore, the postponed meeting of the College with the Hungarian government was cancelled (see EUROPE 13453/8).
The ‘Foreign Affairs’ Council met in Brussels on 22 July, quite properly under the chairmanship of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell. The debate was uncommonly tense, as the Hungarian minister, Peter Szijjarto, accused the EU of ‘pushing for war’. Additionally, the Presidency had included in informal Gymnich-style meeting of the same Council on its own agenda, to take place in Budapest on 28 and 29 August; having played for time and consulted on the matter, Borrell decided that this meeting would be held in Brussels, much to the fury of the Hungarians (see EUROPE 13458/1).
For the month of July at least, the Presidency of the Council of the EU has been busy. The story is not complete without a mention of Hungary’s manoeuvrings at the European Parliament. Under the previous term, the Fidesz MEPs found themselves without a political family, having had to leave the EPP. The 11 MEPs elected on 9 June were the focus of all the Prime Minister’s attention, first trying unsuccessfully to get them into the Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR). There was no question of courting the ‘Identity and Democracy’ group, in freefall after the split between the French Rassemblement national and the German-rights group (AfD). Viktor Orbán then reached an agreement with Marine Le Pen (30 MEPs) to create a new group: the ‘Patriots for Europe’ (PfE) (see EUROPE 13448/1).
In the new Parliament, then, there are now three far-right groups (PfE, ECR and the German-dominated Europe of Sovereign Nations). What these groups have in common is that they have obsessions rather than manifestoes: immigration, the end of the rule of law as we know it and restoring to the states the powers transferred to the EU. As leaving the EU is legally but not politically possible, they choose instead to bring it down from within, treating the institutions with contempt. The head of the Hungarian government is therefore a kind of role model: an egregious act followed by a fake return to normal, one foot outside and one within.
The pro-European parties, which gave Ursula von der Leyen her majority on 18 July, are committed to tackle the far right. A cordon sanitaire was agreed within the institution, with a degree of tolerance for the ECR, which is felt by the EPP at least to be less fascistic than the others. The turbulent applications for the posts of president and vice-president of parliamentary committees spoke volumes. The ‘Patriots’ were beaten in every vote and it was their Hungarian contingent that was angriest about this (see B13459). The chosen strategy was to challenge the legitimacy of the Parliament – and that of the European Commission – as loudly as possible, for instance on the occasion of its latest report on the rule of law in the EU, which was published on 24 July (see EUROPE 13469/1) and is no less damning of Hungary.
The six-month Presidency of the Council needs to secure agreements, calmly and fruitfully. After that, one would like to think that there will be some loyalty to see. Challenging the legitimacy of the European institutions generates negative energy, which is of no service to the people. It is reminiscent of Holzwege, paths that lead nowhere.
Renaud Denuit