The euro became part of everyday life. Prodi saw out his five years before returning happily to Italian politics, where he would preside over another government. 2004 was an interesting year for the EU: following the pitiful Treaty of Nice, the member states felt ashamed enough of themselves to work with civil society to set in train, prepare and sign a Constitutional Treaty, whilst the EU gained ten new members.
It was the same old problem for the Council: ‘who shall we send to Brussels?’ Would Belgium finally get its turn, and the Liberal family along with it? Chirac and Schröder supported Guy Verhofstadt, a rumpled but top-flight head of government, but keen and with undoubted European motivation. But the history of ten years earlier repeated itself: a British veto, this time from Tony Blair, first rumoured and then overt.
So who would it be, from a small country? A Portuguese candidate was found, who had served as Prime Minister for two years and had sympathy for Anglo-American priorities (having supported the war in Iraq). President Chirac went along with it as the candidate spoke French. A member of the EPP, Jose Manuel Barroso won the approval of the Parliament (see EUROPE 8753/1). And as the 2009 European elections were won by his party, an extension of his mandate was deemed legitimate (see EUROPE 9978/1), and the situation would be satisfactory to all governments.
The Treaty of Lisbon did not enter into force until after the European elections of 2009. It brought in new provisions for the appointment of the President of the Commission: the European Council would no longer be bound by the requirement of unanimity to propose a candidate, but would decide by qualified majority; it would have to take account of the results of the European elections. It was on this basis that the Parliament and the political families devised the system of Spitzenkandidaten, whereby the European Council would have to choose the political figure, previously designated the figurehead of his or her party, belonging to the largest political group (or at least the one who had demonstrated an ability to unite several groups to forge a majority).
It was under this new system that despite a ridiculous campaign against him by David Cameron, the former Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker (who beat Michel Barnier to the role within the EPP), became the Commission President in 2014 (see EUROPE 11122/1).
In 2019, the system was called into question by the Liberal family and then by the European Council itself which, on 2 July, shortlisted none of the Spitzenkandaten, and – in another unprecedented move – looked for its candidate outside the usual pool considered by the Council since 1994 (see EUROPE 11287/1).
This was a defeat for the Parliament; but in 2018, it had committed a massive strategic mistake when it rejected the idea of transnational lists (see EUROPE 11956/1). This was tantamount to handing over on a plate the argument that the Spitzenkandidaten should be elected only by a national or international electoral college, without any say for the citizens of the entire EU.
Ursula von der Leyen has Europe in her DNA, as her father, Ernst Albrecht, served as chef de cabinet to the second German Commissioner in the Hallstein Commissions, then as Director General in the institution, and as she attended a European school in Brussels. She began her political career in the stomping ground of her father, then Minister-President of Lower Saxony, before landing several ministerial positions (Family, Work, Defence since 2013) in the local governments. Her achievements are mixed, her ability to lead an impregnable management system or to create political allegiances a matter of some doubt (see EUROPE 12288/5). Her commitment to Europe is undoubtedly sincere, but not hitherto strong enough to get her out of Germany. She has not sat as a member of the European Parliament or the Commission, she has not stood for European elections and she is not known to have produced any political works on the subject, or even a significant speech.
She therefore had no time to lose in getting in touch with the political groups, so as to secure a majority and define the outlines of her future actions.
If she wins the blessing of the EP, this will have proven that the conditions for becoming the President of the Commission have changed. Whereas the position was once under a de facto male monopoly, the door is open for a woman, not because this was what the parties or the Parliament wanted; it has come from the European Council. The Council has taken account of the results of the European elections simply insofar as the post goes to an individual from the party which won the most seats. The Council is expanding its pool, but has confirmed that experience in a solid national ministerial post is a must. This means that a member of the outgoing Commission, even one who has shown commitment and achieved sound European results, would carry less weight, comparatively, than a national minister who has earned his or her stripes; the chances of an MEP, even one completely committed to a position of this level, would be zero.
As regards the democratisation of the EU, the European Council is moving backwards. It is discouraging the Europeanisation of the political parties and scorns their choices in advance. As for the citizens, the imperfect system of Spitzenkandidaten at least has the merits of a degree of comprehensibility and of being likely to prompt a response in the affirmative to the perennial Eurobarometer question: “Does your voice count in the EU?”.
For the future, Angela Merkel has spoken of options such as transnational lists or the election of the President of the Commission by direct universal suffrage. I will certainly be returning to this subject.
Renaud Denuit
See the first (EUROPE 12292/1) and the second (EUROPE 12293A1) series of this Beacons.