Special relations. In the European Commission's latest reports on current and planned accession negotiations, Turkey is a special case. Its desire to join the EU has been recognised for many years and formal negotiations have been under way since 2005. It has sometimes been asked how European Turkey is, however, with most of its surface area lying in Asia. Negotiations have been languishing (barely 8 of the 35 chapters to be negotiated have been opened) and some member states, such as France, have come out explicitly against Turkey's accession. At the same time, Turkey is the country with which the EU has formed the closest ties: it is the only one in a customs union and the number of Turkish immigrants to the EU is the highest of all. But Euro-Turkish relations have also some amazing anomalies: Turkey is the military occupier of part of the EU, and it only applies free trade rules to some of its trade with the Union. What is to be made of all this?
My opinion was formed a long time ago: it is in both parties' interests to have special relations, but I feel that accession is not the right way forward. Mine is only one of many opinions, and is not any more worthy than that of any other EU citizen. But I believe that the reasoning behind it is becoming stronger. If Turkey were to join, the very structure of the EU would be compromised. The size of Turkey would give it greater power in the Council than any other member state, and the largest number of MEPs. From the economic and financial points of view, the common agricultural policy and the regional policy would no longer be viable. On the political and cultural levels, it is incorrect to include the oft-cited problems of Turkey's democratic functioning and its religious differences from the EU among the barriers to accession. There are no obstacles on these two levels, because Turkey is a democratic secular state, and it can continue to make progress and consolidate what has been achieved. The real issue is whether it is not in Turkey's interest to retain its independence and freedom of action. I am certain that this is so, and I wonder just how far Turkish politicians and people realise the constraints that accession would involve.
Turkey's special role requires its independence. Turkey has a key role to play in the huge region that was once part of the USSR, some areas of which belonged formerly to the Ottoman Empire and have retained cultural, religious and linguistic links with Turkey. The European Commission highlighted this geo-strategic role (see Newsletter No 9772): key player in the Caucasus and Middle East, stabilising role in the region (Turkish initiative on creation of a platform of stability for the Caucasus), alternative route for EU energy supplies. At the same time, it has considerable difficulties, both internally with the Kurds and on its borders, for example with Iraqi Kurds and, in the future, Iran. It is up to Turkey to manage these difficulties. The EU cannot contemplate intervening within the framework of its still evolving common foreign policy.
It is also in Turkey's interest to retain its independence in energy, as a transit country vital to Europe's supply. Close cooperation with the EU is essential, and has always to be extended and deepened. But virtually every day brings proof that it is in Turkey's interest to retain its freedom of action without being constrained by European internal market rules - see, for example, Euro-Turkish negotiations on the management of the Nabucco gas pipeline, where one of Ankara's demands “runs counter to Community internal market legislation” (see Newsletter No 9778).
Continue to negotiate. None of above means that negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU should be halted. On the contrary, they are extremely useful for determining the conditions for deepening and improving current links, for consolidating the operation of the customs union and with a view to ever closer cooperation, and they will help Turkey make progress on the path of freedom and democracy and to settle the hugely complex problems of its relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey needs Europe and the EU needs Turkey - an independent Turkey, a largely Asian country able to exert its influence in the Caucasus and elsewhere.
Turkish accession to the EU would unbalance the European institutions and would make it impossible to manage and develop common policies. It would leave the Lisbon Treaty destabilised. Let us not spoil the very positive prospects for EU-Turkish relations by not taking the time to reflect.
(F.R./transl.rt)