More efficient and more legitimate. Over the last few years, the management of the EU trade policy has become more transparent and democratic; the improvements will become official with the entry into force of the European Constitution. This policy was virtually confidential for a long time; it was between the European Commission and a special committee made up of high-level national civil servants. There was no consultation of the Parliament, debates at ministerial level were few and far between, the social partners weren't really in the know, representatives of trade and industry had to lobby to get to know what was going on and get their worries and aspirations across. Then, from 1999 to 2004, Pascal Lamy took it upon himself to change this unsatisfactory situation as much as he could, and he summed up his efforts and the results obtained in his document bidding farewell to his rôle as Commissioner for this sector (see this column from the past few days).
Mr Lamy sought to increase the effectiveness of trade policy, and at the same time boost its legitimacy. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Nice, he had got almost nowhere. However, in his preparations for the Constitution, "the open and public process of the Constitution" changed the game by getting the Commission out of its "tête à tête with the Member States" and by rallying more supporters to its side, especially the MEPs. The results is that "the Constitutional Treaty offers a clear improvement of the way the enlarged Union can carry out its trade policy, in terms of its legitimacy as well as its effectiveness". It makes three notable steps forward:
a) Parliamentary control. Trade legislation will be adopted under the Council/Parliament codecision formula (this, Mr Lamy feels, is what the term "legislative procedure" means);
b) Union competencies. The Constitution states that trade policy comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU for everything relating to trade in goods and services, trade aspects of intellectual property and direct foreign investment, agreements on transport services remaining governed by the "transport" provisions of the Constitution;
c) majority voting. Qualified majority voting within the Council has been made general, the exceptions being clearly limited to cases in which agreements in the cultural or audiovisual domain could harm the Union's linguistic or cultural diversity, or when the agreements could affect the organisation of social services, education and health. In such cases, agreements with third countries must be approved unanimously.
Regular dialogue. Alongside the transformation of the institutional framework came a gradual change in behaviour. Mr Lamy brought in regular dialogue with the competent Committee of the European Parliament, and got MEPs on board for the Union's delegation at minister meetings of the WTO, thus preparing for the entry into force of the Constitution. At the same time, he brought in an active, in-depth dialogue with civil society, especially with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business circles, and trade unions. As we all know, there was no shortage of misunderstandings and populist rhetoric in relations with the NGOs, and Mr Lamy makes no secret of this. The tendency of certain NGOs to depict the WTO as being "to blame for the worst effects of globalisation" and under the thumb of the rich countries and the multinationals has had, and still does have, "a strong impact on public opinion, the press and the political institutions". He adds: "several development NGOs have also tended to take on a self-appointed advisory role with certain developing countries" (and the context of the comment seems to suggest that this is not always a good thing). The consultation of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) was multiplied "profitably".
Three observations. I will conclude this overview with three observations:
- Once again, it proves just how much the Constitution improves the content and management of Community policies. New provisions feature in part III of the draft Constitution (together with provisions on the defence policy, the creation of the European Foreign Minister, etc). This is the part that some adversaries of the Constitution, including a few MEPs who claim to be pro-European, would like to get rid of;
- it is entirely within the interests of the Barroso Commission to keep and consolidate the aforementioned practices;
- the otherwise confidential and secret nature of the Union's trade policy could justify a number of excesses, misinterpretations or biases on the part of a certain NGOs. With new rules and practices, such behaviour could only ever point to ignorance or bad intentions. (F.R.)