Last week, after the IGC session, President Silvio Berlusconi announced the participants' "absolute unanimity" on "providing the EU with an appropriate defence policy and an adequate military force". In his personal press conference, Jacques Chirac spoke even more solemnly of a military force which had been accepted as an indispensable instrument for a European foreign policy, for a Europe which can make its voice heard in the world. Both of them, like Javier Solana and others who expressed a view, at the same time stressed the indissoluble link with the Atlantic Pact: The Europe of Defence will complement, not replace, NATO.
Poland sets the example. Certain commentators felt that the unanimity in favour of ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) was the big novelty of this IGC. The reality is more complicated. The ESDP already exists; for the past few years, in the corridors of the Council, you bump into quite a few men and women in uniform, who symbolise it. Its existence is not up for discussion, but its modalities are. The Convention has done more than remarkable work, and it is an important fact that no Member State has contested the hypothesis of "structured co-operation" going beyond the joint basis to all Member States. But everything is under discussion: the modalities of this co-operation, the criteria for inclusion, the nomination of participant countries, the "collective defence clause", the arms policy.
In general, governments avoided military subjects in their reactions to the Convention, and even the Commission, respectful of the competency of Member States, did not take position in its "opinion". As far as I am aware, the first strong and explicit reservation on the ESDP texts in general and the "structured co-operation" in particular (articles III 310 to III 214 of the draft Constitution) was voiced by the Pole Jacek Saryus Wolski during the conference I talked of in this page of 10 October. He was well-placed to do so, because he is not a member of the government (and therefore not obliged to respect various diplomatic precautions), but at the same time he is part of the organisation which assists and advises this government in European affairs. In his view, the provisions provided for "strucured co-operation" fail to respect the conditions which are absolutely necessary for any initiative of this nature in the Community framework. It has to be said that the differences between the provisions applicable to this structured co-operation and those for "reinforced co-operation" in general are radical. Article III 213 provides for:
- the list of countries taking part in structured co-operation to be included in a protocol which does not yet exist and which will, at the same time, set the criteria to be respected and the commitments to be made in terms of military capacity, in order to be allowed to take part;
- the countries not taking part in the co-operation not to attend the talks of the competent Council; they are simply kept "informed" by the European Foreign Minister;
- a vital point: the countries taking part in the co-operation to decide on any future involvement by other Member States.
If you compare these provisions to those of article III-325 on "reinforced co-operation", the difference is blindingly obvious. This is not surprising, because in this field, which is intergovernmental by its very nature, it is impossible to follow a Community procedure, with opinions and involvement of the European Commission. But we can understand the reservations of countries excluded from the word go.
First concession. According to the available information, a change in the above provisions has apparently already been made: the Constitution will not decide on the list of participating countries to structured co-operation, which is still open for the time being. We can understand the importance of this waiting and hoping in the cases of Italy (whose Defence Minister is ultra pro-NATO, whereas the deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are much more open), and Spain. The protocol should, above all else, indicate the admission criteria and the commitments to be made by countries to be allowed in, such as a minimum percentage of GDP given over to defence, the capacity to mobilise a certain number of troops at short notice, technological innovation efforts… the draft Constitution talks of "greater military capacity" and "more binding commitments", which obviously should be specified.
A clause for the future. The second sticking point concerned the mutual defence clause. In the current text, it is voluntary and open, any Member State can subscribe if it wants, if it accepts the advantages (Community protection against any armed act of aggression) and the obligations (participation in the defence of any Member State attacked). And yet certain governments have reservations, to do with how this relates to the NATO clause. In the conference I have already mentioned, Mr Saryus-Wolski waved this point away: he feels the only guarantee which counts against the risk of external attack is that of the United States via NATO; for the time being, anything else is purely theoretical. He is quite right: the European guarantee is not worth a great deal, and we can understand that these countries of central and eastern Europe are so attached to the American guarantee that they do not want to do anything that might distance them from Washington. Mr Saryus-Wolski even doubts the willingness of the young people of western Europe to fight, if needs be, to defend their ally countries. This cynicism astonished Philippe de Schoutheete, Commission adviser and former Permanent Representative of Belgium; Europe's unification clearly aims to exclude any conflict between Europeans for good and it is to be hoped that no country of the Union will ever be attacked from within; but he is confident that if the need arises, the youth of today would be able to behave like the youth of yesterday to defend the freedom of all and our values.
An Agency for a couple of MPs?. Other elements do not seem to raise major difficulties, such as the extension of the "Petersberg missions", or, at first sight, the principle of the "solidarity clause" on terrorist attacks (defined by a Community procedure: proposal by Commission and Foreign Minister, Parliament informed). But the dossier of the European Armament Agency should be clarified; the Agency is presented as a Community body, open to all Member States; but how many of them are really interested?
My impression is that there are many texts based on the hypothesis that only the "first storey" of construction is for all. For the higher storeys, which are more operational, the texts seem to have been worded with a view to limiting participation. Look at the provisions for the Agency (especially paragraph 2 of article III-212): it is the EU Council ruling with qualified majority which adopts the decision "defining the status, the headquarters and the modalities for the functioning of the Agency", but taking account "of the degree of effective participation in the Agency's activities", and with specific groups "bringing together Member States carrying out joint projects". We can understand this selectiveness, because there are all the problems of purchasing armaments (Europeans and Americans, in competition), making them, and strategic research, which the Agency raises.
If IGC fails, ESDP will be achieved on EU sidelines. The Polish stance, which was clearly and frankly expressed, clarifies and explains the attitudes of most of the countries of central and eastern Europe towards the United States, but is at the same time indicative of future ambition: the doors must remain open, because these countries want to be a part of the Europe of defence when they are in a position to do so. Several statements- such as Hungary's- prove this. It is therefore vital that admission criteria and conditions are crystal clear and respect Community principles. But, at the same time, nobody should think that they can stop the flux towards ESDP by obstructing it in the IGC: the result would be to trigger initiatives outside the Union, its institutions and its procedures. Everything points to the determination of France, Germany and Belgium to proceed towards the Europe of defence (in a Union framework if possible, outside if needs be), and the United Kingdom's firm intentions of getting involved in their initiatives. It is a fair bet that if the IGC fails on this subject, things will move quickly. In the aforementioned press conference, Jacques Chirac said: "we hope that structured co-operation will be open to all, and consistent with Atlantic commitments. We are determined to implement this project, because we are convinced that there can be no Europe without defence". The "we" referred to France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the four countries which took the initiative last Spring. As for the United Kingdom, "we have tried to convince them to get involved. This poses a few problems for the British, to do with European staff. The four are sticking to their guns. We will continue our talks".
Paris and Berlin have a great deal of sympathy for Tony Blair and his woes. He wants his country to be in the thick of European initiatives; for the Euro, this hasn't happened yet; and they're not even talking about Schengen any more. All that remains is defence, and he wants to be in on it. Furthermore, Jacques Chirac acknowledges that the Europe of defence without the UK "would not be coherent". But the British should take account of American reactions (I use the word "should" advisedly, for reasons I went into on 21 May). The excessive media commotion around London's acceptance of the principle of "structured co-operation" and the presentation of this position as a U-turn in favour of European defence didn't make things any easier for Tony Blair, who was immediately under American pressure. Talks are continuing. The main thing is the idea of a European defence at the service of a European foreign policy, ESDP as an instrument of CFSP. The two cannot be separated. I will be taking stock of CFSP, just to complete the picture.
(F.R.)