Brussels, 21/08/2002 (Agence Europe) - "Control by democratically elected Parliaments was not exactly a significant feature of the nuclear sector in the 1950s. All the nuclear weapons States developed their military technology in secret, free from scrutiny by their national Parliaments…Thus it comes as no surprise that monitoring and control by the European "Assembly" (now officially "Parliament" since the adoption of the European Single Act) was not a strong feature of the Euratom Treaty, although, ironically, it can be plausibly argued that it is precisely in these areas that the public feels the need for rigorous democratic scrutiny, control and accountability". This is what is stated in the Working Paper put together by Mervyn O'Driscoll, Gordon Lake and Juliet Lodge, entitled "The European Parliament and the Euratom treaty: Past, Present and Future" and published by the European Parliament services in Luxembourg but which does not necessarily reflect the position of the Parliament (E-mail: DG4-industrie@europarl.eu.int).
The report is also critical of the current European Parliament role in the Euratom Treaty, "The most obvious problem concerns the lack of any requirement for the Council to formally consult the European Parliament on a whole range of issues …even though the Parliament is the co-budgetary authority for all expenditure based on this Treaty. In contrast, consultation of the unelected Economic and Social Committee 'ESC) and the unelected (advisory) Scientific and Technical Committee (which is nominated by the Member States) is usually required."
The report emphasises that the Euratom Treaty "remains essentially unamended". The report also points out that the Treaty has often been "overlooked" whereas, "Its tactical pairing with the EEC was a crucial factor in initially persuading and eventually convincing a sceptical French Government to engage with European integration after the embittering experience of the aborted European Defence Community. Jean Monnet's nuclear energy community proposal, and the negotiations that it generated during 1955, played a crucial role in initiating the relance", notes the report. It also adds that, "The determination and ingenuity of Monnet and Spaak ultimately led to the breakthrough that placed nuclear integration on the agenda of the 'Six' in mid-1955, by linking it with Beyen's idea of a customs union or common market, as a means to reconcile the divergent interests of France and FRG in a package deal". The writers of the report pointed out that the real nature of these issues raised in negotiations, centred around the issue of whether Euratom could become a western European organisation that was totally self-sufficient and which would enable Europe to become a "third power that was economically and militarily independent from the USA". France in particular, supported this idea of a third power but its more pro-Atlantic neighbours, in particular, the FRG was not in favour. By mentioning the merger of the three communities (CECA, Euratom and the ECC) in 1967, the report writers indicate the "unanimous consensus of commentators…that 1967 signals the end of Euratom as an effective force. Many explanations for 'l'échec d'Euratom' are considered including inter alia shortcomings of the Euratom Treaty, nuclear nationalism, a lack of leadership, overinflated initial expectations, and inauspicious circumstances. At the centre of the entire saga is the Franco-German relationship in the nuclear energy sector."
Today, according to the writers of the report, Parliament, "Must be vigilant and seek out the 'windows of opportunity' which may open up possibilities for Treaty revision". The writers also state that the "EP's overarching goal must be to show that it is relevant, and has something worthwhile to contribute in the sensitive areas covered by Euratom". They also claim that, "MEPs' legislative clout might be expanded either juridically via treaty change and entrenched expansion of their authority (universalisation of co-decision) or de facto via intervention as permitted by existing treaties (questions, budget, investigations, public hearings etc.)." The report points out that, "It is no longer acceptable to assume that Euratom's concerns are fundamentally so technical as to dispense with the need for effective political oversight". Future enlargement will demand public control of Euratom issues, asset the writers of the report, who conclude that, "It is entirely appropriate and proper that MEPs should question any issue on which they feel inadequately informed…and inadequately inserted into the legislative process governing the decision on the proposal on the table…To this end, it would be appropriate for MEPs to use all channels open to them - including the right to veto a proposal having budgetary implications, or international repercussions - to assert their legitimate right to have a say, and ultimately, of course, to be an equal partner in the process".