The Convention will be holding its second plenary session next week and the Presidium will certainly be attempting to channel the debates and prevent them going off at a tangent. The general debate allowing Members to indicate their basic positions is more or less finished (80 Convention Members have already made clear where they stand - which is already a lot). This hasn't been a superfluous exercise because it has enabled Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to draw the first conclusion: radical options - namely, total opposition to any progress towards European unification, or the opposite, support for a rigorous and comprehensive federal system are in the minority. It is therefore in the brave and innovative but less extreme solutions where we have to find the large and necessary consensus if the Convention is going to succeed. It is not yet the moment for the Convention to provide the details of possible solutions. This can wait for the moment, together with vague declarations and principled petitions combining the numerous specific questions posed by the Laeken Declaration. Three fundamental questions have first to be answered.
The dilemma of Europe as a power. The first question is: are the Europeans in favour of what Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has defined as a "Europe as a power", with Europe playing a specific role in world affairs? The question appears banal but from certain viewpoints it is not. The Declaration of Laeken doesn't ignore this aspect: the chapter, "the new role for European in a globalised world" focuses upon the issue. But to what point do Member States and their people agree? According to Michel Rocard, around ten Member States do not consider the objective of Europe as a power as important and their citizens joined the Union without this ambition in mind (see this section on 6 April). These are historically the countries that have never wanted such a role and which consider that global governance is the particular remit of the UN and other world organisations. In some cases their wish and that of their people was to participate in a "greater Switzerland" (Michel Rocard's description) in the hope of attaining European integration as a guarantee of democracy and freedom, economic progress and stability. This opinion is not shared by European countries that were formerly "great powers" and which believe that a united Europe should not be about dominating the world but rather for contributing to international stability and defending European values of freedom, solidarity and diversity. Will the Convention be able to chose or will the uncertainty continue? For several decades, Europe has dodged this debate and lived in a degree of doubt; but the creation of the CFSP and ESDP means that choices have to be made on the kind of globalisation, co-operation with developing countries, environmental protection, fight against terrorism and organised crime we want. Perhaps Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will not obtain the kind of explicit answers he would like but answers will be implicitly in the direction the Convention takes with regard to its institutional structure.
The issue they would like to hide. The second issue does not figure in the Laeken Declaration, but certain informed persons have raised it in no uncertain terms: how can the final phase of the exercise be avoided, whereby the possible "no" of a possibly single and small country provokes the collapse of the whole edifice? That the attitude of several tens of thousands of Europeans stifles the will of hundreds of million others? There is only one option: to ensure that the new Treaty enters into force the moment where two thirds of all countries participating in the Convention have ratified it, with those countries that have not, excluding themselves from the new project. The subject is a delicate one and legally very complex but crucial.
An Executive power that is very difficult to define. The third question is simple, what kind of government do we want in the future? What will the power of the Executive consist of? There are currently many different answers but it is possible to distinguish two antinomic but fundamental directions: one supporting a supranational Executive power, independent from national governments (like the European Commission), the other, an intergovernmental system (the Commission would simply become a secretariat, certainly important and prestigious but without decision-making powers). Without putting flesh on the bones, the two possibilities could appear impracticable. Details have to be thrashed out with safeguards, precautions and flexibility measures.
The most thought-out suggestion and the problem it conjures up. The most thought-out and innovative "supranational" proposal is that of Pierre Toulemon, who illustrates a government of Europe that has its roots in the European Commission but which takes into account the possible objections of Member States (see this section n 4 April). This European government would be led by a Presidium, consisting of a President and four or five Vice Presidents rather that a single President in order to obtain a better balance between countries and their political leanings. Its President would chair the European Council sessions and its members would chair the Council sessions. This could provide the most astute and very "European" formula for tackling the complications linked to an indispensable modification of the current six-monthly rota. This Executive would govern on the basis of a programme outlined by the European Council (by consensus or majority if necessary) and in certain fields it would be expected to act in close collaboration with the national Ministerial Councils.
There is something that bothers me in this construction. It would require the partial abandonment of the "Community Method", which the founding European fathers left us and which is the cornerstone of European construction. This method is founded on the equilibrium between the Commission and the Council - the former in charge of representing European interests and possessing the right of initiative and the latter representing national interests and having decision-making powers. The Parliament, which represents the people, shares the legislative power with the Council and exercises political control over the Commission. These different checks and balances could and must be perfected but should they be really be got rid of? I have tried on two occasions to explain the role and importance of the Community Method (6 December a general outline and 28 March to illustrate the real limits of the Commission's powers, often misunderstood) and I don't want to bore the reader in repeating them. One thing is certain, that the balance is delicate and the legitimacy of the democratic governments of our Member States (as elsewhere with Heads of governments at the Summits) is not in question. Any reform must be realistic and safeguard the balance between national and supranational powers. In any case, the Toulemon project contains some very interesting points and must remain on the table.
The mysterious choice of words of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The Convention has not yet reached any degree of detail and its President has so far only partially unveiled its directions. Something that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has said created quite a stir: the future 30 or more member Commission would no longer be able to vote, which would mean in practice that in the future it could no longer constitute the Executive. What institution will be able to do this then? Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has not yet replied, which is understandable, as he has to approach the Members first and assess the direction of the Convention. He cannot create the impression that he has already decided on the matter before the debates. He has, nonetheless, let it be understood that in his opinion new methods of co-operation between the Commission and Council are needed and his reflections are certainly not going in the direction of withdrawing the executive power from the Council. I'm not in a position to anticipate any further directions of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. But his choice of words; "The future Commission will not be able to vote" refers to a Commission consisting of around thirty Commissioners one for each of the Member States in enlargement. In a situation where simple majority voting and no possibility of taking into account the radically different weight of the countries that the Commissioners represent, the Commission would be unable to enjoy any majority having any kind of importance (see this section on 3 April). It's as if Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wanted to say, if you, current and future Member States demand a Commissioner for each country, the Commission will be unable to govern Europe. Would Commissioners independent of national powers have the same power? In certain conditions, the Commission will be a forum for debates high level of course, but it will be unable to embody the executive power.
The three Commission documents. We'll have to think of something different but what? It is at this point that the ideas of the European political parties, the political groups of the European Parliament become important. Would the "double majority" (that of the college of Commissioners and the people) represent a possible solution? I'm not sure. The European Commission announced three documents, the first before the end of April, on the Europe of tomorrow - more general with the specific activities of the Union (this document could answer the first of the three questions). The second document, in May, would treat the joint policies and how they are managed - a sensitive issue for CFSP and ESDP, which are currently intergovernmental, and in the opinion of certain people (apparently even within the Commission), should remain so. The third document will focus on the institutional structure of tomorrow's Europe and should therefore provide the Commission's answer to the third essential question: who will govern Europe? From this perspective we should be able to see more clearly.
(F.R.)