The European countries’ current race to their own rearmament can be explained by three main factors: intelligence suggesting that Russia’s plans for the second half of this decade involve another large-scale military attack in Europe’s direction, total uncertainty as to America’s solidarity in such an event and the situation of Ukraine, which has not repelled the Russian aggressor from its territory and has lost its hold on Kursk, to the extent that if the ‘peace negotiations’ conclude, they will do so to its detriment. And if Washington’s lack of interest in Europe continues, Russia will have a free hand, perhaps to conquer Moldova or carry out incursions into the Baltic states.
The European Union unquestionably has the means to help Ukraine and Moldova financially and militarily, but the feeling of the risk of a war that would affect it directly differs enormously, depending on the geographical location of its citizens and the fundamental options of their governments.
There are texts setting out guarantees in the event of an attack. Firstly, article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: an armed attack on one or more members in Europe or North America would be considered an attack on them all. This is the principle of assistance, including by means of armed force. Secondly, article 42 §7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which provides that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power. The former was invoked following the attacks of 11 September 2001, leading to a military operation in Afghanistan. The latter has never been activated.
As regards Europe, we can draw a distinction between different categories of countries: (1) the four member states of the EU that are not members of NATO (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus), which have the greatest interest in ensuring that the TEU article is respected, should they ever need it to be; (2) Ukraine, Moldova and various countries of the Western Balkans that are members of neither the EU nor of NATO; (3) non-EU member states that are in NATO (United Kingdom, Norway, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland); finally, (4) the 23 EU member states that are also NATO members, including the most recent signatories, Finland (see EUROPE 13156/1) and Sweden (see EUROPE 13366/14), for obvious reasons.
Some of the latter group do not want military integration within Europe, because they are friends of Putin (Hungary, Slovakia), because they worship Trump and are still counting on Atlantic solidarity (Italy); others, however, believe that it is time for a sovereign European Union that is the master of its own defence (France, Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Poland, to name but the largest countries in the group).
The European Commission’s White Paper, which was published on 19 March, outlines the EU’s industrial and budgetary effort rapidly to increase its own military capabilities up to 2030, but it takes enormous pains to stress that this will happen within the NATO framework. This constant reference to NATO implies that the Commission believes that NATO will still exist by the end of the decade. Furthermore, the title of the document (readiness) is ideal, as the potential adversary could deduce from it that the EU will not be ready to defend itself before 2030, giving it a considerable window of opportunity.
Let us look at the hypothetical scenario of a conventional Russian attack on at least one member state of the EU that is also a member of NATO. At that point in time, either article 5 of the treaty would be invoked and the United States of America would agree to intervene, or they would refuse to do so while other NATO members were in favour, but had their hands tied by the consensual decision-making principle, or the United States has already left NATO, taking their military might with it, or NATO no longer exists. Would article 42 of the Treaty on European Union be triggered? That is a matter of great uncertainty and it is understandable that the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, Poland and Romania are already taking major provisions for their own defence.
Things would get even more complicated if, not content with testing the adherence to article 5 of the NATO treaty, the despot in the Kremlin decided to use nuclear weapons, as he has already threatened to do on more than one occasion. Russia has the largest number of warheads in the world: 4380, followed by the United States (3708), France (290) and the United Kingdom (225). The UK is no longer bound by article 42 TEU; from a logistical point of view, it is in a situation of interdependence with the United States.
France, therefore, is the only EU member state with a nuclear deterrent. How far would this deterrent go? Many years ago, de Gaulle intimated that defence of vital interests could transcend France’s borders. On 12 March of this year, Emmanuel Macron referred to a new debate on the possibility of “using our deterrent to protect our allies on the European continent”. This was in response to a request from the future German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, to be afforded protection under the French nuclear ‘umbrella’. But that is not all: the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has also expressed an interest in benefiting from the French deterrent. He sets enormous store by ensuring that his country is able to hold out against the Russians and his government is unquestionably the current European champion in getting ready for a conventional war.
We must bear in mind the fact that only the President of the French Republic can ‘press the red button’ and that even if the objective is to defend another state, the enemy could respond with a strike on French soil. In other words, France is currently making a fairly generous offer, but it might still be selective about who can claim it.
Germany, France and Poland are connected by a triangular pact concluded in 1991 by the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and made official in the town of Weimar. It was the symbol of German-Polish reconciliation. Since then, many working meetings have been held at ministerial and parliamentary level. The ‘Weimar Triangle’ experienced something of a second wind after Tusk returned to power in Poland and the Weimar Agenda, adopted in May 2024 (see EUROPE 13415/5), concerns aid to Ukraine and investment in defence.
Together, the three countries constitute a demographic, economic and political power house. Between them, they have 200 million inhabitants and nearly 600,000 soldiers; they are linked together by quality transport infrastructure. If their leaders manage to reach an agreement in the strategic domain, including with the conception of a common chain of command in the event of these clearly identified scenarios, they could be the keystone of European defence in all its dimensions.
New coalitions will emerge on the basis of vital security requirements. Small countries will create privileged links with those that will above all offer them a form of solidarity and protection in the event of the worst. The three Baltic states spring very quickly to mind, easy targets that will be unable to wait for a decision of the European Council. The ‘Weimar Triangle’ could give article 42 TEU its teeth, setting the example at the heart of Europe.
It is beyond naive to believe that a union of European defence will spring from the common will of the Twenty-Seven, who have far too many disloyal elements among them. Only a strong pioneering group can usefully face up to the huge geopolitical upheaval underway, by deterring an aggressor or, failing that, limiting the damage it can do.
Bye bye, Trump! Hello, Goethe and Schiller!
Renaud Denuit