The former President of the European Commission and Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, believes that a majority exists in the European Parliament between the EPP, S&D and Renew Europe groups to reappoint the Christian Democrat candidate, Ursula von der Leyen, as head of the Commission, with, if necessary, the votes of Green MEPs. He refers to the major political priorities for the next five years and the budgetary and institutional impact of Ukraine joining the European Union. (Interviewed on Wednesday 19 June by Mathieu Bion)
Agence Europe - Unlike in 2019, at this stage there is no major manoeuvring between the EU27 on the appointments to the three top European posts to be filled, whereas in 2019 a three-day European summit was necessary (see EUROPE 12287/1).
Jean-Claude Juncker - I believe that the Heads of State or Government intend to draw all the lessons springing from the expression of universal suffrage, after the bad experiences of 2019, when Mr Macron did not want to take the results of the elections into account. We're trying not to make the same mistake again.
It would seem obvious to me that Ms von der Leyen could be invested with a second mandate [heading up the European Commission, editor's note] (see EUROPE 13433/1). I am very much in favour of the proposal to see former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa become President of the European Council, and Ms Kallas High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs.
If Ms von der Leyen is appointed by the EU27, will a tripartite EPP/S&D/Renew Europe coalition be sufficient or will this pro-European majority need to be enlarged?
There is a sufficient majority with these three parties. I am assuming that Green MEPs will support the programme when it is presented by Ms von der Leyen.
It is possible that she could draw on other support. But I strongly recommend against seeking a formal coalition with other parties that are not part of the European mainstream.
I'm talking about a contribution of votes from Ms Meloni's group.
Five years ago, you picked up the phone to champion the candidacy of Ms von der Leyen within the European Parliament (see EUROPE 12356/1). Have you done the same thing?
Last time, it could not be ruled out that Ms von der Leyen would not have the required majority. So I called a number of non-EPP MEPs to plead Ms von der Leyen's case.
I won't do it this time, because it's not necessary.
Should the gains made by the conservatives and the far right lead us to change the European political agenda?
I would not recommend that, in terms of content, we take steps in the direction of the extreme right.
Why is the far right so strong? One of the reasons is that too many representatives of the traditional political parties, during the election campaign, gave the impression that they were following the far right in its erroneous proposals.
And if the far right comes to power in France, what will be the impact at European level?
Fortunately, the decisions to be taken by the European Council will have to be taken before the outcome of the French elections.
Does Ms Meloni's victory in the Italian European elections entitle her to a vice-presidency of the Commission?
If Ms von der Leyen is elected, she will have to put together her Commission and appoint the Vice-President, unlike in 2019, when the European Council appointed a number of Vice-Presidents.
This is a serious mistake that should not be repeated, because it is a matter for the President of the Commission, who has to justify their choice to the European Parliament, but only after they have been appointed. We must respect the powers of the President of the Commission and not give the impression that she is taking orders from the European Council.
What should the strategic agenda for the period 2024-2029 contain?
We must ensure that the geopolitical challenges are clearly mentioned: United States, China, Russia and others. As far as China is concerned, there must be no decoupling of European objectives from Chinese desiderata, but rather a reduction in risks.
On Russia, we will have to repeat what we have said so far: no to the violation of borders as they result from the system put in place after the Second World War, and a message of solidarity towards Ukraine by ensuring that EU assistance remains credible in the long term.
And then there are the internal challenges. On this point, sufficient emphasis should be placed once and for all on respect for Europe's fundamental values, the rule of law.
Then Europe's social ambitions need to be taken into account, i.e. the implementation of the European pillar of social rights put in place at the Gothenburg summit in 2017.
The protection of external borders, yes. Then make it clear that the ‘Green Deal’ will not be called into question. There may be adjustments, but not a fundamental rethink, because the climate crisis will remain with us for decades to come.
On the question of respect for values, are you expecting any clashes with certain EU countries whose governments do not respect them?
It's not out of the question that there could be a clash, as you put it, with two or three governments. But the position of the European Council, and therefore of the Commission, must not allow fundamental values to be called into question.
We can’t go on discussing for months and years, whether or not we want to take action against those who do not comply with the canon of European rules. From now on, as soon as a government strays from fundamental values, the Commission should take immediate action.
Should the so-called ‘Article 7’ procedure of the Treaty on respect for the rule of law be strengthened?
Yes. You don't have to bring out the big guns straight away, but you mustn't allow any doubt about the Commission's determination to act to creep into the decision-making process.
The next five years will be spent preparing for EU enlargement. Is Ukraine's accession inevitable, and what impact would it have on the Union itself?
A distinction must be made between the enlargement process towards the countries of the Western Balkans, and Ukraine.
I said in 2014 that under my mandate there would be no new Member States from the Western Balkans. The European Parliament and the countries concerned were very disappointed that I said so. I note that, in the five years since I took office, nothing of the kind has been done.
To date, none of the countries of the Western Balkans is ready to join the EU, although they have made notable progress in some cases. This is particularly true of Montenegro and Serbia, even though Serbia's relations with Russia and China are not in line with EU positions.
We must ensure that conflicts between countries in the Western Balkans, particularly over borders, the protection of minorities and the rule of law, are not imported into the Union as factors of instability.
What about Ukraine?
The subject is of the utmost magnitude. It is clear that Ukraine has a credible European perspective. But the accession negotiations with Ukraine, which will begin shortly (see EUROPE 13433/18), are revealing a degree of difficulty that exceeds all previous accession negotiations.
There have been seven enlargements to date, but the one involving Ukraine will be on a completely different scale. Promising Ukraine that its membership of the European Union could be settled in four or five years would be a huge mistake, because it would be giving it unjustified hopes.
Internally, substantial reforms will have to be made within the European Union, because we cannot imagine a Commission with 35 or 36 Commissioners.
And the budgetary requirements clearly mean that the size of the European budget will have to be adjusted upwards the day Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union. It would be highly irresponsible to hide this difficulty from Europeans.
In fact, the cycle of preparations for the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework will begin in 2025. How should European policies evolve to make room for countries as important as Ukraine?
Ukraine's accession raises above all the problem of the agricultural budget. The size of Ukrainian farms, compared with European farms, clearly shows that the impact on the budget will be enormous.
My Commission had also made proposals that the European Council corrected downwards. The ‘European Defence Fund’ had been divided by seven, whereas today everyone agrees that the European budgetary resources allocated to defence will have to be increased.
When you were President of the Commission, you also made far-reaching proposals for institutional reform...
Over the past five years, there has been no great progress in institutional matters. I very much regretted the fact that the European Council has not made use of the “passerelle” clause contained in the Lisbon Treaty (see EUROPE 12996/18).
You know, there are perfect treaties that are not applied in everyday reality. There are also imperfect treaties that can produce perfect results, if the governments' will to act is perfect. But governments have not shown the will to do so.
As far as the governance of the Commission was concerned, I had invented a first vice-president and several vice-presidents who did not have their own portfolio, but who were responsible for coordinating the work of the Commissioners. There is not enough work for 27 commissioners. But I don't see the number of portfolios being multiplied or enlarged to give work to 34 or 35 commissioners.
In preparation for future enlargements, therefore, we need to think about how the Commission should be organised functionally.
I also proposed merging the presidencies of the European Council and the Commission. An idea that was rejected at the time, but which some people now realise had some virtues, given the sometimes unfortunate experience of the two-headed leadership of the European Union...