General elections will be held in Spain this Sunday. It is very much to be hoped that the new composition of the Parliament will feature a coherent and sustainable majority. This is of critical importance to the people of Spain, both for their external relations and for the internal social and economic situation.
The elections will be of particular importance for the Catalans: the most radically pro-independence of them see it as a sort of spite referendum after the harsh sentences handed down on 14 October by the Supreme Court of the country against nine separatist leaders who were involved in the declaration of independence of 2017 (see EUROPE 12348/23). However, Catalonian nationalism has also re-awoken Spanish nationalism and this is likely to be reflected in the parliamentary composition. In particular, a government with just a slender majority will be in no position either to engage bilateral dialogue with the Catalan authorities or to conduct a broader constitutional reflection on the powers of infra-national entities.
The citizens of the European Union are only too aware of what is going on in Catalonia. They have not yet forgotten the brutality of the national police on 1 October 2017, the day of the referendum, and more recently still, they saw half a million demonstrators protesting at the sentencing of their elected representatives; they saw the attempted occupation of Barcelona airport. Former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, who fled to Belgium, who was arrested and then released in Germany, has become almost a familiar face. Whether or not they are in favour of the region’s independence, they have an understanding of what’s at stake (particularly if there are centrifugal tendencies in their own country), as the people Catalan are Europeans just like them, fervently pro-European even, and, what’s more, friendly and hospitable: who hasn’t been on holiday to Barcelona and/or the surrounding area?
It is precisely for all these reasons that the institution that directly represents them could be reasonably expected to permit a debate on Catalonia, just as it has legitimately debated other sensitive issues. On 22 October, however, the European Parliament chose to do the opposite. The request for a debate – just a debate – was tabled by the GUE/NGL and Greens/EFA groups; it was rejected by 301 votes to 109 and 21 abstentions (see EUROPE 12354/22). The vote promptly tightened the ranks of the EPP-S&D-Renew Europe ‘new majority’. The grounds for rejecting the proposal were given by a Spanish Socialist, who explained that his country is a democracy beyond reproach and no Parliament outside Spain has any right to interfere in what is a domestic issue …
In June of this year as well, the European Parliament put its head above the parapet, when it forbade Puigdemont and Antoni Comin, both former separatist leaders who were elected in the recent European elections, from taking their seats in the new assembly. On 6 May, the Spanish Supreme Court unanimously found against the electoral commission and in favour of Puigdemont, by recognising his right to stand in the European elections (see EUROPE B12248B22). President Tajani backed the Spanish authorities in their insistence that he first swear an oath before the national constitution, which would have required the two men to return to Spanish soil… where they would have been put straight under lock and key (see EUROPE B 12267A5).
This was how the Catalan voters discovered that their elected representatives would not automatically take their seats at the European Parliament and that the Madrid authorities would bar the route to Strasbourg for two of them. It is all the more perplexing when you consider this requirement in light of article 10 § 2 TEU: “Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament”. On 18 June, 79 MEPs signed a letter containing a solid argument in favour of authorising the accreditation of Puigdemont and Conin (see EUROPE 12277/16) and sent it to the Bureau of the EP, but in vain. This meant that neither of the two men benefited from parliamentary immunity. Denying that its decision was political in nature, the Parliament thus supported the repressive strategy of the national authorities of a member state through its actions.
Having been badly let down by the European Council and the Commission ever since autumn 2017, the Catalan militant separatists have now been let down again by the foremost institution of the EU, the one that represents the citizens.
At the same time, no political negotiation has got underway in Spain; the latter continues to be dealt with solely by the courts, as shown by recent events. The Belgian courts received a third European arrest warrant from the Spanish Supreme Court against Puigdemont in mid-October and then, on 5 November, two more against Lluis Puig and Antoni Conin.
The decisions of October 2017 to hold a referendum and declare independence obviously ran counter to the constitutional law of Spain. It is highly unlikely that an independent Catalonia would generate economic performances and social welfare that are objectively better than the current situation. It is even less likely that the state thus created would find it easy to be recognised internationally or successfully apply to join the European Union, despite its legislative acquis, as member states must vote unanimously and Spain would most assuredly play its veto.
We often hear, these days, that regionalist autonomy ambitions are fuelled by economic selfishness. Catalonia’s GDP is higher than that of the other regions of the country, but the same is not true of Scotland. In both these cases, the historical and cultural roots do far more to explain the nationalist feeling, which is in fact a ‘Euro-nationalism’, as the EU is seen by such regions as a target future political space. (To be continued)
Renaud Denuit