Energy is once again at the centre of what is happening in Europe. On 8 March, the European Commission will approve its “Green Paper” revealing what should be an if not common at least coordinated policy, on 14 the Energy Council will meet and a week later it will be the turn of the Heads of Government. In the meantime, I shall make a few remarks on recent developments, beginning today with two key aspects, before returning tomorrow to more pressing news.
Willingness of Member States. The willingness of Member States to work more closely together than in the past is becoming clear. Awareness that the challenges the future will bring can only be regulated by Europe acting as a whole has continued to gain ground, even in the United Kingdom. In the past, traditional political leanings and the availability of North Sea resources led British authorities to retain a certain reticence towards any Community approach in this area. But North Sea resources are dwindling and the UK is becoming as vulnerable as all the other Member States; traditional pragmatism in this case works in favour of pro-European positions. France has produced its “energy” policy paper (see no. 9115 of this bulletin) which favours a European multi-annual programme for investment (production, transport, storage, etc.) and additional measures on energy efficiency (for example, a European system of certification for energy savings in the construction, transport, agricultural industries). France would like to see this national policy paper become a Franco-German one, given that the coalition in power in Germany now no longer rejects the nuclear option out of hand, but is prepared to discuss it.
The realisation that we need to work together should also be expressed in the support for the new initiatives put forward by the Commission on renewable energy from agricultural sources.
Russia and the Energy Charter. Russia is once again the centre of attention, particularly because of its possible ratification of the “Energy Charter”, a European initiative from the early 90s which has been left partly in limbo. Russia signed the Charter in 1994, but has never ratified it (just like the United States and Canada). It appears that, within the European Commission, there is no single view on the importance of the Charter today, but during the G8 Finance ministers' meeting in Moscow on 10 and 11 February, European Ministers insisted it be ratified for one key reason: it would mean that Russian gas and oil exports would no longer be the monopoly of the largely State-owned giant Gazprom. European importers could then take their supplies from independent Russian suppliers, such as Novatek, Loukoil or Rosneft etc, which currently can only supply the internal Russian market. The Energy Charter would allow them access to Gasprom's networks abroad. To the great surprise of G8's Western members, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin announced on 10 February that his country would consider ratifying of the Charter (although he failed to give a date). During the G8 meeting, Mr Kudrin, known for his liberal leanings, was much more cautious. Observers saw in this Mr Putin's hand , in order to defend Gazprom's monopoly, which involves the ability to set, as it thinks fit, export prices, which, in practical terms, remain under the control of the Kremlin (and which represent a powerful political weapon, as was seen recently in the disputes with Ukraine, Georgia and the EU itself).
European Minsters noted that Russia was still not ready to ratify the Charter, but the EU has not given up on discussions with the Kremlin, within the context of security of supply (an additional protocol on transit forms part of the Charter). The Russians have everything to gain from proving that they are a reliable supplier and they are aware that the current situation in which Gazprom has total control of pipelines is not satisfactory. Russia's weight in the G8, along with European funding that Russia would like to obtain to modernise its gas pipelines and build new ones, derive from serious guarantees on security of supply and on the partial opening of the market. Gazprom installations are ageing and its quest for new deposits is flagging, at the same time, it would appear, as the independent companies are showing greater dynamism, own more recently discovered deposits and are regularly increasing production. Premises for the Kremlin to negotiate these issues with the EU, something that would reassure Western Europe. (F.R.)