Nothing rational. The advantages and benefits the Constitutional Treaty will bring to the European countries and their citizens are such that there would be nothing rational about negotiations failing this Friday and Saturday. The controversial aspects which could scupper the IGC only really revolve around the "power issues": the composition of the European Commission, and, to a greater extent, the voting modalities within the Council. Public opinion sees no real meaning in the details which are being so hotly discussed; it doesn't necessarily even understand them. How can the man on the street be brought to understand the difference between 60% and 66% of the population, which must be agreed before the text can be approved? Or the significance of the number of years the Commission will be made up according to the rules of the Treaty of Nice? The Constitution would work so much of a change in the life of Europe- more efficient and democratic management, the option of a simplified procedure to revise common policies- and would be such a step forward in common ambitions- a European Foreign Minister, defence, possibly justice- that it would defy comprehension if the Heads of Government failed to agree, without demolishing the Convention's results.
A more willing Spain? At first glance, however, these opposing positions were so unyielding that on Friday evening, the way to agreement seemed impenetrable. But how do you calculate the role played by tactics? It's the old rule: positions become firmer approaching the decision, as everyone is trying to get the best negotiating position. But at the same time, openness was creeping in. José Maria Aznar no longer says that the Treaty of Nice provisions on majority voting are untouchable, but rather is complaining that the Presidency has failed to come up with a formula acceptable to his country (and to Poland); Silvio Berlusconi has answered that he has the proposal in his pocket and will get it out when the time is right. At the same time, Ana de Palacio has confirmed that her country supports all other aspects of the Convention draft. The Spanish willingness to contribute to democracy and the efficiency of the Union were beyond doubt, so why not hope for a global institutional compromise safeguarding the principle of double majority (States and populations) whilst guaranteeing Spain and Poland a "large country" rank? Calculations based on the ease of blocking a decision, instead of taking the capacity to decide into the equation, point to a serious unawareness of the history of the Unoin and the way decisions are negotiated and taken, and an unjustifiable reciprocal mistrust.
Imbalance. As for the composition of the Commission, the one Commissioner per country formula will very likely be accepted as a compromise; the main thing is not to set it in stone as the definitive solution, in the hope that the legitimacy and authority of such an unbalanced Commission are not irretrievably compromised, pending the moment of wisdom (see this column yesterday).
The agreement on defence is not a done deal. A third contentious subject is defence. The Presidency's draft (see this column of 9 December) has raised even more misgivings: it is no mean feat to reconcile the general competencies of the Council with the desire of States taking part in "structured co-operation" to be the masters of this co-operation, which they are funding themselves. Another tricky bit is the autonomous planning capability of defence Europe, to be defined in a separate definition. A text was prepared by France, Germany and the UK, but the British have yet to give their definitive "yes"; they are evidnetly still discussing it with Washington. The US must understand that excessive inflexibility on their part could cause this plank of the Constitution to collapse, leading to a separate initiative by France, Germany, Belgium and a few others, without the mollifying presence of the United Kingdom.
An undeservedly neglected dossier. In conclusion, my impression is that most observers wrongly overlook the budgetary and financial side. The right to reject the annual budget, given to the Parliament by the draft Constitution, is of concern to several Member States; the common agricultural policy budget, which is an "uncontrollable expense", could be rejected by this and will have to be negotiated with the MEPs. We can see why France and a few others have their misgivings; but Parliament has made this into a question of principle. A second warning concerns the modalities for the pluri-annual financial framework to be approved; going from unanimity to majority is envisaged (even though a bit of fancy wording would avoid it). This is a prospect which is particularly perturbing to the "net contributor" countries; this is understandable. It is not an easy dossier. (F.R.)