Is an institutional compromise still possible? The few instances of progress achieved last week by the Convention Presidium towards a compromise over one or other aspect of the constitutional treaty must not delude us: the Convention continues to slide towards the most insidious and ambiguous result there is; that of 'options.' With regards to the institutional chapter, the Presidium was unable to define a new draft moving towards a consensus. The positions that were previously expressed during plenary session had been so contradictory or ambiguous that the Presidium, for the time being, maintained its former draft in the knowledge that it could not be the object of a consensus (see yesterday's Bulletin pp. 5 and 6). The Presidium's intention is to encourage, next week, a fresh debate in plenary, in the hope of gaining indications that will enable it to attempt to define a compromise. The crucial divergences not only concern the two often cited aspects - the Presidency of the European Council and the structure of the European Commission - but also the refusal by Spain and other countries to accept the 'double majority' rule for deliberations within the Council (see this section on 23 May, pages 3 and 4). With a failure to reach a compromise, there will be no global consensual plan for the European Commission and the Convention will have to admit that, for the institutions, divergent opinions exist.
Call by Olivier Duhamel and VGE's doubts. It is with great interest that I learned of the call made by Olivier Duhamel to his Convention colleagues for them to 'expel before returning' the venom from the options, which would equate to 'signing the failure of the Convention' and the paralysis of the European Union (see out bulletin of 22 March, p. 6). This call has nothing new to offer readers of this section, which, for several weeks, has denounced the dangerous slide towards options. It would be a return to the beginning, that is to say entrusting the institutional dossier to classic intergovernmental negotiations, which would be unable to do more than provide a few modifications to the Nice Treaty. Oh, what a result!
I wonder whether Valéry Giscard d'Estaing himself is not starting to doubt the feasibility of creating a single 'progressive' text with the assent of Great Britain. After his meeting, last week, with Tony Blair, he had to realise that the margin for manoeuvre available to the British Prime Minister at home is very slight and, in an interview with the BBC, he gave British citizens a ten year deadline for deciding whether they want to fully take part in the united Europe. In the meantime, either Europe accepts London's pace, which is not attractive, or it moves forward without London, as it did with the currency. In the BBC programme, VGE had already:
- anticipated the Convention's renunciation of the term 'federal.' I do not share the indignation over this point. If the term is ambiguous, in Great Britain it has taken on a symbolic meaning. If it was replaced by the term 'Community' to indicate the method of working of the Union, this would not be a significant terminological sacrifice. What matters, is the true institutional functioning, not the word;
- confirmed that the creation of a European super-state is not being considered by anybody and that Convention obviously does not aim to define a common foreign policy, but would like to define the conditions that would make common positions and attitudes possible;
- reaffirmed the requirement to better coordinate economic policies at the European level.
The fundamental question. On this basis, is a minimal compromise with Great Britain still possible? With regards to economic coordination, the Presidium managed to agree on a strengthening of the initial draft (even if it does not yet entirely satisfy the European Commission). The Convention will deal with this on Friday in plenary; if it follows the Presidium, which could be the most significant achievement of this week, while awaiting the new institutional debate next week. Thus, a fundamental question presents itself: is it preferable to accept and consider as acquired the non-negotiable results that the Convention has already amassed and that it will amass before closing its works, by postponing a more radical reform until later? Or should we fear that this pragmatic attitude precipitates a slide towards the intergovernmental Europe and the dilution of the EU? In the second case, it would require gambling all on 'differentiation' and the two Europes. What seems certain, is that the simple and desirable solution - that of a consensual Constitution, accepted by all and in line with the aims and requirements of the present historic phase - is not that which awaits us. We must be highly vigilant to avoid a derailing. (F.R.)