Is the "two Europes" scenario coming true? This state of affairs should not be a project planned out in advance, but a hypothesis to be envisaged if the Convention does not manage to reach consensus on a single model for the European Constitution. If the Convention produces alternative texts, the conclusive Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) could either look for compromises which would, by their nature, fall short of the original ambitions (the worst-case scenario), or go in the direction of the "two Europes", one of them wider but less compact, the other more restricted but powerfully integrated.
British offensive? Several indicators are giving the impression that this project is gaining momentum. This column has already pointed out various arresting facts. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announced that the texts on defence (that the Convention's President will present in late April) are directed at only some Member States, in the presumption that European defence will be established by a limited number of them. The European Commissioner Michel Barnier, President of the Convention's "defence" group, has come to the same conclusion. The impression the British give is more one of going on the offensive. Denis MacShane, Minister for European Affairs, wants to work towards an "everyday" Europe, leaving political ambitions out of it. Last week, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown presented his document on radically reducing the economic cohesion policy (see yesterday's column). In an interview with "The Times", Peter Hain, Tony Blair's representative in the Convention, indicated that he was building an alliance with central and eastern European countries against any move towards a European "super-state", citing areas in which the UK will give no ground, even to the point of using its veto (at the ICG). He particularly rejected: majority decisions in foreign affairs issues; special powers for the EU in terms of co-ordinating national economic policy (especially budgetary and fiscal policy); use of the word "federal" in the Constitutional Treaty; and the possibility for citizens individually to cite the "Charter of Fundamental Rights" in court. Denis MacShane returned to the attack, talking of a "coherent foreign policy" for Europe. He wrote: "we need to distinguish between single policy and common policy. The former is impossible and not worth the risk. Neither France nor Great Britain will abandon their position as permanent members of the Security Council. Ireland will not give up its neutrality. Great Britain and Spain will not accept their differences over Gibraltar being resolved by European Commissioners from Luxembourg and Austria". This does not rule out common positions being taken on many aspects of foreign policy; but Mr MacShane feels that the way to achieve this lies in discussions between the British House of Commons, the French Assemblée Nationale, and the German Bundestag, focussing on "a permanent dialogue between MPs". No Community procedure was mentioned.
At the same time, the Spanish press reported on active contact between France, Germany and Belgium, to prepare an initiative by a limited group of countries, aiming to relaunch European politics and European defence, and to strengthen Community institutions.
For a positive mindset. There is maybe nothing new in all this. It is merely the acceleration of what we already saw coming. But the state of mind is a bad one. Those heralding the inevitable dawn of a "European power" within the "European area", are slightly wary of the former, as if it were a Europe by Dutch auction. We have to come back to Jacques Delors's concept of Europe, which deemed that what we need to build is a wider Europe, with its three basis objectives: a) an area of peace, liberty and democracy; b) a framework for sustainable development and greater economic and social cohesion, in conformity with the European societal model; c) respect for cultural diversity and national identity. The success of such an undertaking would be an example to the world. On top of this, there is the economic aspect (currency, co-ordinated economic policies) or the political one (foreign and defence policy), which cannot be achieved with 25 or 30 from the outset. We need to accept the "differentiation", the achievements starting between countries who can and will take part, but which remain open to everything. This is not "two Europes" set in stone, but a Europe in the process of becoming. If the British do not come straight away, we will wait for them; we are used to this.
Only an open and generous project will foster the positive state of mind necessary to overcome the misunderstandings, the jealousy and the pettiness so apparent in today's discussions.