Who wants political Europe? Many commentators, many politicians who speak out on EU affairs without knowing them, as well as citizens often seeking points of reference often without ever finding them, would have done well to follow at the end of last week the Convention debate on the effects of the Iraqi affair on European construction. They would have found many elements of clarification. Not having had the opportunity of hearing the speakers live, they can read the report on page 3 of our bulleting on 8 February. Let's try to draw some conclusions:
1. The common foreign policy does not exist and it is therefore absurd to be surprised at the lack of agreement. There is at most "some dispersed joint actions", stressed Jean-Luc Dehaene, and it is not the Convention that can create the political will to act together (this will does not come by decree), but it can create the instruments allowing for it to be expressed, if it exists. Commissioner Michel Barnier added that the creation, in Brussels, of a "mixed" place (bringing together Community States and institutions) would allow for a European culture of foreign policy to be developed, thanks to joint analyses on the world, undertaken by diplomats who previously were rivals.
2. The obvious observation (notably recalled by Lord Tomlinson) that the Iraqi crisis itself is outside the Convention's remit does not rule out, according to other members (notably Pierre Lequiller and Josep Borrell), that it deserves being raised and can provide lessons. Ben Fayot, representative of the Luxembourg Parliament, wondered what a full-time and long-standing president of the Union could have done, faced with the differences expressed so vividly and publicly. Valery Giscrad d'Estaing considered that the very general principles of a solidarity policy already existed since the Maastricht Treaty (and he cited them) had not even been respected.
According to Elmar Brok MEP, the events should lead the Convention to strengthen its proposals over CFSP, and VGE concluded that the Convention needed to raise two questions: a) is there the will for a common foreign policy?; b) if so, what mechanisms should we create for it to work?
The "letter of the Eight" is not the dividing line. As we see, VGE ponders on the very existence of the will to create a CFSP. If the "letter of the Eight", which stressed the signatories' total solidarity with the United States, and the consecutive stance along the same lines by the Vilnius group, should be considered as dividing line between countries in favour of a Europe with an autonomous role in the world and a Europe a priori linked to American stances, then the situation would be very serious. Fortunately, in my opinion, that's no altogether the case. Among the signatories of the "letter of the Eight" are countries in favour of strengthening both CFSP and ESDP, and I believe that the interpretations, current in France, that give this letter the value of an act of allegiance to the United States are excessive. The dividing line will not be the same within the Convention; I believe, for example, that Spain (whose government is represented in the Convention by Ana Palacio, guarantees conformity with the European idea) and Portugal will be on the "right side". Italy, only one among the Community's founding countries to have signed the letter of the Eight, no doubt sabotaged by that gesture any hope of itself promoting a joint initiative by the Six on the Convention's major stakes, but will not finally betray half a century of active and passionate participation in European construction.
Let's not immediately draw the dividing line, and let's not forget that - according to several observers, as well as Convention Vice-President Giuliano Amato - France and Germany also bear part of the responsibility in these events, having lacked tact towards their partners by taking a firm position without consulting tem.
Having said that, it would be disingenuous not to see that the difference in the two concepts of tomorrow's Europe is beginning to appear earlier than expected. It's not necessarily a bad thing, on condition that it does not prevent countries wanting Europe to play a role in world affairs from pursuing that goal among themselves, giving rise to the "two Europes" announced several years ago by a few clairvoyant minds, which are: a very large Europe guaranteeing peace, democracy and stability, as well as a reasonable level of economic and social coherence, and a more restrained Europe defending its model of society and civilisation and providing itself with appropriate institutional and financial means.
(F.R.)