On 11 September, the Swedish electorate voted on the composition of the single-chamber parliament. The Social Democrat Prime Minister, Magdalena Andersson, lost her majority (although her own party gained a little bit of ground) and stepped down. At 3 feet in front of the red and green coalition, the right-wing opposition is in a position to form the next government. It is made up of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the (misnamed) Democrats of Sweden. While the first three of those parties lost a few seats, the last of them gained 11. This means that the far-right party, the second-largest political group (73 seats) at the Rikstag, may be able to lay claim to the position of Prime Minister. But it was the leader of the Moderates party (68 seats), Ulf Kristersson, who was invited on 19 September by the president of the Parliament to form the new government.
The campaign was dominated by security and migration issues, but even before it began, in spring 2021, a pre-agreement had already been concluded, breaking the cordon sanitaire in which the democratic parties had undertaken not to enter into government with the far right. At the European Parliament, this situation was greeted with considerable alarm by the entire Left, which accused Christian Democracy of being unfaithful to itself (see EUROPE 13021/25).
In Italy on 25 September, the general elections saw the political landscape turned on its head. The Five-Star Movement (M5S), which had triumphed at the previous elections, fell to 15% of votes cast and became the third-largest party (41 seats). The Democratic party, which had high hopes of victory, won just 19.7% (57 seats). Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, came out in much the same position as it went in at 8% (22 seats) and Salvini’s Lega lost half of its support, claiming just 9% of the vote (23 seats). The undoubted winner was the far-right party Fratelli d’Italia, with 26% and 69 seats. Its leader, Giorgia Meloni, may claim her rightful position at the head of the future government, as the right-wing coalition has a total of 114 seats, as against 68 for the Left. However, taking account of the M5S and the tiny party Azione (social-liberal), opposition in the Chamber would stand at a total of 130 seats. It is worth pointing out that electoral turnout was significantly lower than in 2018.
The respective weights of the two countries referred to above are very different. Italy, a founder State of Community Europe, has 60 million inhabitants, the third-largest economy in the EU and is a member of the Eurozone. Sweden is home to 10 million souls, is in seventh place by GDP and has been a member of the EU since 1995. In particular, whereas the Democrats of Sweden gained the support of 20% of the electorate, the two Italian far-right parties (Fratelli d’Italia and Lega) have as much as 35% between them.
While the far right remained on the sidelines of successive Swedish governments for many years, Berlusconi aligned himself with Lega as long ago as 1994; the Five-Star Movement did likewise in 2018. In 2009, the National Alliance, which rose from the ashes of the Italian Social Movement (MSI, neofascist), merged with Forza Italia within the People of Freedom (PdL); it was around this time that Giorgia Meloni held her one and only ministerial post (Youth, 2008-2011), in the fourth Berlusconi government.
Italy and Sweden by no means holds the EU monopoly on national executives that have shifted a long way to the Right. In Austria, the FPÖ party, founded by former Nazis, took part in governments headed up by Social Democrats in the 1990s. After the 1999 elections, the FPÖ joined a coalition with the Christian Democrats, causing considerable uproar throughout Europe: there was talk of sanctions, boycotting Austrian winter sports resorts. This criticism was counter-productive and various investigations concluded that democracy and minorities were not under threat. The FPÖ collapsed in the next elections. It returned to the fore in 2017 under the first Kurz government. Its murky links with Russia toppled it from its position once they became public knowledge.
But let us return to Giorgia Meloni. A committed member of the MSI from a very early age and, subsequently, of the National Alliance under Gianfranco Fini that succeeded it, she held positions of responsibility within the party. In 2012, she left Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party to set up her own, the Brothers of Italy, which have consistently gained in favour in the opinion polls since then. In 2020, she became the Italians’ most popular political leader, winning them over with her powers of rhetoric, and also the President of the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), which features a large Polish representation, even though her political DNA would probably put her closer to the ‘Identity and Democracy’ party.
Giorgia Meloni’s beliefs are of an undeniable radical right-wing flavour. She has been known to praise the qualities of Benito Mussolini. Speaking out against the Islamisation of Europe, and extremely hostile to the idea of opening up the country to migrants, she defends the traditional Catholic model, opposes gay marriage and adoption for single-sex parents, but has not moved to restrict abortion rights. Her social policy (housing, employment) would be reserved for Italians only. She wants to put an end to the citizens’ income brought in under the Conte government. On Europe, the favours a confederal vision, maintaining the sovereignty of the member states, but without leaving the Eurozone or the EU. A firm pro-Atlantist, she supports Western sanctions against Russia and the supply of weapons to Ukraine.
Unsurprisingly, the election victory enjoyed a warm welcome in Warsaw and Budapest. Even so, it is too early to say whether her model will be like the current Polish regime, which famously put the squeeze on the judiciary, or its Hungarian counterpart, an autocracy supported by corruption. She is also aware that she will have to deal with the institutions of the EU, even if for purely economic reasons, with a national government debt of 2 700 billion euros. On Tuesday, the Commission approved the disbursement to Italy of a new tranche (21 billion euros) of payments scheduled under the post-Covid recovery plan, subject to the agreement of the Twenty-Seven in the Council. Furthermore, the new government must present the Commission with its draft 2023 budget by the middle of October. And above all, the markets need reassurance. All of this could add a pinch of pragmatism to her flamboyant ideology.
One of the major challenges she will face will be reaching agreement in a coalition that has little numerical balance in terms of seats. The new head of government will have to rub along on a day-to-day basis with two experienced tenors whose machismo is well known and whose appetite for positions knows no bounds. Politically, the three of them have similar views on migration policy. This convergence will be less obvious when it comes to foreign policy, as Salvini is a Putin supporter. And although Bernasconi remains the European vision of the EPP, the other two tend to mistrust the Brussels ‘elite’, with Salvini often delivering verbal hostilities. The names of the future foreign affairs (Antonio Tajani?) and finance ministers is awaited with particular interest.
How long these two governments of the right-wing bloc will manage to cling onto power is a further double unknown. Certainly, the Swedish parliament could be the scene of a dramatic turn of events. But the Italian political classes, desperately immature, have great form for the instability of governments: its latest exploit, in an inspirational act of stupidity, was to bring down the Draghi government, triggering early elections in an extremely unpromising national and international context.
It is true that the far right of today bears little resemblance to that of the inter-war period, when it grew fat on anti-parliamentarianism, anti-Semitism, the corporatist order and the idealism of the strong provider. But they do have some points in common (such as their attitudes to non-nationals and the LBGTI community). Currently, the prize for the most stable far-right government goes to the two illiberal regimes of central Europe, which are well supported in electoral terms. They are said to be ready to provide a little ‘paternal’ support to the rest of the fledgling right-wing bloc. But whether they will be able to spread like an oil stain over the rest of the continent seems unlikely. In the meantime, even though the coalitions referred to above, which came and went, failed to overturn the functioning of democracy, methodical vigilance is nonetheless required, particularly in the framework of the Commission’s annual report on the rule of law.
The choice of the voters must be respected and it would be folly to try to punish them for it. The Commission was therefore very sensible simply to express its hopes for constructive cooperation with the new Italian government (see EUROPE 13029/27). Whether these hopes come to fruition will be judged on the basis of the legislation adopted and decisions made.
Although the far right has failed to work together meaningfully at European level (as nationalism is, by definition, incompatible with the opposite of nationalism), its success in itself bears the potential to damage the cohesion of the European Union. The most worrying fact is undoubtedly that a coalition of four States tends to flex its muscles at the European Council and ministerial meetings. This kind of mutual support could lead to expensive blocks on legislation and prove more clearly than ever that article 7 of the Treaty on the EU is decidedly unfit for purpose.
Renaud Denuit