login
login

Europe Daily Bulletin No. 12664

24 February 2021
EXTERNAL ACTION / Morocco interview
EU must move away from logic of teacher and pupil”, says Nasser Bourita
Brussels, 23/02/2021 (Agence Europe)

The Moroccan Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, believes that the European Commission’s recent communication on the partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood countries lays the foundations for a new post-Covid-19 relationship between the European Union and Morocco (see EUROPE 12654/8). He asks Europeans that not take decisions affecting the southern shore of the Mediterranean without prior consultation. He also urges the EU to get on board with leading the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. (Interview by Mathieu Bion)

Agence Europe – What is the status of the Covid-19 vaccination campaign in Morocco?

Nasser Bourita – The vaccination campaign is part of a global approach initiated by His Majesty the King to manage the pandemic.

The first discussions on the vaccine began in April 2020, and Morocco signed the first vaccine-related documents in August. Preparatory work began at the end of October. Since the first doses were received in January 2021, nearly 2.5 million people have been vaccinated.

Morocco is in the top six internationally.

What vaccines are administered?

We use vaccines from AstraZeneca and Sinopharm based on advice from the national scientific committee and the WHO. For Sinopharm, Morocco also participated in the clinical trials with a sample of 600 people to whom the vaccine was administered.

Have you experienced, as in Europe, delays in delivery?

Access to vaccines is an international issue. Demand far exceeds production capacity.

I am not saying that there are no difficulties, but so far the supply has been normal.

How has European bilateral aid been used to fight the pandemic?

The European Union was among the first partners to support Morocco.

€450 million has been paid into the Special Anti-Covid-19 Fund. This is a reallocation of resources that were earmarked for different bilateral projects and programmes. The money was for access to protective equipment and business support.

The vaccine is 100% financed by the Moroccan state budget and will be free of charge.

Morocco is the country that has given the most to Africa during this period, as protective equipment has been delivered to more than 20 African countries.

Africa has shown resilience. Its collapse, which some predicted, did not happen, on the contrary.

Does the recent Communication on Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood lay the foundations for a new relationship with the EU?

The pandemic challenges the Morocco-EU partnership to project onto the post-Covid-19 period. And the post-Covid-19 period is not just about the neighbourhood, a classic type of cooperation, albeit very fruitful.

The recent Commission communication is relevant for its timing and innovative in its approach.

European Commissioner Várhelyi and the EU in general made an effort to consult the countries concerned before finalising the communication. We used to find out about these documents through the media. This time, we had several sessions to share our aspirations and questions.

Thirdly, the content of the communication reinforces our overall approach. In June 2019, Morocco and the EU agreed on four areas of cooperation which are today very relevant (see EUROPE 12284/1).

In 7 of the 12 proposed flagship projects—including the Mohammed VI Fund for Strategic Investments, renewable energies, sustainable agriculture, social protection—Morocco feels a convergence between national priorities and the priorities that the EU wants to give in its relations with the neighbourhood.

The interest is also that we get out of the intergovernmental arena.

The EU officially declared on Monday 22 February that Morocco had fulfilled its commitments on tax cooperation (see EUROPE 12663/28). What measures have been taken?

The management of this case deserves some consideration. There are good sides and bad sides.

Morocco has, from the outset, considered that dialogue must be the basis managing sensitive issues between the two partners and that the EU, with this kind of list, should take into account the global nature of the partnership. The EU cannot set criteria and declare: ‘We use them for the Cayman Islands, we use them for Morocco’.

If the southern neighbourhood is important, it should not suffer the consequences of decisions taken by the EU. The southern Mediterranean countries must be involved, not in the decision, but at least in the deliberation.

Second lesson: Morocco has asked the EU to move away from this teacher-student method of thinking and to enter into one of consultation in which each understands the concerns of the other in order to arrive at solutions that can satisfy the interests of Europe without damaging Morocco’s interests.

The result is good, but the starting point has raised considerable questions from Morocco.

What about the removal of Morocco from another list, that of non-Member States whose nationals may make non-essential journeys within the EU (see EUROPE 12544/8)?

Where this is based on health criteria, the criteria can be decided in a sovereign manner. But afterwards, there must be some effort to explain, especially vis-à-vis the direct neighbours.

Passage through Morocco affects Moroccans, but also an enormous number of Sub-Saharan Africans for whom Morocco is the gateway to Europe.

Does the Migration and Asylum Pact meet your expectations in a context of increasing irregular arrivals of migrants in the Canary Islands (see EUROPE 12566/1)?

Any approach that seeks to find the culprits rather than the solutions is a bad route. Migration is a natural phenomenon between the two shores. How can it be channelled? How do you fight human trafficking and its networks?

The approach should be a concerted one to find a solution to a common challenge, not one for ‘name and shame’.

The easy solution is to put everything on the backs of the transit countries, because solving the problem at the outset seems difficult, and because there is such political pressure in the host countries that nobody wants to hold a serene, lucid discussion on the phenomenon that is migration.

Therefore, excessive guilt-tripping on the part of transit countries is a bad route.

Do you sense this in the EU’s attitude?

We have seen several proposals in the past, on ‘hotspot’ identification centres (see EUROPE 11838/3). Morocco repeats: it fulfils its responsibilities, but will never play the policeman, because it is neither its vocation, nor its conviction.

Morocco considers that the phenomenon of migration is exaggerated for political rather than objective reasons. Figures show that African migration to Europe is in the minority: less than one person in ten.

In coordination with Spain in particular, Morocco conducts operations to fight human trafficking networks which are not necessarily on this side of the Mediterranean shore. The number of dismantled networks is enormous.

And Morocco’s deployed security and material effort seeks to ensure that the ‘western’ route of migration is the least used, even if it is the most obvious route compared to the ‘central’ and ‘eastern’ routes.

At the end of 2020, the United States, under the Trump administration, recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. What signals are you receiving from the Biden administration on this issue? Could EU countries follow suit by opening local consulates?

If there was a decision taken by France, I don’t know that you would say, ‘President Sarkozy or Holland did this...’. These are country positions.

This is a natural evolution of the American position which, since 2007, considers the Moroccan autonomy initiative as a serious and realistic basis for finding a definitive solution to this regional dispute. And when we say autonomy, I don't think there is any autonomy outside of sovereignty.

This position strengthens the chances of a definitive solution. Morocco is ready to engage in such a process, under the aegis of the United Nations, to find a solution within the framework of its autonomy initiative to the Sahara issue.

At the end of January, 42 countries supported this approach. This is not an isolated position, but a trend at the level of the international community.

All that is needed is for Europe to step out of its comfort zone and support this international trend.

By supporting the UN process, is the EU still in its comfort zone?

The process has been going in circles for years. Today, a direction is emerging, and it is this direction that the EU must also embrace.

Europe needs a stable and secure Sahelo-Saharan area. These wishes may remain empty words, if there is no commitment. The train is pulling away from the station today. Is Europe going to remain passive or contribute to this dynamic?

What about the repeated litigation before the Court of Justice of the EU related to the EU-Morocco agreements?

This is guerrilla warfare, not strategy.

If Europe believes in the partnership between Morocco and the EU, Europe must be aware that this partnership has enemies. It is up to Europe to respond to this judicial harassment.

Contents

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - SOCIETAL ISSUES
EXTERNAL ACTION
EU RESPONSE TO COVID-19
SECTORAL POLICIES
INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMY - FINANCE - BUSINESS
SOCIAL AFFAIRS - EDUCATION
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU
NEWS BRIEFS