In a police series, this would be the moment when two individuals stab an otherwise healthy victim who is concerned about the collective interest. But the search for the culprits would not be necessary: they would assume in public. Instead, the issue would be to save the victim and put away the thugs. A temporary accomplice of the other two, a Slovenian, is said to have taken a turn for the worse so as not to aggravate the situation or his own case.
There is nothing to joke with Covid-19, which has already caused 1.3 million deaths in the world, including nearly 290,000 in Europe, and which is causing an economic recession and large-scale social damage that will last an indefinite period. There is therefore no reason – neither ethical nor political – to inhibit the collective response to this enormous multidimensional crisis, a response which, within the European Union, has been sought, and then expressed, through the €750-billion recovery plan and its related dossiers. Now, that reply cannot wait any longer. From now on, every day counts; self-employed and salaried employees are vying for their survival.
The European Parliament did its job, as did the Commission, and the negotiation with the Council of the EU ended with a compromise (see EUROPE 12599/2). All the elements were in place for the Multiannual Financial Framework, the 2021 budget, the Recovery Plan, own resources and the Regulation on conditionality for the rule of law to become effective. This was the decisive moment chosen by the two aggressors, Messrs Orbán and Morawiecki, representing their respective governments, to impose their veto and thus take all the people hostage who could benefit from the Recovery Plan and EU programmes (see EUROPE 12602/1). Whatever the outcome, this act of sabotage will be a watershed.
Like the pandemic, respect for EU values must be taken seriously. A regulation consolidating such compliance while protecting the budget should not be a problem for those who have joined the Union and adopted all its legislative acquis – including Hungary and Poland. So what are their arguments for turning a historically major and unprecedented public-interest enterprise on its head?
Under the Article 7 of the TEU procedure, these states have repeated that they have been put on trial unjustifiably for several years now and that they have respected EU values, including the Rule of law. Since they declare that their behaviour is above board, they should not be afraid of an additional guarantee in this area.
They point out that Article 7 is sufficient. By ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon, they acceded to it. Sadly, this article is useless. Despite several hearings, the EU Council has still not taken a decision. If only it were to do so, in order to establish the infringement, which the European Council would then have to adjudicate unanimously (without the accused Member State). The diplomats and their leaders who wrote and validated this article bear a heavy historical responsibility. If just one government is in solidarity with the ‘thief’, the ‘thief’ can escape punishment (loss of voting rights in the EU Council). The authors of the Treaty proved, on this point, to be far below the mark. The complicity between the two illiberal regimes demonstrates this.
They consider that only the EU Court of Justice can say who violates EU law, not a majority of politicians. Indeed, a decision to suspend the benefit of the funds, taken by a qualified majority of Member States on the basis of the Regulation, would be more effective than the weak Article 7. But this one – which they defend – does not mention the Court as an actor in the process either. Their argument does not hold up. They should be made to understand that, in both cases, the convicted State can always bring the matter before the Court if it considers itself wronged.
Poland and Hungary do not want this Regulation, which is an acquis of the July European Council, in which they were represented (see EUROPE 12532/2). Subsequently, two institutions, the first in the hierarchy of the Treaties – the European Parliament – and the Commission, abandoned their common approach – the reverse qualified majority required to block a sanction – in favour of the European Council’s thesis: the qualified majority required to take disciplinary action. Are the two henchmen grateful to the institution where they sit? Not at all.
It is still being said that the European Union is attacking the sovereignty of the two states, that it would apply the methods of communism, and other horrors. If such were actually the case, it would be better to leave this criminal association; Article 50 of the TEU allows this. Would the governments of these two countries, which are net beneficiaries, choose to activate it? Logical, but unlikely.
So, what do you gentlemen want? That the Regulation be withdrawn? Never mind. Put your plans on the table, before your power to harm others has alienated all your partners. By the way, what value do the Polish and Hungarian governments add to the Union’s overall policy? Where is the creativity? What proposals are there for the future? What ability to look forward? What art of compromise? Zero.
The truth is that in Hungary, the elections of 2022 look set to be difficult for Fidesz (already in the minority in the polls) and the benefits of the funds, if the regulation is applied, might not accrue to the regime’s loyalists. In Poland, on the other hand, the majority in power is showing cracks, and civil society is becoming increasingly restive. In both cases, major cities seek to receive future European aid directly, urging Brussels to stop going through corrupt and undemocratic governments (see EUROPE 12606/29).
The European Council would be foolish to give in to these two desperate governments. Firstly, because the Union would have sold out its values: an irreparable mistake. Secondly, because accommodating an autocrat is an incentive (for him, as well as for his future clones). While the Americans have just rid themselves of Trump, a 21st century “little Munich” is taking shape in Europe – and one that would be avoidable by making a recovery plan for 25 Members. It would be more complicated, but far more moral.
Original version in French by Renaud Denuit