Former Greens/EFA group-MEP from June 1999 to June 2018, Claude Turmes was appointed Luxembourg’s Minister for Energy and Spatial Planning at the end of 2018. A function that leads him to sit on the Council of the European Union, the other legislative institution of the EU. In an interview given to EUROPE, he shared with us his vision of recent developments in the field of climate within the European institutions, his opinion on the ‘hydrogen strategy’ and his perception of the role of the European Parliament [comments collected by Damien Genicot].
Agence Europe – While the European Parliament advocates an EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 60% by 2030 (see EUROPE 12577/12), discussions between Member States on a target of at least 55% are still ongoing. What is Luxembourg’s position?
Claude Turmes – Over the past few years, Luxembourg has always said that the current target of reducing emissions by at least 40% is not enough. We advocate an increased target of at least 55%, which we have also set as an ambition in our integrated national energy and climate plan (NECP).
It is very good news that Parliament is shifting to 60% and that countries such as Finland and Denmark are joining it. This will provide a positive impetus to the discussions in the EU Council on the target of at least 55%, but also on some rather strange elements of the European Commission’s proposal, notably the inclusion of LULUCF [editor’s note: Regulation 2018/841 on GHG emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry – see EUROPE 12561/5].
Parliament’s vote will help the EU to adopt a more ambitious and clearer position than the Commission’s proposal.
A majority of Member States reportedly support a reduction of at least 55%, but is it 55% net, as proposed by the Commission (including LULUCF emissions and removals) or 55% ‘gross’?
This is the issue that needs to be clarified. But Parliament’s vote creates a negotiating dynamic that can improve the Commission’s position.
The 27 Heads of State or Government will have a second discussion on the 2030 climate target in December, with a view to reaching a unanimous agreement (see EUROPE 12582/2). However, one of the novelties introduced by the ‘Climate Law’ was normally the fact that the climate objectives were to be defined by the co-decision procedure and, therefore, by a qualified majority of the Member States...
I have always personally defended the fact that such decisions are taken by qualified majority and not by unanimity.
One of the main reasons why the EU cannot function smoothly is that subjects that are institutionally subject to co-decision are brought up to the European Council and thus subject to the unanimity rule.
Everything that is at the level of co-decision should remain under co-decision.
The German EU Council Presidency wants to complete the ‘Climate Law’ before the end of the year. Do you think that is feasible?
It is a good thing that Ms Merkel and the German Presidency have made this one of their priorities.
The interinstitutional negotiations [editor’s note: trilogues] will be difficult, but I am quite optimistic, especially as we are increasingly confronted with climate change.
The recent, unprecedentedly intense rains in the Mediterranean, as well as events in California and Siberia show us: climate change is not 10 years away, it is now.
I hope that all European leaders have understood that we are already in a climate emergency and that we must decide and move forward.
The good news is that at the last meeting of Energy Ministers [see EUROPE 12576/16] the tone was completely different than before. Much of the Polish minister’s speech focused on offshore wind energy and the fact that Poland wants to be one of the main industrial players in order to develop huge volumes of renewable energy rapidly, thereby creating jobs in Poland.
Could this new dynamic lead countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic to adhere to a target of at least 55% gross?
Poles are very good negotiators. They are asking for even more money to help their country in its energy transition, which is what is at stake in the Polish obstruction.
Regarding the EU’s ‘hydrogen strategy’, you consider in particular that it focuses too much on hydrogen produced from natural gas in combination with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. How do you respond to those who see this as a necessary step in developing a renewable hydrogen market?
I tell them that they have not understood that reforming fossil gas creates 10 tonnes of CO2 for every tonne of hydrogen and will not accelerate innovation in the ‘green electricity/electrolysers’ chain.
Reforming methane requires a completely different technology, which will require funding that could have been invested where it is really needed: in the electrolysers needed to produce renewable hydrogen.
The focus should be on creating a rapid critical mass of investment in electrolysers and accelerating the deployment of renewable energy. Everything else is a waste of public and private money that will not help us with regard to climate change.
You do not share the view that gas should play a transitional role in allowing some states to move away from coal. But is it economically realistic for a country like Poland to switch directly from coal to renewables?
Yes, because Poland will be a big industrial winner from offshore wind power.
Offshore wind power means 4,000 to 5,000 constant hours of electricity at very competitive prices.
Today, there are already more than 10,000 Polish workers in this sector constructing the foundations for the wind turbines deployed in Denmark.
What do you expect from the strategy on offshore renewable energy that the Commission is due to present on 18 November?
The first issue is the security of investments and, in particular, the debate on the review of State Aid. It needs to be clarified that offshore wind energy will be entitled to a stable investment regime, including ‘contracts for difference’ (CFD).
Thus, if the market price is low, the investor in wind energy is guaranteed a stable price. On the contrary, if the market price is high, the investor pays back a portion of the money he earns.
Secondly, all electricity grids must be planned for a 100% renewable world, so that the large quantities of green electricity coming onshore can be transported within the EU. Hydrogen produced by electrolysis will be part of the solutions to absorb these huge amounts of electricity.
The third important element is to take into account the fact that offshore wind energy is not only a game changer for those countries around the North Sea or the Baltic Sea, it is also a game changer for all countries around the Black Sea, such as Bulgaria and Romania.
There is also floating wind power, which is also an option, especially for the south of France. Floating wind power may be Europe’s next industrial step, because it is a huge market given the surface area of the planet’s seas.
On Thursday, Parliament will debate the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT – see EUROPE 12558/9). What is your opinion on this treaty in the process of modernisation?
This is a very important project.
There is a major contradiction between this treaty, which protects fossil industries, and the policies that the EU wishes to implement to meet its climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.
In order to resolve this contradiction, the Commission must formulate a clear position, aimed at removing the protection of fossil fuels from this treaty, in the context of the negotiations under way with the non-Member States that are signatories to the treaty.
Now that there is real momentum to move away from fossil fuels, it is important that the EU not be subject to blockage as a result of signing this treaty in the 1990s.
Now that you are on the EU Council, how do you see the role of the European Parliament? Does it weigh more than when you were an MEP?
On energy and climate policy, Parliament has been the real driving force over the last 20 years. It has always gone further than the Commission’s proposals.
Even with regard to its recent decision to approve the inclusion of gas investments in the Just Transition Fund (see EUROPE 12561/11)?
This is the exception that proves the rule.
In the EU Council, it was confirmed that gas is excluded from the negotiating mandate for the trilogues.
I am quite optimistic that, at the end of the negotiations, gas will not be included in the Just Transition Fund. We are going to make sure that is not the case.