Developments in the situation in Ireland with regard to the Lisbon Treaty are at the same time both encouraging and worrying. Encouraging, in the sense that the great majority of the public has reaffirmed its support for European construction and its will to participate in it, and that the government is also currently outlining its strategy in view of the new referendum; worrying, in the sense that this same government considers that a certain time frame is necessary for putting its intentions into practice, which is further slowing down the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and makes matters more complicated for the next European elections, the new European Commission and other aspects.
The Irish foreign affairs minister, Micheál Martin's report on the reasons for the failure in the first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (see the following pages in this newsletter, with the reaction from the president of the European Parliament) indicates that: 70% of the Irish support their country's participation in the EU and 42% of the no vote was motivated by a lack of information on the contents of the treaty. If this analysis is correct, it ought to lead, in my opinion, to two conclusions:
1. Referendums are not the appropriate democratic means of approving a technically complex treaty. It is inevitable that each political tendency and interest group finds such and such an element as not being entirely satisfactory, because the text is the result of a delicate negotiation between 27 countries and contains necessary compromises. An overall assessment ought to prevail and this led all the European institutions, governments and national parliaments that have given their verdict, to approve the result. If specific interests have their voice, misgivings add up and could prevail, even if the reasons themselves are contradictory. This is not democracy but the negation of democracy, based on elected parliaments that have to define the general interest and take all aspects into account, not just specific interests. Referendums are appropriate and genuinely democratic when they respond to simple issues and fundamental “yes” or “no” choices.
2. Unmasking the lies. In the Irish case, the “no” supporters lied in a horrendous manner to convey the idea that the Lisbon Treaty would oblige Ireland to abandon its neutrality and fiscal autonomy, get rid of its commissioner, and legalise abortion and marriages between homosexuals. In an effort to avoid creating the impression of putting pressure on the people, the Irish government did not publicly or explicitly denounce these lies. It would not have needed to enter into any polemics, but could have simply explained the reality of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the different points cited.
Examples and difficulties. Publication of the report on the reasons for the “no” vote, and the official indication that the Irish government would submit declarations and other measures to the October European Council, have clarified the situation and way forward. Many difficulties, however, still persist. What Ireland is calling for, and the timetable it is planning (EUROPE 9714) imply that:
the decision on the future size of the Commission (return to the principle of a Commissioner for each nationality) could prove difficult in obtaining a formal unanimous agreement before the Lisbon Treaty enters into force (Ireland is calling for this before another national referendum). It should not be forgotten that the provisions on the number of commissioners are based on comprehensive institutional provisions, covering the weighting of votes at the Council and the number of MEPs;
how would the Council be able to formally decide on amending a provision in a treaty that is not yet in force? At most, it would be able to express an intention to do so;
if the Irish referendum takes place in autumn 2009, changes to the new Commission (planned for November 2009) should be done according to the rules of the Treaty of Nice, implying an immediate reduction in the number of commissioners. To avoid this, the current Commission's mandate would need extending;
in the absence of the Lisbon Treaty, the 2009 European elections would be based on provisions in the Treaty of Nice (736 members instead of the current 785 and 751 under the Lisbon Treaty) and the elections would take place in an unhealthy atmosphere of uncertainty for the public.
These are just a few of the envisaged complications. In the hypothesis of another no vote in the referendum occurring, the situation would be even more complex and difficult to manage from both political and legal points of view. (F.R./transl.rh)