Relaunch or stalemate? Neither. I am not confident of an inspiring result from this week's European Council, but nor do I believe that there will be a resounding failure, causing a split between the member states. The willingness to provide the EU with a new treaty will be reaffirmed, although certain elements of it will remain hazy, and the decision to convene an IGC (intergovernmental conference) will be made with the indication that it must be a short one, but without any deadline stated or bombshells dropped. Nobody will come out of it entirely satisfied, but nobody will reject a compromise which appears, on first sight, to be reasonable, and which will allow those taking part in the summit to announce that the EU is coming out of its crisis. The alternative would be to delay the convening of the IGC, or a breakdown with consequences impossible to predict.
Moderation. It is the heads of government themselves, or at least most of them, who seem to be moving towards conciliation. Even in Warsaw, which has produced the most inflammatory statements and where the word “veto” has been pronounced, the tone is getting less harsh. “Poland is prepared for a compromise”, said Prime Minister Jaroslav Kaczynski, adding an enthusiastic assessment of his country's entry into the Union: the overall result is “excellent”, Polish exports have practically doubled, economic growth is high and public opinion in the campaigns (which was yesterday “steadfastly opposed” to Europe) is now very much in favour of Europe. In several other capitals, the emphasis has been laid on getting over the differences of opinion and bringing the positions closer together, all the time moving towards a “new simplified treaty”. This does not mean that all the differences of opinion have been levelled off, far from it; there are still many of them, and the German presidency does not hide the fact. But at the highest level, the tendency is, and I repeat the word, towards conciliation.
The example of majority voting. These overall positive developments bring with them the risk of apparent or unsound compromises, masking conflicts which would then inevitably re-emerge later on, or excessive concessions which would compromise the anticipated results. In the list of questions put to the foreign affairs ministers on Sunday (see the next page of this bulletin), the German presidency had left out the two most politically sensitive subjects, which remain reserved for the heads of government: extending the majority rule to new areas; and the details for the majority decisions to be taken within the Council.
On this latter point, almost all of the member states support “double majority” (55% of the member states, 65% of the population), which is included in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Poland is opposed to it, but it is not asking for the Summit to abandon this formula this week, but the question remains open, to be discussed at the intergovernmental conference (IGC). Jaroslav Kaczynski said (our translation) “We would like more time to allow the forthcoming IGC to examine certain crucial issues, such as the decision-making system. Let us start the discussion. Poland is prepared for a compromise”. However, he added that the formula included in the draft constitution “would be a capitulation. However, a capitulation is not the same as a compromise”. What, then, is the situation? Has this difference of opinion levelled off, or does it still exist in the same form? In the view of most of the member states, it is precisely the formula of double majority which already represents a compromise, born of difficult negotiations within the Convention.
The price of failure. Poland, and all of the member states in general, are called upon to have a good, long think about this. A breakdown over the new treaty would, according to the President of the European Commission, constitute “a defeat for all those who want a Europe of solidarity and cohesion”. This generic phraseology of Mr Barroso gets more specific elsewhere. According to the press, over at the Bundestag, Christian Democrat Andreas Schockenhoff has stated that in the case of a failure, “Germany will not be giving anything away when it is time for Europe's funding to be re-examined”. And it is no secret that Poland has become the number one beneficiary of this funding, and that it is (rightly) asking for European solidarity in the field of energy. But solidarity cannot be a one-way street. At the same time, however, it is no secret that a Europe which no longer funds agriculture and which does not have a cohesion policy (replaced by a bit of support for the least well-off member states) would not displease London, or a few other capitals.
Acceptable concessions. The above considerations explain why the appeasing attitudes and this tendency towards conciliation, whilst undoubtedly positive, are at the same time not without risks. There is a distinction between the concessions which (not without regrets, in some cases) are acceptable, and those which would be dangerous. In the first category I would put the following orientations, which (after the exchange of views at ministerial level) seem to be fairly broadly accepted, and include:
a) the principle of a simplified treaty, which would not aim to replace the Treaties currently in force with a single text;
b) sacrificing the terms “Constitution” and “Constitutional”, and the symbols of Europe;
c) references to the new objectives of the Union, particularly climate change.
The sacrifices which would arise from the first two points I mentioned may be the cause of some regret and even a certain amount of bitterness, but they are inevitable. France and the Netherlands must be in a position to justify to their people support for the new treaty, despite the results of the referendums, and the United Kingdom must be able to explain why it is not bothering with a referendum (unless…). Their governments can only do this if certain clearly constitutional aspects are shelved.
I'm only too aware that at least one of these sacrifices is controversial, both at political level (a proportion of the European Parliament, the President of the Convention) and among certain commentators: that of the European symbols. I have already explained in this column (bulletin 9432) the opinion that their importance does not reside in their inclusion in a text which the man in the street will not read. The European flag, with its stars against a blue backdrop, has become familiar to the citizens, and it can be seen in windows and on balconies and in the streets; and the final ode of Beethoven's ninth Symphony has become an increasingly important presence at European events. If they are not included in the new treaty, nothing will change in reality.
Are the symbols indispensable? Valéry Giscard d'Estaing reacted forcefully to the idea of getting rid of the symbols in a text sent out to all members of the European Council, he spoke of “pitiful proposals to remove the European symbols, anthem, flag and logo; they would be laughable if they did not injure our still fragile pride in feeling European”. Among the commentaries, I would like to quote that by Thomas Ferenczy: “a community needs symbols” ( Le Monde of 14 June). As well as the anthem, flag and logo referred to by VGE, he also mentioned the “preamble” to the constitutional draft, which speaks of “the cultural, religious and humanist heritage” of Europe, and which he feels are also destined to disappear without trace. He notes: “the simplified Treaty will not be a Constitution, the European Foreign Affairs Minister will not bear the name of Minister, the Charter of Fundamental Rights will not be included in the text, and some people would even prefer it if the primacy of Community law was not specifically reaffirmed”. Mr Ferenczy then went on to comment: “this will change nothing fundamentally”, because the powers of the head of European diplomacy will be the same whatever his or her job title, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is already part of the body of European texts and the primacy of Community law is recognised by the Court of Justice. He concludes: “they will do nothing to change all of this, but it will not be written down”. According to European parliamentarian Johannes Voggenhuber, it is actually more serious, because “a government which wants to shed a symbol wants to shed an idea”.
But if it is a straight choice between appearances and reality, how can we hesitate? If the content is safe, the symbols can be left to one side. Furthermore, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing himself backed the principle of the “simplified Treaty”, on the condition that “the simplification does not hide a manipulation”, tending to get rid of certain steps forward included in the draft which bears its name. Its title is: “Simplified Treaty, yes; Mutilated Treaty, no”. The first part of the draft must remain as it is; it is a “coherent text (…), it is hard to see how it could be simplified”. What can be simplified is the third part, and it is with a perverse pleasure that the former president of the convention points out that this third part “is not the work of the Convention but of the governments, who are thus called upon to correct their own work”. He goes on to refer to the new developments achieved, and which must not be touched.
The mandate of the IGC is essential. Essentially, and admitting a genuine desire for compromise, the real focus of deliberations at the Summit will be defining the mandate for the IGC. This mandate must be as specific and detailed as possible, so that the intergovernmental conference can limit itself to giving the appropriate form to political choices already defined by the heads of state and government. Chairing the IGC will be the job of the forthcoming presidency, that of Portugal. However, the Portuguese authorities have already stated that they would not call the Conference if the mandate was not sufficiently clear and precise. This is only to be expected, as it would not be possible to negotiate all the aspects of the new treaty in six months, on the basis of a few general guidelines. If the fundamental elements remain open, discussions between the heads of state and government should be carried out at an additional summit, to be called as a matter of urgency. And this summit should consider the fact that the current climate of conciliation and compromise represents a façade only, as all parties are getting ready to blame the others in case of a breakdown.
(F.R.)