Safeguarding possibility of common energy policy. There's nothing inevitable about the current tense state of relations between the EU and Russia. The constant mutual blame-mongering for the differences arising (see this column yesterday) is unjustified and ultimately naive. The fault of the EU mainly lies in its not being able to present itself as a single entity when dealing with Moscow and not speaking with a single voice. Every time the “Community method” is respected, the European position is stronger. Unity is certainly not easily obtained, as the interests of member states are often, at first glance, different, and the Russian authorities play on these differences and seek to discuss and negotiate separately with one or other of the member states, according to the subjects or circumstances in question. The temptation for member states to express their purely national interests is strong and they often give in to this but it is short-sighted. The lack of union sometimes goes as far as the director general of the Commission's “external relations”, Eneko Landaburu, affirming that Russia represents a big danger to Europe, especially as an element of division among member states (see this column in EUROPE 9428). The absence of cohesion between the 27 over energy is, particularly, one of the reasons why the main contents of the draft Constitutional Treaty has to be safeguarded; the new European treaty that is envisaged has to include the provision that makes a common energy policy legally possible. In the meantime, it will be necessary to apply the 2007-09 “action plan” approved on 9 March by the European Council (published in EUROPE/Documents 2463) in order to take a major step forward. Some recent developments are expected to have made the governments think seriously about the risks and inefficiency of the national stands that have been taken, such as that in Poland, Hungary, Estonia and elsewhere.
An attempt to understand. The EU has to make an effort to understand the Russians' frustrations and Russia's desire to win back the political weight previously enjoyed by the USSR. Vladimir Putin's words about the dissolution of the USSR being the biggest political error of the last century was no joke or simple regret expressed by a former power. According to the assiduous observer, Sir Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to Moscow, “many Russians have accepted the fall of Communism but not that of the Soviet Union, because this was their country”. Russia has to adapt to a triple simultaneous transformation: the transition to democracy; the shift to a market economy; and the change from the international status of a superpower to a state that in one go lost a significant part of its territory and half its population. It is true that certain components of the former USSR resulted from unacceptable invasions of formerly free countries, such as the Baltic states, and it is totally legitimate that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regained their freedom and chose EU membership. The situation, however, is not as cut and dry in all other cases and it is understandable that Moscow strives to maintain its sphere of influence in one or other of the new republics that have grown out of the break-up of the USSR. This does not in any way mean that the EU should agree to all the different aspects of Vladimir Putin's attempts to give his country more weight in the world.
In the energy dossier, however, Russia has some powerful arguments and Putin has made them known; the EU is at fault if it is unable to act together. In areas where a common policy exists, such as trade, the EU is much more efficient, whether this is in respect of Russia joining the WTO or Polish agricultural exports.
Limits to CFSP and ESDP. The European Union also has to ask itself a few questions about its attitude displayed in the US anti-missile dossier. It was unable to take a position in this affair. The only thing it was able to say what that the matter had to be discussed within NATO and the NATO/Russia contact mechanisms. According to the report on EU/Russia relations that has just been approved by the French Senate, the president of the Council Frank-Walter Steinmeier, underlined the need to discuss the matter at NATO but did not mention the EU, whereas Javier Solana highlighted the necessity of member states debating it between themselves. Defence ministers also raised the matter in discussions between themselves. This affair confirms the current limits to European foreign and defence policy. The French Senate report also contains several items of information and comments to which I propose to return.
(F.R.)