As could be predicted, the imminent increase, from 25 to 27, in the number of European Commissioners has re-opened the debate on the composition and working of the Commission (see this column in yesterday's edition). The formal appointment of the Romanian and Bulgarian Commissioners will shortly take place. Logically, this will be according to the arrangements currently in force, which are very different from those set out in the draft Constitutional Treaty. In this case, however, one cannot speak of a “cost of the non-Constitution”, because the Constitution would not have made any radical improvement on what is already there, except on one point: the creation of the post of European Minister for Foreign Affairs, the incumbent of which would have also been Vice-President of the Commission. For the rest, the Constitutional Treaty does not provide a satisfactory response to two basic issues: the size of the Commission and its internal balance.
A debatable solution. The arrival of two new Commissioners is in no way responsible for these two problems, which result from the Treaty of Nice, or even the Treaty of Amsterdam: it just makes them more apparent. The size of the Commission has been a matter of concern to the political leaders of the Union for several years (with one or two exceptions, since a minority does not see the number of Commissioners as a problem), but no reasonable solution has yet been found. The Convention invented the convoluted system of two different categories of Commissioner; fifteen who would have voting rights, and the others with no voting rights, but sufficiently numerous so that all nationalities would be represented in the College. Rotation between the two categories was to be strictly egalitarian. Convention President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing did not like this system, but had to resign himself to it. It was the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that rejected it, some governments fearing that their nationals would be reduced to the rank of sub-Commissioner, despite the “egalitarian rotation” between the two categories. The less-than-brilliant system decided on by heads of government is made up of two phases: a Commissioner of the nationality of each Member State until 2014 (when the EU could be made up by as many as 35 countries), and thereafter a number of Commissioners corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, a system the intelligence and logic of which is debatable. With the Constitutional Treaty still in hiatus, one is stuck for the moment with the texts that are in force.
27 Commissioners until 2009. The Treaty of Nice introduced the principle of a restricted Commission: as soon as the EU had 27 Member States, the number of Commissioners had to be lower than 27. By how many? No one knows: were the mechanisms and rotation (strictly egalitarian, of course) to be negotiated a teach enlargement? Please note: this new rule does not apply to the present Commission, but to the following one. In the normal way of things, it will come into effect in 2009, unless something unforeseen happens (motion of censure by the Parliament of collective resignation). Thus, the new rules will have to be applied immediately, without anyone knowing how. How many Commissioners? How are they to be rotated? It is a mystery, and no one is talking about it. It is an absurd situation.
If everything goes without mishap, there will be 27 Commissioners until 2009, with pressure already for the rule “one Commissioner per country” to be extended until 2014, when there probably be more than 30 Member States. What has just been noted (see this column in yesterday's edition) is that even with 27 Commissioners it is not easy for the President to find a substantial portfolio for each one.
Doubts over voting legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is a very delicate one. At the current time, the six largest Member States (76% of the population of the EU, and 77% of GDP) have six Commissioners out of 25, according to the nationality principle, to which the new States are very attached. Does a College made up in this way have sufficient legitimacy to take decisions on a simple majority, as is the rule? Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's response was categoric: no, such a Commission cannot vote.
The other institutions are better balanced: the make-up of he Parliament depends (partly) on the size of the countries, and, within the Council, the influence of Member States is differentiated. But the Commission holds many autonomous powers, and the areas where it alone makes decisions are sometimes very important: competition, state aid, management of the CAP etc. In addition, the number of smaller Member States could further increase, through the fragmentation of former unitary states: Montenegro, Kosovo perhaps, etc. Should each one have a Commissioner? And why not one day Flanders, Scotland, Catalonia or Bavaria, all larger and more powerful than many of the smaller States. Some day, things will have to be discussed.
(F.R.)
Plenary session of the European Parliament