A draft destined to evolve. Don't be expecting a detailed technical analysis of Tony Blair's proposals on the financial perspectives 2007-2013 from me, because his text is destined to be modified considerably during the talks due to open this Wednesday, nor any political analysis (with mandatory indignation at the lack of European ambition in the draft), because the negotiation strategem will, without a doubt, have a considerable part to play. Let us not forget that the letter calling for the overall budget not to exceed 1% of Union GNI was signed by six Member States, and not just any six Member States, and that several governments would not hesitate to scuttle the agreement rather than give up on various of their claims. Nor that the uncertainty on the future of Europe is unlikely to motivate the Member States to invest much in a construction which may not correspond to their ambitions (the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt said last week that "several of the 'old' Member States had split off from the federalist group", and that "a number of the 10 new Member States favour the inter-governmental approach"). Furthermore, the memory of previous budgetary quarrels have taught us that when money is on the table and economic situations are tough, generosity is unlikely to be the first spontaneous movement on the part of governments. And it is always on the eve of decision-making time that the governments take the firmest stances possible, so as to avoid weakening their bargaining position.
And so let us wait to see what happens next, whilst taking note of the judgment of the President of the European Commission (who feels that the Blair draft is unacceptable, as it is quite simply unrealistic), and other, equally negative reactions. Here are a few morsels of food for thought.
1. Tony Blair's gymnastics. The British Prime Minister was, without a doubt, well aware of the storm his draft was likely to raise (Mr Barroso gave him the outlines of his own reaction before publishing it). Let us not neglect the tactical element. As of now, any flexibility will be seen as a success by those who protest. Mr Blair knows very well that as President of the European Council, at some point or other it will be up to him to suggest compromises, and therefore to give up a bit of ground, particularly on the "rebate" enjoyed by his country. If he adopts an extreme starting point, he is giving himself more room for manoeuvre. This room is, unfortunately, limited by the pernicious attitude of the national press, the sceptical public opinion of his country and by the anti-European beliefs or some of his ministers, not least Gordon Brown.
2. The dilemma of the Central and Eastern European countries. The reactions of some of the Member States may, in part, be dictated by a similar strategy to that adopted by Tony Blair. Declaring oneself satisfied before the negotiations are concluded would mean giving up on playing the game of final mutual concessions. Whenever such concessions are indispensable in order to reach some kind of conclusion, nobody wants to be excluded, and for the time being, everybody is sticking to their refusal to accept what they describe as unacceptable. However, some of the positions may change. It is worth noting that the countries of central and eastern Europe announced back in June that they were prepared, to a certain extent, to give up on some proportion of the funding to which they are entitled, in return for reaching an immediate agreement. For them, the most important thing is a swift decision, which will allow them to receive the support earmarked for the start of 2007. The scale of this possible sacrifice remains to be determined.
3. Partial satisfaction. Tony Blair has been shrewd enough to make a compromise that is satisfactory to France on agricultural expenditure (sacrificing what is, in reality, the most important element for the future, the "rural development" plank, but in Paris, the people in the ivory towers have not yet understood this), and to other Member States (Spain partly, the Netherlands and Sweden) on various aspects.
4. To the detriment of European ambitions. The various elements referred to all play against a brave and generous vision of Europe. But it is the Heads of State and Government who decide. A second-rate compromise would come in for serious criticism from the Commission and the European Parliament; the latter would even be able to oppose decisions it disagrees with. But would the Parliament go so far as to reject a compromise which would, for better or for worse, have rallied together a unanimous compromise, opening up the crisis which some people want, but the consequences of which are impossible to calculate ? A possible minimal compromise would lead us to question the reality of European ambitions, the place and role of the United Kingdom, and many other things. Let us wait and see what happens. (F.R.)