Last week, when the first certificates of the "Academia Diplomatica Europaea" were awarded, (see our bulletin of 3 June, p.5), I gave a short speech which maybe held nothing new for the regular readers of this column, but which sums up several of my views on the Union's common foreign policy (CFSP). Three days later, and the most important, Eneko Landaburu, Director General for external relations at the European Commission, spoke of the same subject at the colloquium of the association "European realities of the present". This is what I said:
"I have come to the conclusion that diplomacy (in its broadest sense) will have a central and growing role in the development of CFSP. I don't believe in stellar progress in this policy, and I especially don't believe in the miraculous virtues of majority voting in this field. I believe instead in slow, gradual diplomatic advancement.
"I am well aware that generous spirits recommend moving immediately to majority voting. But I would rather refer to two of Europe's leading lights. Jacques Delors doubted the appropriateness of even talking of a common foreign policy for now, in terms of common positions, and possibly actions, on specific issues on which agreement has been reached. In his 'Memoirs' he wrote (unofficial translation): our countries "have their traditions, their geopolitical history, privileged relations in certain parts of the world; how can we ask them to abandon all this for an artificial merger into a common foreign policy?" For his part, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was fully involved with the Convention when the Iraq crisis broke out. Unlike those I would describe as "superficial enthusiasts", he did not feel at all that the differences of opinion between the Member States on Iraq mitigated in support of majority voting on CFSP. Quite the contrary, he explained that if majority voting had already existed, the European Union would have fallen to pieces. In a hypothetical vote for or against attacks on Iraq, who would imagine that France and Germany would have gracefully agreed to support the war if their position had been a minority one? Or that the United Kingdom, Poland, Mr Aznar's Spain and Mr Berlusconi's Italy would have agreed not to support the US? Let's be realistic!
"Here, then, is what will be the nature of CFSP for a number of years: getting used to talking together, having the 'European reflex' of looking into problems together, preparing common positions where an agreement is forming, deciding on 'common actions' where possible, possibly with the involvement of just some Member States. This, firstly, is the job of diplomats and those familiar with the history, traditions, mindsets of the people, the situation on the ground, and who are aware of how interests may differ. This, at first sight, is hardly an ambitious goal, but it is the basis of all else: understanding what's at stake strategically, and the historical reasons for the different attitudes. A master of diplomacy in the person of Viscount Etienne Davignon, told me one day that after a careful reading of the famous 'letter of the Eight" (in support of the American position in Iraq) and the reaction of the countries of 'old Europe', he concluded that any young diplomat could easily have made a joint text of the two, because the two apparently diametrically opposed basic positions were in fact very similar! Support for the Atlantic Alliance, Europe's autonomy of judgement in full respect of the alliance, and so on. Mr Davignon might have been a bit optimistic in saying that any young diplomat could have put together a joint text: he, the Viscount, could have; and the European diplomacy of tomorrow could do so too".
Eneko Landaburu's moderate and reasonable optimism
Let's move on to the main thing now, to what the Director General of External Relations of the Commission said to the colloquium of "European Realities of the Present". He feels that despite the gaps and the difficulties which have filled the papers in recent years, CFSP (common foreign and security policy) and ESDP (European security and defence policy) have made progress, and that the Constitution will offer genuine possibilities for future progress. But this consolidation has its limits, notably the requirement for unanimity and the intergovernmental nature of the exercise.
His first point was that Europe's identity is consolidating itself to the outside world. Mr Landaburu referred, for example, to preparations for the final resolution of the recent EU/Latin America Summit in Guadalajara: it was the European Commission speaking on behalf of the 25. And when Europe speaks with one voice,
it makes its weight felt and its voice heard. "I didn't realise to what extent, Europe's identity is recognised in the world". In Guadalajara, the Union asked for the text to be included, as part of the partnership's objectives, the demand that Latin American countries progress on the path to social cohesion and regional co-operation; and it obtained it, due to Europe having spoken with one voice.
Limits to ambitions. Second observation: we should not, all the same, believe that Europe is ripe and ready for a common foreign policy, because ambitions of Member States are different and governments are "extremely cool" about it. During the Iraqi crisis, the EU continued to actively set about its external relations but between them but heads of government wanted to talk about everything except Iraq (Russia, Middle East, Pakistan etc.). Where's the progress? In the fact that in the CFSP framework, Member States are beginning at different levels to tackle all the different subjects. Seeking common positions is now permanent. It's being talked about And starting something is essential, as is working together. The three main directions on which CFSP is working have come about by themselves: a) the Balkans: he EU has to take the leadership of this zone and it is doing so; b) neighbourhood policy: whether it is in the East, Ukraine and the list of other countries included in the Commission document on this subject, or even in the Mediterranean, the EU must never forget that this involves its borders, its territory and providing itself with the means for pursuing this policy; c) relations with the "big partners" , the USA, Russia, China and India.
With regard to Russia, in particular, Mr Landaburu considers that any mention of it joining the EU is nonsense. Russia has no intention of being part of CFSP. It has its own strategic project and wants to pursue it autonomously. The EU has to establish solid relations with this country and create co-operation frameworks, for energy, notably, by defending its interests.
Need for coherency. Other areas of progress involves the co-ordinated use of all available Union instruments: its weight, of course, but also its financial instruments, its co-operation and development policy and essentially, its trade instrument. This calls for coherency in all its policies, coherency that for the moment, is not guaranteed, according to Mr Landaburu. If every European Commissioner wants to play his hand separately, the EU will not have the influence it would like on world affairs: it has to play all its cards at the same time.
The need for coherency incorporates the "internal" Union policies. Landaburu had a striking formula on this subject, "External relations are the external projection of internal policies". One can understand to what extent I agree with this definition. Let's take agriculture: the EU has identified over the years the most important demands of its agriculture and its external policy has to be compatible with these demands. This was certainly not the case (I say this, not Mr Landaburu) in Leon Brittan's period when he promise free trade zones in the whole world. Certainly, the influence between different polices has to be reciprocated: the maintaining of a living and efficient agriculture in Europe which has to determine supply to third countries in this area and at the same time deal with the demands arising in the relationship with third countries (notably with poor countries), which have to be taken into account in the definition of agricultural policy. Coherency is born out of balancing out the different demands.
Prospects arising out of the Constitution. Mr Landaburu considers that the constitutional treaty now opens up the doors in the right direction. The European minister of foreign affairs, who should be operational in around two years, could both ensure coherency (acting in the name of the Council while being a vice president at the Commission at the same time) and visibility of the Union's external policy. the current duality, with Javier Solana on the side of the Council and Chris Patten at the Commission has worked well because "Chris Patten is a gentleman" but objectively, there have been many areas of friction. When Solana is wearing his two different ministerial cap badges (we already know he has been nominated) and he has his various staff consisting of officials from the Commission, the Council and Member States, conditions will exist for "creating ten or fifteen years f European diplomatic culture". This optimistic forecast presupposes that the "Community method" is consolidated and does not slide into the purely inter-governmental method.
While awaiting these developments, the next Commission, in Mr Landaburu's opinion, should set up a horizontal vice president responsible for co-ordinating the initiatives and policies of Commissioner for external relations, development co-operation and trade policy.
And what about Turkey? Mr Landaburu considers that if the EU evolves to an entity of 30 or 35 States, "differentiation" will have to be applied and then the case of Turkey will be presented in a way tat is different compared to today. He believes that "most Turks" agree with European values. A "capacity for vision" is needed and the taking into account of the contribution to peace a Muslim country could make by proving its democratic credentials in practice. (FR)