How much of the draft Constitution on the European defence policy is really in the bag? This may seem an inappropriate or confrontational question, because one way or another, all commentators have written that the main success of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) to date has been the compromise on CFSP, which exceeded the results of the Convention itself. The text initially negotiated between the "three big ones" (France, United Kingdom, Germany), discussed by the IGC at Foreign Minister level in Naples at the end of November, developed under the aegis of the Italian Presidency in early December and submitted to the IGC and Heads of Government level on 12 and 13 December in Brussels, added to the Convention's draft in the field on two essential points: "structured co-operation" (whereby Member States with the greatest military capabilities make the most binding commitments), and the "mutual defence clause", curiously known as "closer co-operation". Despite the Summit's overall failure, this chapter escaped further discussion and is considered an achievement, perhaps the main one, of the Constitution. What exactly is it all about?
Two major changes to the Convention's results. Huber Haenel, who was part of the Convention (where his role was not inconsiderable), and who chairs the French senate's delegation to the French senate, wanted to get to the bottom of this and organised a hearing by Armand De Decker, president of the WEU Assembly. There was a special meeting of the above-mentioned delegation and the Senate's "foreign affairs and defence" committee, which was also attended by French senators who were members of the WEU Assembly, to take stock. Mr Haenel himself had prepared an extremely interesting "communication" on the Constitution's texts on the CFSP. Stating that the compromise from the bilateral France/UK/Germany talks, taken up by the Italian Presidency, contains a few substantial departures from the Convention draft, it underlines the scope and significance of these changes, which relate to aspects for which the "differentiation" between Member States is taken into account (the other aspects- extensions of "Petersberg missions", solidarity clause in case of terrorist attack or disaster, creation of European Armament Agency and implementation of "crisis management" missions- apply, in principle, to all Member States). In this way:
a) launch of "structured co-operation" would not be automatic once the Constitution enters into force, with a protocol indicating the list of participating countries, but it would be subject to a decision by Council ruling by qualified majority, to decide on the list of countries. Future involvement would be decided by majority by participating countries. According to Mr Haenel, "the text has been drafted in such a way as to give the impression that admission is a matter of entitlement once the State wishing to join structured co-operation has fulfilled the criteria and taken the necessary commitments". These modifications evidently answer the criticism of countries led by Poland (see this column of 24 October), which think the Convention's draft is setting up a closed club, as the unanimity of participating States is required by the draft for new members. Its availability to countries which started off outside "co-operation" is reinforced by the new provision, by providing for negotiations to take place in the presence of all countries of the Union.
Mr Haenel also stresses that the "protocol" on criteria for participation imposes no quantitative commitment, although whilst the Convention was doing its work, "most were thinking of a small percentage of GDP dedicated to defence to take part in structured co-operation". He deduces from this that "one gets the feeling that the IGC was looking mainly to allow each Member State to take part in this structured co-operation, even if it means curtailing its ambitions and means".
b) the "mutual defence clause" has been weakened. This "closer co-operation", writes Mr Haenel, "no longer comes across as co-operation between certain Member States, but as a valid clause for all Member States". To this effect, "the wording is much more binding", in three ways: -if a Member State is attacked, the others "owe it their help and assistance", rather than "give it their help and assistance"; -military means are no longer explicitly referred to as an element of this help and assistance; -"the specific nature of the security and defence policy of certain Member States" is unaffected. Mr Haenel's conclusion is that, in the IGC's text, "the mutual defence clause appears more like a petition of principle, and can no longer be seen as a substitute for the
WEU mutual defence clause".
An inefficient alternative text. This is not all. Mr Haenel points out that four Member States- Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden- have submitted an alternative draft of the mutual defence clause, and recalls the text (our translation): "Should a Member State be the victim of armed aggression, it may call upon the other Member States to provide help and assistance by all the means in their power, military and otherwise". The obligation of assistance goes out, and Mr Haenel comments: "this text has no real scope, nor any value, as it is hard to see what, in the absence of any text, would stop a Member State under attack from asking for the help of the other Member States". It is true that this counter-draft has not even been discussed by the IGC at high level, but according to the French senator "with the current state of play of the IGC's work, it is not certain that the four States behind this proposal have effectively rallied to the Presidency compromise and abandoned the idea of pushing their own text forward".
This is an important point, which needs to be cleared up by the Irish Presidency in the report it will present to the March Summit on the state of play of the IGC's work, and prospects for agreement.
"Erosion"? Mr Haenel draws the following general conclusion: "For structured co-operation as well as the mutual defence clause, during the IGC's negotiations, there was a certain 'erosion' taking place, to promote the involvement of all Member States, which ruled out the very option of a voluntary and ambition defence vanguard within the framework of the Treaty". The French senator also pointed out the general rule that "there is agreement on nothing until there is agreement on everything".
We can see that Mr Haenel's description is unlike that which prevailed in the first half of December, when agreement on the "defence" chapter of the Constitution was generally put forward as an extremely positive result towards a European defence policy. I will summarise the meeting in the French senate, and the impressions of its president, before getting the possible reactions of other players to this dossier, starting with Michel Barnier (who chaired the Convention's "defence" working group) and by the Irish Presidency of the IGC (which is to indicate whether it considers the "Italian text" to be a sure thing, or if the alternative text of the Four, of which Ireland is one, is still in contention). The reading will, of course, be kept abreast of these reactions.
Other aspects. In the French senate, other aspects of this chapter were discussed during the debate which followed Mr Haenel's presentation. The President of the WEU Assembly, Armand De Decker, tried to eliminate criticism of "the four countries calling for neutrality (...) Let us not criticise neutral countries! Sweden is a model for peacekeeping missions. I feel our mutual comprehension is compromised by the use of vocabulary dating back to the Cold War". Some senators expressed puzzlement at the little stability in "structured co-operation", given that States can join it and leave. Mr Haenel, who took part in the Convention's work, reassured them on this point, stating that the get-out clause "is mainly a political symbol (...) it is an answer to sovereignists and Eurosceptics, by showing them that Europe is not a prison".
A "Community" agency. The communication by senator Serge Vinçon on the creation of a European Armament Agency traces the history of this dossier and the co-operation instruments already in existence, stressing that the fragmentation of the European armaments market (included in the Treaty, because it practically excludes this sector from common market rules) "is an obstacle to productivity and damages the defence potential in a context of budgetary restrictions". In his view, the provisions included in the draft Constitution do not add much to the existing instruments (which, incidentally, work like clockwork); their great merit "resides in the inclusion of the new structure within the Union". The Thessaloniki European Council (June 2003) launched the process of the Agency's creation, which is not tied to approval of the Constitution, and defined the role of this Agency in fairly precise and operational terms. In mid-November, Council reached agreement not only on the role of the Agency (which was already described by the Summit), but also on its organisation. It was designed to be open to all Member States, and the responsible bodies come under the institutional wing of the Union (General Affairs/External Relations Council). Mr Vinçon highlighted future issues, notably criteria for the choice of armaments (the "peace criterion" as sole criterion would benefits the Americans),and the extension of the Agency's role: it should "favour common acquisitions" rather than just identify needs (see EUROPE of 30 January, p.7, on the Briton Nick Witney's choices to set up the Agency).
WEU positions. I have yet to discuss the last part of this Parisian meeting: the WEU positions, voiced by the President of its Assembly, Armand De Decker. I'll save this for tomorrow.
(F.R.)