A few points will remain open. In a couple of hours we should see the release of the Italian Presidency's compromise on Europe's constitution, and, like me, you can understand the expectations over its possible content. The Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi met several Heads of Government to obtain their opinions, and as foreseen, it was in Warsaw that he faced the greatest opposition towards an aspect of the plan to emerge from the Convention: that of the majority voting procedure within the Council (see yesterday's bulletin, p. 4). The meeting on the same subject with Jose Maria Aznar is only scheduled for 4 December. Resultantly, the Conclave at the end of the week in Naples between the Ministers for Foreign Affaires will not aim to smooth out all the differences: it will leave open a few issues (four at most, according to Italian sources) that can only be resolved at Head of State or Government level, on 12 December in Brussels.
Commission, eternal doubt. The Italian compromise will include a considerable number of technical modifications and improvements, aimed at clearing the way for most of the amendments put forward by the member states without changing the substance of the present plan. There will also be an effort for compromise over a few politically sensitive points, such as the definition of the role and institutional position of the future European Minister for Foreign Affaires: the aim is to resolve this point in Naples. As for the composition of the Commission, much is being said over the possibility of Italy suggesting that each member state has at least one Commissioner, though with two Commissioners for Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain and Poland. This would be an attempt to appease fears felt by the large countries, which criticise their low level of representation within this institution, a key element to the institutional balance. In fact, if we resign ourselves to soon reaching the figure of 27 Commissioner and to then move to around thirty, it is not five or six more that will make a difference. Though, is this near unlimited extension of its composition compatible with the Commission's nature, duties and effectiveness?
Defence Europe will take place, but within or without the EU? Concerning the equally fundamental dossier of Defence, the hypothesis of renouncing the 'common defence clause' (in the case of external aggression) seems to be winning ground, as a bargaining chip for crucial progress in other aspects of this chapter, notably that of structured cooperation. I gladly recognise that structured cooperation represents the cornerstone of the whole enterprise, the sole concrete element that is able to provide credibility to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Nevertheless I wonder if a true European constitution can live without a common defence clause. It would have no immediate concrete meaning and would not be operational for some time, but should, in my opinion, necessarily form part of a true Union of states and peoples'. Those who are reticent say: Europe will change nature. However this is precisely what is sought! I use Michel Barnier's formula: 'the stake is to know if defence Europe occurs within or without the Union' (unofficial translation). This brings me back to noting that a group of countries will build it anyway, in the EU if possible, or, if necessary, on the sidelines.
The true stake. The remark made by the European Commissioner for institutional reform nevertheless exceeds the field of defence to cover the entire constitution. Mr Barnier feels (see his interview last Saturday with Baudouin Bollaert in 'Le Figaro') that Germany, France and the three Benelux countries, Italy and Greece will defend this current project to the bitter end. Specifically they will defend the creation of a right to maintain margins of flexibility enabling countries, which wish to build a powerful Europe, to move forward. If we end this flexibility the pressure to build a Europe outside the Community institutions, formed of only a few countries, would necessarily increase. The result would be a new division in Europe, between the economic Europe with its large market and the political Europe formed of a few. I continue to believe that this can be avoided. This is the true stake of the IGC.
The Convention President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, underlined his belief (during his speech before the Montaigne institute in Paris) that the IGC must truly avoid seeking a compromise satisfying the marginal dissenters. The twenty or twenty two countries that support this present project, in the absence of unanimity, should solemnly proclaim their agreement and leave the naysayers to ponder. For lack of this, a constituent group formed of the six founding countries, plus two or three additional partners would form. VGE does not favour this, but recalls that the previous IGCs all more or less failed; the present IGC will also fail if it is not based on the Convention's results, leading to a democratic process which, in his opinion, it would be unthinkable to ignore. (F.R.)